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And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
-T.S. Eliot'
Privatization has been the source of growing global exhilaration. By
the early 1990s, "at least eighty-three countries were conducting some sig-
nificant form of privatization,"2 prompting commentators to describe the
world-wide movement as "profound"3 and "unprecedented"4-an "eco-
nomic revolution."5 Policymakers throughout the developing world have
embraced privatization as the means to efficiency and productivity,6 lower
* Associate Professor, Duke University School of Law. I would like to thank Bruce
Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Guyora Binder, Lea Brilmayer, Richard Buxbaum, Owen Fiss,
Henry Hansmann, Donald Horowitz, Paul Kahn, Robert Kaufman, Harold Koh, Marco
Lau, Ed McCaffrey, Jed Rubenfeld, Heloise Segal, Jacob Sun, Joseph Weiler, and Stephen
Zamora for their invaluable suggestions.
1. T.S. Eliot, Little Gidding, in The Complete Poems and Plays 1909-1950, at 138, 145
(1971).
2. Anna Gelpem & Malcolm Harrison, Ideology, Practice, and Performance in
Privatization: A Case Study of Argentina, 33 Harv. Int'l LJ. 240, 240 (1992) (citing Helen
Nankani, Techniques of Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises, 1 World Bank Technical
Paper 89 (1988)).
3. Carlos E. Martinez, Early Lessons of Latin American Privatizations, 15 Suffolk
Transnat'l LJ. 468, 468 (1992).
4. RebeccaJ. Hanson, The Legal Framework for Privatization in Hungary, 23 Law &
Pol'y Int'l Bus. 441, 441 (1992).
5. Jos6 Pifiera & William Glade, Privatization in Chile, in Privatization of Public
Enterprises in Latin America 19, 19 (William Glade ed., 1991) [hereinafter Privatization of
Public Enterprises in Latin America]; see Robert A. Packenham, Freedom and
Development in Latin America, 155 World Aff., Summer 1992, at 3.
6. See, e.g., Christopher Adam et al., Adjusting Privatization: Case Studies from
Developing Countries 116-17, 163, 311 (1992) (discussing privatization aims ofJamaican
and Sri Lankan governments); Oscar H. Vera Ferrer, The Political Economy of
Privatization in Mexico, in Privatization of Public Enterprises in Latin America, supra note
5, at 35, 49 (discussing privatization goals of Mexican government).
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prices,7 economic development and modernization,8 democracy,9 equal-
ity,' 0 justice,11 maximization of social welfare, 12 and the elimination of
social evils.' 3
According to former Argentine economics minister, Rogelio
Frigerio, the influx of private capital, particularly foreign capital, "will al-
low us to increase production, the sole goal of any economic system.
Greater production means more work and better salaries, full employ-
ment, an improved standard of living, that is to say, a solution to the
social problem, both for the urban population and for the rural popula-
tion."14 Minister Frigerio's claims are notable because they describe not
the privatization initiatives of the 1990s but rather those of the 1950s.
This earlier "solution to the social problem" was followed by a return to
statist economic policies in the 1960s, a renewed commitment to free en-
terprise, a swing back to nationalization in the 1970s, and only then by
the latest round of Argentinian privatizations. 15
The same grand promises, moreover, are invariably made by those
championing nationalization policies. When the government of India
called for the "optimisation of petroleum production,"16 and "develop-
ment, modernisation and expansion,"' 7 the call was not for privatization,
but for nationalization. Similarly, in 1935 President Lfizaro Clrdenas of
7. See, e.g., William Glade, The Contexts of Privatization, in Privatization of Public
Enterprises in Latin America, supra note 5, at 1, 2 ("Governments have also felt the need
to get the parastatal sector in hand so that ... they may arrest inflation ....").
8. See, e.g., Mary M. Shirley, The What, Why, and How of Privatization: A World
Bank Perspective, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S23, S24 (1992) (noting that privatization in Mexico
is expected to free public resources for paving roads, "potable water, sewerage, hospitals,
and education to the poor").
9. See, e.g., Adam et al., supra note 6, at 128-29 (noting that formerJamaican Prime
Minister, Edward Seaga, sought to "democratize" through privatization).
10. See, e.g., id. at 214, 226-27 (noting that in Malaysia improvement of economic
balance between races was a goal to be pursued through privatization).
11. In making the case for privatization, Mexico's former President, Carlos Salinas de
Gortari, stated in his November 1989 State of the Union address: "[T]he focal point of
state reform is to ... resolve the dilemma between property to be managed orjustice to be
dispensed, between a more proprietary state or a more just state." Glade, supra note 7, at
17.
12. "The reality is that in Mexico a larger state has resulted in less capacity to respond
to the social demands of our fellow citizens .... The size of the state was growing while the
well-being of the people was deteriorating." Carlos Salinas de Gortari, First State of the
Union Address (Nov. 1, 1989), quoted in Vera Ferrer, supra note 6, at 56.
13. See President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Address at Port Authority of New York &
NewJersey (Oct. 1, 1990), cited in Martinez, supra note 3, at 479 n.24 ("vender los bienes
para eliminar los males").
14. Rogelio Frigerio, La Reforma Agraria, in El Problema Agrario Argentino 137, 156
(Arturo Frondizi ed., 1965).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 164-173.
16. 2 Nguyen Huu-Tru, Les nationalisations dans quelques pays d'Asie de tradition
britannique: Inde - Sri Lanca - Birmanie 175 (1984) (reprinting speech by Indian Minister
of Petroleum, K.D. Malaviya, during Parliamentary debates, Jan. 16, 1976).
17. Id. at 252.
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Mexico predicted that nationalization would bring "justice for the
worker"18 and the "conver[sion of] Mexico from a poor country to a rich
and prosperous nation."19 But Cfrdenas's nationalizations of the 1930s
were followed by a privatization campaign in the 1940s and 1950s, then by
renationalization, and now by the current Mexican privatization program
that has received so much attention.20
The point is not that privatization, like nationalization, will fail to
cure all social evils. All serious commentary acknowledges that. The
point is more fundamental.
In the midst of a global privatization movement, and against the
backdrop of the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the temptation is to
regard the dismantling of the corporatist state as the culmination of a
world-historical learning process. Privatization, according to the former
prime minister of Jamaica, is "'irreversible . . .no power on earth can
change it.'"21 Or in the words of a World Bank official: "The present
interest in privatization is no fad.... Lessons have been learned .... and
today's strategies reflect these lessons."22
This Article challenges the prevailing assessment of the historical
"lessons" of privatization. Whatever may be true of Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union, the historical record does not support the no-
tion that in the developing world privatization is "irreversible." Through
the examination of two developing regions, Latin America and Southeast
Asia, I identify in Part I a profound problem in the privatization field that
has been ignored despite the voluminous literature.23 Today's privatiza-
tions by no means represent the first effort to pursue free-market eco-
nomic policies in Latin America and Southeast Asia. On the contrary,
with few exceptions, 24 the countries of both these regions-despite all
the differences among them-have been cycling back and forth between
privatization and nationalization for as long as they have been
independent.
18. Interview with President CGrdenas (Apr. 13, 1935), quoted in Alfredo B. Cuellar,
Expropiaci6n y Crisis en Mexico 319 (1940).
19. Paul E. Sigmund, Multinationals in Latin America: The Politics of Nationalization
59 (1980) (quoting compulsory textbooks used in all Mexican schools following
nationalization of oil companies by President Izaro CArdenas).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 58-141.
21. Adam et al., supra note 6, at 56 (quoting former Prime Minister, Edward Seaga,
on the privatization of a Jamaican national bank).
22. Shirley, supra note 8, at S31-S32.
23. See, e.g., Adam et al., supra note 6; Roman Frydman & Andrzej Rapaczynski,
Privatization in Eastern Europe: Is the State Withering Away? (1994); E.S. Savas,
Privatization: The Key to Better Government (1987); Gelpern & Harrison, supra note 2;
Alan S. Gutterman, Japanese Securities Markets: The Impact of Privatization and
Deregulation of Japan's Public Enterprises, 12 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 589 (1991); Shirley,
supra note 8; Book Note, A "Four Warning," 107 Harv. L. Rev. 2105 (1994) (reviewing A
Fourth Way? Privatization, Property, and the Emergence of New Market Economics
(Gregory S. Alexander & Grazyna Sktapska eds., 1994)).
24. See infra notes 383, 582.
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In Part II, I analyze the causes of this cyclicality, seeking to show that
the cycle is determined by political and cultural as well as economic fac-
tors. After examining several alternative explanations, I propose a more
comprehensive model that explains the privatization-nationalization cycle
in light of the explosive role that nationalism plays in the developing
world. The model addresses nationalism directed not only at Western (or
other "imperialist") foreigners but also, equally significantly, at certain
groups within a nation, typically identified ethnically, whom I call "for-
eigners within."
The argument in Part II is based on three principal claims. First, the
postcolonial nations of the developing world are deeply divided along
ethnic and economic lines. Second, free-market policies in these coun-
tries have historically resulted in the disproportionate prosperity of par-
ticular, ethnically identifiable groups. Third, on behalf of the disadvan-
taged majorities, ethnically charged-and therefore extremely potent-
nationalist movements have repeatedly succeeded in overturning regimes
championing private enterprise. The privatization-nationalization cycle
cannot be understood without recognizing this fundamental tension be-
tween the forces of the marketplace and the forces of ethnic division.
Finally, in Part III, I discuss possible responses to the privatization-
nationalization cycle. Signs are already observable in many of today's
privatizing countries (including those of Eastern Europe) 25 of the same
conditions that in the past led to nationalizations after previous periods
of privatization. I suggest that breaking out of the privatization-nationali-
zation cycle may require fundamental political and social innovations that
go far beyond the narrow economic focus of today's privatizers.
American lawyers and academics today are being called upon to de-
sign and to implement legal institutions for the developing world on a
scale unprecedented since decolonization. Thus far, those responding to
this challenge have essentially addressed two questions: First, what is the
most efficient end-state of any given privatized economy? Second, what
are the best transition mechanisms needed to get there? And yet if the
current efforts and opportunities are not to be squandered, a third prob-
lem must also be confronted: How can today's privatization programs be
designed to avoid a swing back to nationalization tomorrow?
I. HisTOr.CAL RECORD
In this Part, I describe the repeated oscillation between privatization
and nationalization that marks the postcolonial history of Latin America
and Southeast Aia. By "privatization" I refer to the transfer of ownership
or control of assets from the public to the private sector.26 By "nationali-
25. See infra text accompanying notes 577-581.
26. For the purposes of this Article, transferring "control" of assets to the private
sector includes the granting by a state of concessions, franchises, leases, and management
contracts to the private sector. See Adam et al., supra note 6, at 6-7.
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zation" I refer to the transfer of ownership or control of assets from the
private sector to the government.2 7
A. Latin America
The colonial peoples of Latin America achieved independence from
Spain and Portugal in a series of revolutions during the first half of the
nineteenth century.28 Following a period of political turbulence that in-
cluded efforts at monarchical rule, most of the modem nation-states of
Central and South America took their present shape by about 1880.29
While political and economic conditions varied from country to country,
in every case the newly emergent national governments embraced the
institutions of late nineteenth-century economic liberalism: private prop-
erty regimes generally accompanied by laissez-faire policies on wealth dis-
tribution and the vigorous promotion of capital investment.30
Again with considerable variation in the form and pace of change,
these regimes were typically followed by a new burst of revolutionary ac-
tivity that gave rise to the first Latin American nationalization programs.
These programs themselves surrendered to a new phase of privatization
and free enterprise, which was in turn succeeded by another series of
nationalization programs. In many Latin American countries, the cur-
rent round of privatizations is the fifth phase of a privatization-nationali-
zation cycle. The postcolonial history of Mexico, whose current privatiza-
tion program is considered among the most ambitious and successful in
27. Actual transfer of ownership or control of assets is not the only measure a state
may take to broaden the scope of private or public sector activity. For example, a
privatizing regime will often (but not always) abolish price and import controls, deregulate
factor markets, and ease domestic and foreign capital restrictions; similarly, a nationalizing
regime will often (but not always) reregulate industry, restrict capital flows, and create new
state-owned enterprises such as public utilities or transportation projects. See, e.g., Adam
et al., supra note 6, at 6-7, 215-19; Paul Cook & Colin Kirkpatrick, Privatisation in Less
Developed Countries: An Overview, in Privatisation in Less Developed Countries 3, 3-4
(Paul Cook & Colin Kirkpatrick eds., 1988). Undoubtedly such measures could have been
included in a looser definition of "privatization" and "nationalization" (respectively), but,
following the more rigorous studies, see, e.g., Adam et al., supra note 6, at 6-7, I adhere to
the stricter definitions given in the text. Although this narrower focus carries some danger
of arbitrariness (the presence or absence of systematic regulatory measures could be more
important in a given case than isolated acts of nationalization or privatization), I believe
the danger is more apparent than real. Actual privatizations and nationalizations (as
defined) are the extreme, nodal points in the economic oscillations characteristic of
postcolonial Latin America and Southeast Asia. They offer the most useful frames of
reference in observing the cyclical shifts between private and state control that I intend to
establish here. In any event, in the discussion that follows, I take note of the presence or
absence of alternative economic measures where pertinent.
28. See Ronaldo Munck, Latin America: The Transition to Democracy 25 (1989).
29. See generally David Bushnell & Neill Macaulay, The Emergence of Latin America
in the Nineteenth Century (1988) (discussing social, economic, and political development
of Latin America in the 19th century).
30. See id. at 192-248; Munck, supra note 28, at 25-26.
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Latin America,3' is representative of this pattern.
1. Mexico.
(a) Postcolonial Laissez Faire (1867-1910). - Although Mexico
achieved independence from Spain in 1821,32 historians generally
agree that 1867-the year French intervention ended and Archduke
Maximilian of Hapsburg, whom Napoleon had made King of Mexico, was
executed in Queretaro-marks the birth of modern Mexico.33 The new
state, however, was highly disaggregated. The majority of Mexico's in-
habitants at the time were uneducated peasants, who lived in isolated
communities and spoke a wide range of dialects. At the same time, the
nation's wealth was concentrated in the hands of a few thousand large
landowners, typically criollos (Mexican-born Spaniards).34
The economy was in a deplorable state. Mining, colonial Mexico's
most dynamic industry, had never recovered from the destruction and
chaos of the wars of independence.3 5 The federal government was bank-
rupt, trade was sluggish, and foreign creditors were demanding full repay-
ment of Mexico's debts.3 6 Because of the country's political instability,
"[i] t was virtually impossible to secure sorely needed infusions" of private
capital, particularly from abroad 3 7
This era was dominated by the administration of Porfirio Diaz
(1876-1880, 1884-1911). Diaz aggressively promoted private enterprise,
a policy particularly welcomed by the hacendados, his wealthy landowning
supporters.38 Although Diaz called for "absolute respect for private prop-
erty,"39 he simultaneously ordered accelerated expropriation of land
owned communally by Indian peasants "on the ground that their prop-
erty titles were not clear."40 The property thus appropriated was then
31. See, e.g., Shirley, supra note 8, at S28.
32. For general histories of Mexico see, for example, Michael C. Meyer & William L.
Sherman, The Course of Mexican History (1979) and Robert R. Miller, Mexico: A History
(1985).
33. See, e.g., Preface to Modernization and Revolution in Mexico: A Comparative
Approach, at vii (Omar Martfnex Legorreta ed., 1989) [hereinafter Legorreta].
34. See Lorenzo Meyer, The Political Modernization of Mexico (1867-1940), in
Legorreta, supra note 33, at 27, 29; Miller, supra note 32, at 117.
35. See Fernando H. Cardoso & Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin
America 40 (Marjory M. Urguidi trans., 1978); Meyer & Sherman, supra note 32, at 432.
36. See Bushnell & Macaulay, supra note 29, at 200; Friedrich Katz, The Liberal
Republic and the Porfiriato, 1867-1910, in Mexico Since Independence 49, 51 (Leslie
Bethell ed., 1991); Meyer & Sherman, supra note 32, at 432.
37. Meyer & Sherman, supra note 32, at 432.
38. See Katz, supra note 36, at 67.
39. Luis Gonzilez, The Cultural Modernization of Mexico (1857-1958), in Legorreta,
supra note 33, at 66, 71.
40. Cardoso & Faletto, supra note 35, at 106; see Katz, supra note 36, at 94-95. The
chief legal basis for Diaz's expropriations was the Ley Lerdo, a law which, as early as 1856,
had authorized the Liberals to "launch[ ] an all out assault" on land held communally by
peasants and by the Catholic church. See id. at 49, 95. Such "conversion" of communal
properties into private holdings "in the name of liberal ideologies" occurred not just in
Mexico but in all the "highland republics"; by the turn of the century, "practically every
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"sold cheaply" to private landowners, "politicians[,] and foreign specula-
tors," all of whom profited tremendously during this period.
41
The chief source of Mexico's growth during the Porfiriato was the
foreign investment that Diaz courted with the promise of "definite and
generous returns," tax exemptions, and protection in the courts.4 2 "Be-
tween 1900 and 1910 the flow of foreign investment into Mexico assumed
torrential proportions." 43 By 1911, "three-quarters of the mines be-
longed to foreigners,"44 and the railway, banking, electricity, and oil in-
dustries-the heart of Mexico's modem economy-were all in the hands
of foreign investors. 45 Moreover, apart from their land, the wealth of
Mexico's ruling elites derived above all from their "role as intermediaries
for foreign companies." 46 Socially and artistically, too, "there was a 'Euro-
peanization' movement visible throughout the republic"; meanwhile, the
Indians were "downgraded racially" in accordance with the "Survival of
the Fittest" doctrine embraced by Diaz's cientifico advisors. 47
In many ways Mexico's first extended liaison with private capital was
an unprecedented success. Between 1877 and 1910, the country's gross
domestic product more than tripled in real terms.48 The growing na-
tional wealth created demands for massive transportation and public util-
ity projects. 49 Ports were modernized, and a genuine banking system was
developed.50 Together with the revitalization of mining, "there was some
industrial development: lead and copper foundries, an iron and steel
plant in Monterrey, cotton and woolen textile factories, food products,
and so forth."51
The industrial sector, however, could not meet growing domestic de-
mand, and Mexico became increasingly dependent on imports, princi-
pally from the United States.52 More important, the urban and industrial
acre of high-quality land in Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia was part of a
white man's or mestizo's hacienda." Marvin Harris, Patterns of Race in the Americas 22
(1964).
41. Cardoso & Faletto, supra note 35, at 106.
42. Miller, supra note 32, at 267; see Berta Ulloa, Conflict Threatening Mexico's
Sovereignty- The Continuing Crisis (1867-1940), in Legorreta, supra note 33, at 40, 51.
43. Katz, supra note 36, at 109.
44. Cardoso & Faletto, supra note 35, at 105; see also John M. Hart, Revolutionary
Mexico 142-43 (1987) (stating that in 1910, "the Americans dominated the [mining]
industry").
45. See Hart, supra note 44, at 140-41; Meyer, supra note 34, at 32. By the end of the
Porfiriato, "foreign concerns exercised control over 130 of Mexico's largest 170
enterprises." Hart, supra note 44, at 178.
46. Katz, supra note 36, at 103.
47. Miller, supra note 32, at 263, 266.
48. See Meyer, supra note 34, at 32.
49. See Miller, supra note 32, at 269.
50. See Meyer, supra note 34, at 32.
51. Cardoso & Faletto, supra note 35, at 105; see Fernando Rosenzweig, Foreign
Investments and the Growth of Manufactures in Mexico (1867-1940), in Legorreta, supra
note 33, at 20, 22.
52. See Cardoso & Faletto, supra note 35, at 105.
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progress of the Po7firiato "scarcely touched the majority of the people-
the rural population. '53 Landownership grew highly concentrated: "By
1910 about eight hundred hacendados owned more than 90 percent of the
rural land . . . and less than 3 percent of the agricultural population
owned any land whatever."54 Fittingly, during the 1910 commemoration
of Mexico's one-hundredth anniversary of independence, the poor "were
pushed off of the streets of the capital" so that foreign visitors "would
receive the proper impressions of a prosperous Mexico." 55
(b) The Revolutionary Period (1910-1940). - The Mexican
Revolution began in 1910 and lasted three decades.56 Between 1910 and
1920, war and rebellion laid the country to waste, as haciendas, mines,
factories, and entire villages were destroyed; strikes proliferated; foreign
hatred approached hysteria; and the economy fell into chaos. 57 A new
constitution, ratified in 1917, declared that all property was subject to the
public welfare; affirmed that all water and subsoil riches belonged to the
state; and prohibited foreigners from owning land or obtaining conces-
sions unless they waived protection of their governments. 58
The election of General Ldzaro Crdenas to the presidency in 1934
was in many ways the culmination of the revolutionary process. Cfirdenas
glorified Mexico's Indian past and longed for a "society in which indige-
nous communalist values curbed the excesses of individualistic capital-
ism."59 He conducted sweeping land reform, and during his six-year
term virtually eliminated the hacienda.60 In the cities, Cirdenas estab-
lished the Mexican Workers Federation ("CTM"), which united the ex-
isting unions and brought together many laborers who were not organ-
ized at all. Backed fully by the state, the CTM embarked on a series of
strategic strikes intended to improve the conditions of the working
class.61 A strike against the Mexican Light and Motive Power Company in
1936 became the first victory of the CTM against a foreign enterprise;
53. Miller, supra note 32, at 271; see Hart, supra note 44, at 174-75.
54. Miller, supra note 32, at 272.
55. Meyer & Sherman, supra note 32, at 496; see Miller, supra note 32, at 282.
56. A great deal has been written about the causes and significance of the Mexican
revolutionary process, which, according to many commentators, was not a single revolution
but numerous regional revolutions that occurred more or less simultaneously, see, e.g.,
James D. Cockroft, Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1913, at 5
(1968), and that reflected "very different, even contradictory, objectives." Jean Meyer,
Revolution and Reconstruction in the 1920s, in Mexico Since Independence, supra note
36, at 201, 201.
57. See Hart, supra note 44, at 252-54; Miller supra note 32, at 283-85, 292-95.
58. See Miller, supra note 32, at 306.
59. Fredrick B. Pike, The United States and Latin America: Myths and Stereotypes of
Civilization and Nature 272 (1992).
60. See Meyer, supra note 34, at 36-37. Along with land, CArdenas "handed over
arms to the peasants, uniting them in the first real national agrarian organization." Id. at
37.
61. See Mois~s Gonzilez Navarro, The Social Transformation of Mexico (1867-1940),
in Legorreta, supra note 33, at 1, 12-13.
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numerous other victories followed. 62
A year later, in order to ensure Mexican control over the nation's
railroads, "and to remove the threat of interference in their management
by [British and North American] railroad bondholders," Cirdenas na-
tionalized Mexico's railway system and placed management in the hands
of the railroad union. 63 More dramatically, decrying the "innumerable
outrages [and] abuses" by foreign oil companies that pursued "private,
selfish, and often illegal interests" while relegating Mexicans to "misery,
drabness, and insalubrity,"6 4 cGrdenas, in a nationwide radio broadcast,
announced his intention to nationalize the entire oil industry.6 5 "From
the bishops to the students of the National University, Mexicans rallied to
the national cause.., perhaps a quarter of a million paraded through the
streets of the capital carrying mock coffins inscribed with the names of
the fallen giants [such as] Standard, Huasteca, [and] Aguila."66 The ex-
propriated oil fields and refineries became Petr6leos Mexicanos, or
Pemex, a government-controlled monopoly.
To this day CGrdenas represents the promise of a "Mexico for the
Mexicans." 67 By the end of his administration, the role of foreign capital
had diminished substantially: in 1940 total direct foreign investment in
Mexico was under 500 million dollars, less than one-quarter of most esti-
mates for the 1920s. 6 8 "Of the four areas traditionally dominated by for-
eign capital-railroads, oil, mining, and electric power-foreign control
had been eliminated from the first two. Foreign enterprise still con-
trolled the mining and electric power industries... but even in those
fields the amount of foreign capital had been reduced."
69
CGirdenas's last two years in office brought "severe economic diffi-
culty."70 Several factors-among them, the expropriation of the oil in-
dustry, bitter counterattacks in the press by foreign companies, and retali-
atory economic sanctions against Mexico-prompted the exodus of
domestic as well as foreign investment capital.7 1 Inflation continued to
62. See id. at 13.
63. See Harry K. Wright, Foreign Enterprise in Mexico 67-68 (1971); Gonzilez
Navarro, supra note 61, at 13.
64. Miller, supra note 32, at 320-21 (citing Mexico's Oil, A Compilation of Official
Documents 878-79 (1940)).
65. See Wright, supra note 63, at 70. Whereas nationalization of the railways had
been a possibility for some years, C~rdenas's expropriation of the oil industry came as a
"spectacular" surprise. See Alan Knight, The Rise and Fall of Cardenismo, c. 1930-c. 1946,
in Mexico Since Independence, supra note 36, at 241, 280. For a detailed description of
the events leading up to the expropriation, see id. at 279-84.
66. Knight, supra note 65, at 282.
67. Miller, supra note 32, at 320.
68. See Wright, supra note 63, at 70.
69. Id. Foreign investment in manufacturing actually increased slightly during the
Crdenas era. See id.
70. Meyer & Sherman, supra note 32, at 606.
71. See id. at 606; Wright, supra note 63, at 70.
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be a serious problem.72 Moreover, Pemex, the new national oil company,
was besieged with technical difficulties. 73 "As oil revenues declined, the
national debt rose and confidence in the government lagged."74
In addition, a more profound political disintegration was threaten-
ing the revolutionary program. By 1940, many of the rural poor who, as a
result of Cdrdenas's agrarian reform, were now small landowners, no
longer represented a revolutionary political bloc. 75 The newly strength-
ened labor unions, too, were splintering in pursuit of their various inter-
ests. 76 Meanwhile, Cirdenas faced increasing hostility from "private en-
terprise-above all, the nucleus of the national bourgeoisie based at
Monterrey."77 Thus, bankers and businessmen decried Cirdenas's "fan-
tastic" pro-union policies and denounced the new excess profits tax as
"an example of 'Hitlerite totalitarianism.' "78 With a resurgence of "a
growing aggressive, authoritarian right,"7 9 it became clear that "[t] he rel-
ative national unity created by the revolutionary process was in
jeopardy."80
(c) Post-Revolutionary Privatization (1940-1958). - In 1940, Cfirdenas
stepped down from the presidency. The election of Manuel Avila
Camacho "marked a watershed in Mexico's history." Stressing themes of
national unity, Avila Camacho promptly halted "expropriations of going
concerns" and initiated private enterprise policies that lasted almost
twenty years. 8 1 The main objective of the Mexican government during
this period was to foster industrialization; its emphasis shifted markedly
from nationalistic social reform back to the promotion of private invest-
ment, which increased dramatically in the forties and early fifties.82
Although the greater part of this investment was domestic, the shift to
free-market policies "was accompanied by a change in attitude toward for-
eign capital," beginning with measures by Avila Camacho to settle inter-
national debts inherited from prior administrations in order "to improve
the climate for foreign participation" in the economy.8 3 By the end of
72. Between 1935 and 1940, food prices rose by 49%. See Knight, supra note 65, at
241, 290; Meyer & Sherman, supra note 32, at 606.
73. See Meyer & Sherman, supra note 32, at 606.
74. Id.
75. See Cardoso & Faletto, supra note 35, at 144.
76. See id.
77. Knight, supra note 65, at 273.
78. Id. at 274 (footnote omitted).
79. Id. at 293. The last few years of Cardenismo witnessed "a new nostalgia for the
Porfiriato, evident in the cinemas's [sic] loving evocation of ranchero life." Id. (emphasis
omitted).
80. Cardoso & Faletto, supra note 35, at 144.
81. Miller, supra note 32, at 323, 325; Wright, supra note 63, at 71.
82. See Wright, supra note 63, at 73-76; Vera Ferrer, supra note 6, at 35, 37-38.
83. Wright, supra note 63, at 71; see id. at 73. Pursuant to the Mexican-American
General Agreement signed in 1941, claims of United States citizens against Mexico arising
from land expropriations under Cardenas's agrarian reform programs were settled in full
for $40 million. In addition, procedures were established to settle the debt owed to United
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the Second World War, Mexico was "on exceptionally good terms with
the United States."84
Miguel Alemdn, who succeeded Avila Camacho in 1946, "was deter-
mined to continue and extend the process of import substitution indus-
trialization that had started during the war."8 5 It was AlemS±n's view that
Private enterprise should have complete freedom and be able to
count on support from the state, so long as it acts on behalf of
the general interest.... [T]he state should guarantee the rights
of businessmen to open centers of production and to multiply
the country's industries, confident that their investments will be
safe from the vagaries of injustice.8 6
Seeking to accelerate the rate of industrialization, Alem~n openly invited
foreign capital to participate in Mexico's economic development. Ac-
cording to one commentator, "No Mexican government since Porfirio
Diaz ha[d] welcomed foreign investment so warmly."87 During Alemdn's
administration, direct foreign investment in Mexico rose sharply, from
575 million dollars in 1946 to roughly 730 million dollars by the end of
1952.88
The partial reprivatization of the petroleum industry was one of
Alemln's most controversial initiatives, because the creation of Pemex
had been the centerpiece of Grdenas's nationalization program. Nu-
merous private concerns, including American companies,89 were permit-
ted to drill for and extract petroleum during this period.90 A smaller
"number of contracts were executed with foreign-owned companies for
exploration and production."91 Although the Mexican government con-
tinued to "own" the deposits at issue, the private companies were paid not
in cash but in oil.9
2
States oil companies as a result of the 1938 expropriation of their oil properties. See id. at
71-72.
84. Peter H. Smith, Mexico Since 1946: Dynamics of an Authoritarian Regime, in
Mexico Since Independence, supra note 36, at 321, 337.
85. Id. at 339.
86. Id. (quoting from a speech Alemfin gave before the GTM (footnote omitted)).
87. Wright, supra note 63, at 73. At the same time, Alemfin sought to "strengthen
Mexico's own business class through a variety of protectionist measures" such as import
quotas, tariffs and the devaluation of 1948, which "discouraged Mexican consumers from
purchasing imported goods." Smith, supra note 84, at 321, 340.
88. See Wright, supra note 63, at 76. While directed increasingly at manufacturing
after 1940, foreign private investment in Mexico remained concentrated in core sectors
such as mining, electricity, transport, and communications until the late fifties. See id.
89. "In 1947, Alemfin became the first Mexican president to visit the United States as
head of state. During that visit he... invited American investment capital to participate in
the offshore petroleum explorations of Veracruz and Tabasco." Miller, supra note 32, at
331.
90. See id.; Wright, supra note 63, at 127.
91. Wright, supra note 63, at 127.
92. See Miller, supra note 32, at 331; Wright, supra note 63, at 127. Another example
of Alemfn's private-enterprise policies concerned sulphur mining. Under the constitution
of 1917, the Mexican government owned all "subsoil riches" and had the right to decree
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The 1940s and 1950s were years of dynamic economic growth.9 3
Mexico's nascent industrial development was spurred by World War II,
which cut back the flow of imports from the United States.94 The govern-
ment's protectionist strategy further "stimulat[ed] local manufacturing
and [created] a new cadre of prominent industrialists."95
By the time Adolfo Ruiz Cortines took office in 1952, however,
profitable investment opportunities in the production of domestic goods
were dwindling, and foreign demand for Mexican exports had begun to
decline. 96 In addition, the limitations of Mexico's import substitution
strategy were becoming increasingly apparent. 97 Furthermore, popula-
tion growth in Mexico started to take its toll: by the late fifties large num-
bers of rural poor were migrating to the cities, many to join the ranks of
the urban destitute.98 Although the economy continued generally to
grow under Cortines,99 by 1958 Mexico was due once more for change.
(d) The Road to Renationalization (1958-1983). - Even before taking
office, Adolfo L6pez Mateos (1958-1964) had championed the return to
Mexican control of the national telephone company, Telfonos de Max-
ico.10 0 Shortly after his inauguration, he declared "himself to be 'on the
extreme left within the Constitution.'"101 Loyalty among the peasantry
was strengthened by distributing "approximately 11.4 million hectares of
land to more than 300,000 campesinos, an activist record that placed him
second only to Crdenas."10 2 L6pez Mateos "adopted a similarly populist
posture toward labour, proposing in 1961 a measure to institute profit-
sharing between workers and proprietors."1 03 In addition, he extended
that only state-owned companies could exploit mineral deposits (as Crdenas had in the
case, for example, of most petroleum reserves). Alemfin declined to create a state-owned
enterprise for the mining of the newly lucrative sulphur deposits in the Isthmus of
Tehuantepec; instead he granted production rights to private concerns. See id. at 87-88,
136. By 1964, these private companies were "second only to the United States in sulphur
production." Id. at 88.
93. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 84, at 321, 324. Between 1940 and 1960, gross
domestic product in Mexico grew at an average real rate of 6.4% annually. See id.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. See Wright, supra note 63, at 76.
97. See Smith, supra note 84, at 321,325-36. Thus, although "[pirotectionist policies
helped local industry to displace foreign competition from the consumer market, ... there
was conspicuously less progress in the capital goods sector," and Mexico continued to
import technology and heavy machinery in substantial quantities. Id. at 325 (emphasis
omitted). Another, "and paradoxical, consequence of Mexico's [import substitution]
strategy was widespread unemployment." Id. at 326.
98. See Meyer & Sherman, supra note 32, at 647.
99. See Smith, supra note 84, at 321, 324.
100. See Wright supra note 63, at 80.
101. See Smith, supra note 84, at 321, 353. "The statement was shrewd and
significant. It pre-empted any move on the radical wing of the PRI and isolated the anti-





social security coverage and established numerous welfare programs.' 04
In the petroleum industry, L6pez Mateos closed a number of doors
that his predecessors had opened. A "new petroleum law enacted in 1958
and a 1960 amendment to article 27 of the Constitution terminated ex-
isting concessions and provided that only the nation, through [Pemex],
may operate in the industry."10 5 Although contracts with private persons
were still permitted, "compensation in the form of royalty payments out
of production" was prohibited. 10 6 Moreover, "regulations were issued
limiting foreign participation in [the petrochemical] industry to a minor-
ity role."107 Soon thereafter, the mining industry too was "Mexicanized":
the government passed a new mining law that prohibited the issuing
of new mining concessions to foreigners or to foreign-controlled
companies. 108
L6pez Mateos's most important presidential act "rivaled Cirdenas'
expropriation of the oil industry."10 9 In 1960, touting the slogan, "La
electricidad es nuestra,"110 L6pez Mateos embarked on the nationalization
of all foreign-owned power companies."' Although the Mexican govern-
ment was careful to pay what seemed a fair price for the enterprises, the
nationalizations were nevertheless a "source of great jubilation and pride
on the part of the Mexican people."" 2 Shortly afterwards, the L6pez
Mateos government acquired a controlling interest in the Mexican sub-
sidiaries of Renault and American Motors.113
Despite such populist gestures, and the increased role of the state in
the national economy, L6pez Mateos continued generally "to support the
business sector and to court foreign capital."114 Indeed, during the ad-
ministration of L6pez Mateos, and that of his "competent but un-
glamorous" successor, Gustavo Dfaz Ordaz (1964-1970), direct United
States investment in Mexico actually increased, and the economy contin-
ued its path of strong growth." 5
104. See Miller, supra note 32, at 336-37.
105. Wright, supra note 63, at 127.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 80.
108. See id. at 83.
109. Wright, supra note 63, at 80.
110. "Electricity is ours."
111. See Miller, supra note 32, at 336; Wright, supra note 63, at 80-82.
112. Wright, supra note 63, at 83.
113. See Miller, supra note 32, at 336-37. The government "also purchased
controlling shares in the motion-picture industry from long-resident U.S. millionaire
William Jenkins." Smith, supra note 84, at 353.
114. Smith, supra note 84, at 354. No statutory limits on profit remittances were
imposed; foreign investors were allowed "to repatriate their earnings at a predictable (and
favourable) rate of exchange." Id.
115. Id. at 354, 356; see Wright, supra note 63, at 86. "Unquestionably the most
significant single step taken in the early years" by President Diaz Ordaz "was the
Mexicanization of the sulphur industry." Id. at 87. In 1967 the Mexican government, as
part of a consortium of Mexican investors, acquired a controlling interest in the Pan
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During the troubled administration of Luis Echeverria (1970-1976),
"the role of the state, already large, expanded sharply."116 New laws were
passed to regulate the actions of foreign enterprise. 117 Public spending
poured into housing, education, and other development programs. 18 At
the same time, the government bought out numerous (principally fail-
ing) private companies in the television, telecommunications, and finan-
cial sectors, and it nationalized the entire tobacco industry. 1 9 While spe-
cific estimates vary, sources agree that the total number of state-owned
enterprises rose dramatically during Echeverria's regime, by some ac-
counts from 86 to 740.120
In 1982, following three years of strong, oil-driven economic growth,
the Mexican economy collapsed. Inflation approached 100%, gross do-
mestic product decreased in real terms for the first time in decades, and
total external debt "soared" to 87.6 billion dollars. 12' Jos6 L6pez Portillo
(1976-1982) responded by finding "a perfect scapegoat"; unexpectedly,
"he accused the country's private banks of looting, of greed, and of disloy-
alty for their participation in the flight of Mexican capital in the amount
of $22 billion."122 In September 1982, L6pez Portillo nationalized
Mexico's entire private banking system and established stringent foreign
exchange controls;123 in one commentator's words, "These two govern-
ment actions produced the worst conflict between the private and public
sectors in over fifty years."' 24 Between 1975 and 1982, the share of gross
domestic product, total employment, and gross capital investment attrib-
utable to public enterprises generally increased, reflecting the growing
American Sulphur Company, the last giant in the extractive industries still under foreign
control. See id. By 1968, foreign investment was concentrated almost exclusively in
manufacturing. See id. at 83, 87.
116. Smith, supra note 84, at 371.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See Mexico: A Country Study 75 (James D. Rudolph ed., 3d ed. 1985); Smith,
supra note 84, at 371.
120. See Sol W. Sanders, Mexico: Chaos on our Doorstep 42 (1986); Smith, supra
note 84, at 371.
121. See Vera Ferrer, supra note 6, at 42; see also id. at 43 (citing annual reports from
various years).
122. Meyer & Sherman, supra note 32, at 685.
123. See Miller, supra note 32, at 351-52. Early in his administration, L6pez Portillo
had embraced "a series of economic policies designed to regain the private sector's
confidence," including the relaxation of price controls on basic commodities, tax and
investment concessions, and the reduction of state-owned enterprises. See Kevin J.
Middlebrook, Political Liberalization in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Mexico, in
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America 123, 131 (Guillermo O'Donnell et al.
eds., 1986). However, under L6pez Portillo the total number of public enterprises in
Mexico continued to increase, "albeit more slowly" than between 1972 and 1977. See Vera
Ferrer, supra note 6, at 40.
124. Vera Ferrer, supra note 6, at 43.
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importance of the public sector during that period.1 25 At the same time,
foreign direct investment fell dramatically.126
(e) The Current Privatization Programs (1983 to the present). -
Promptly after taking office in December 1982, President Miguel de la
Madrid (1982-1988) announced an economic restructuring program
"designed to correct the public sector's financial disequilibrium." 27
Although few actual privatizations occurred during 1983 and 1984,128 in
February 1985 de la Madrid announced a more drastic program that
called for "accelerated liberalization of the economy" and the "dis-
incorporation" of numerous state-owned entities.' 29 Between 1983 and
1987, the number of public enterprises fell from 1155 to 889; an addi-
tional 92 privatizations were concluded in 1988.130
Carlos Salinas de Gortari succeeded de la Madrid as president and
carried his predecessor's liberalization and privatization policies much
further. Between 1988 and 1994, the Mexican government sold or closed
down at least 362 state-owned companies.' 5 ' The Mexican government
also announced its intention to privatize Mexico's ports and airports, 32
170 television stations, 3 3 Pemex's secondary petrochemical plants, 3 4 the
state-owned insurance company, several hotels, 3 5 a number of warehous-
ing and natural gas concerns, 3 6 and dozens of cinemas. To date, and
more importantly than the absolute figures, the country's telecommuni-
cations, steel, mining, automotive, pharmaceutical, and financial sectors
are all back in the hands of private investors.1 37
125. See id. at 41 (citing Secretaria de Programaci6n y Presupuesto, Cuentas de
producci6n del sector pfiblico (Mexico City, 1984 and 1987)).
126. See Roberto Newell Garcia & Luis Rubio, Mexico's Dilemma: The Political
Origins of Economic Crisis 294 (1984).
127. Vera Ferrer, supra note 6, at 43.
128. Initially, the plan of the de Ia Madrid administration was not to sell off
government enterprises but simply "to modernize them, to operate them efficiently and
honestly, and to reduce their deficits." Id. at 43-44.
129. Id. at 45-46.
130. See id. at 47. Most of the entities privatized by de la Madrid, however, "were
commissions and trust funds; and in the case of enterprises, the great majority were
relatively small or had low operating levels." Id. at 48.
131. See Damian Fraser, Mexico Puts Last Companies on Sale, Fin. Times, Jan. 20,
1993, at 7.
132. See Kevin G. Hall, Mexico Discovers Difficulties of Privatizing Ports, J. Com.,
Mar. 10, 1993, at 8B; Craig Torres, Mexico Plans to Sell Four Firms as Part of Privatization,
Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1994, at A9.
133. See Kevin G. Hall, TV Privatization in Mexico Opens Doors for Trade, J. Com.,
Apr. 1, 1993, at 10A.
134. See Pemex Poised to Privatize its Petrochemical Plants, J. Com., Feb. 16, 1993, at
9A.
135. See Fraser, supra note 131, at 5.
136. See Charles W. Thurston, Mexico Hopes Privatization Will Yield $5 Billion in '93,
J. Com., Mar. 4, 1993, at IA, 10A.
137. See Final Prospectus of Tel~fonos de Mexico, SAL de C.V. 56-57 (May 11, 1992)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); Charles H. Oppenheim, Mexico Won't Turn
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The latest trend toward privatization in Mexico has once more been
accompanied by a significant increase in foreign participation. The na-
tional telephone company is now partially controlled by affiliates of
Southwestern Bell and the French national telephone company, and its
shares (in the form of American depository receipts) are now widely held
in the United States;138 Pemex, amidst much controversy, is planning to
sell its petrochemical plants to foreign as well as domestic investors; and
foreign participation is being contemplated in the privatization of the
railroad, insurance, television, and numerous other industries.'3 9 In
1993 foreign investment in Mexico totalled 15 billion dollars, 40 percent
over the previous historical high; in the first four months of 1994, it rose
to 5.2 billion dollars, an 89 percent increase over the same period a year
earlier.140 In addition, foreigners, principally from the United States, ac-
count for almost 20 percent of the total capitalization of the Mexican
stock market and for more than half of its total trading volume.' 41
2. Other Latin American Countries. - A number of other Latin Amer-
ican countries follow the Mexican pattern very closely. For example, in
Chile and Peru, two countries with significant participation in the recent
privatization trend,142 the privatization-nationalization cycle is also in
its fifth oscillation. In both countries an extended period of post-
independence economic liberalism' 43 was followed by a phase of nation-
alism and nationalization beginning in the 1930s;144 a return to privatiza-
Back, Wall St.J., Oct. 26, 1993, at B9; Dianna Solis, Prolonged Slide in Silver Prices Comes
as Mexico Seeks Foreign Prospectors, Wall St. J., May 1, 1991, at A12.
138. See Gregory Katz, Promise of Mexico's Phone System Remains Unfulfilled, J.
Com., Mar. 23, 1993, at 12A; Mexico to End Holding in Telmex, Fin. Times, May 6, 1994,
at 30.
139. See Paul Dykewicz, U.S. Insurers Scouting for Partners to Gain Entry to Mexican
Market, J. Com., Aug. 19, 1993, at 10A, Damian Fraser, Mexican Government Changes
Channels, Fin. Times, Mar. 9, 1993, at 19; Kevin G. Hall, Privatization Rumours Surround
Mexican Rail, J. Com., Aug. 11, 1993, at IA, 5A; Hall, supra note 133, at 10A.
140. See Foreign Investment Surges 89% in Mexico, J. Com., May 2, 1994, at 5A;
Kevin G. Hall, Unrest Fails to Deter Investment in Mexico, J. Com., Feb. 7, 1994, at 3A.
141. See Anthony DePalma, Fortunes and Fear in Mexican Stocks, N.Y. Times, Apr.
12, 1993, at Dl.
142. See, e.g., Glade, supra note 7, at 6-7; The Peru Business Report, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 23, 1993, at A15 (advertisement for Peru's "sweeping" privatization program).
143. See, e.g., Magnus M6rner, The Andean Past 135, 164, 187 (1985) (discussing
integration of the Andean countries in Latin America into the world economy); Munck,
supra note 28, at 25 (discussing Chilean economy in the late nineteenth century);
Rosemary Thorp & Geoffrey Bertram, Peru 1890-1977, at 37, 112 (1978) (discussing
Peru's dynamic growth in 1890s).
144. See M6rner, supra note 143, at 199 (discussing "indigenist" brand of nationalism
in Peru). In both Chile and Peru, the nationalism and statism of the thirties and forties
were, by comparison to Mexico, relatively mild. Thus, although the Chilean government
came to dominate the petroleum, nitrate, and finance industries during this period, mixed
private-public enterprises were also encouraged, and "[p]lans to nationalize several
companies were canceled on account of [United States] pressure." Barbara Stallings, Class
Conflict and Economic Development in Chile, 1958-1973, at 31 (1978); see also William P.
Glade, The Latin American Economies 432 (1969) (concluding that "public policy moved
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tion some twenty years later (beginning in 1958 in Chile, and in 1948 in
Peru); 145 another round of nationalization and antiforeign sentiment
commencing in the sixties; 146 and a subsequent return to free-market
policies. 47 Commencing in 1973 in Chile, General Pinochet undertook
"a massive reprivatization program" that returned most of the companies
nationalized during the Allende administration to the private sector.' 48
Peru's latest reprivatization program contemplates the privatization of
220 state-owned entities, including Peru's largest mines and the state oil
falteringly but clearly toward a new synthesis involving substantial economic activity and
direction by the state" during period between 1927 and 1958 in Chile). Similarly in Peru,
although the petroleum sector reverted back to state control between 1930 and 1948, see
Thorp & Bertram, supra note 143, at 166-68, there was a "lack of whole-hearted
commitment to an interventionist policy," id. at 190. See also M6rner, supra note 143, at
194 (concluding that attempts at greater state involvement in Peru in late part of 1930s
"failed miserably").
145. In Chile, with the decline of populism, the regime of Jorge Alessandri
(1958-1964) took significant measures to diminish the role of the state, including
"return[ing] state economic activities to private capital." Cardoso & Faletto, supra note 35,
at 148. Likewise, Peru's "flirtation with nationalistic and interventionist policies having
come to a definitive end in 1948," there followed a twenty-year period of reprivatization
(particularly of oil) and "total integration into the international system." Thorp &
Bertram, supra note 143, at 205, 223; see also M6rner, supra note 143, at 194 (stating that
there was a "return to laissez-faire" in Peru beginning in 1948).
146. In Chile, by the end of Eduardo Fiei's presidency in 1970, the state had
"assumed sole or majority ownership of forty-four companies." Pifiera & Glade, supra note
5, at 20. "[S]tate ownership of corporations peaked" under President Salvador Allende
(1970-1973), who nationalized approximately 250 to 350 private companies. See id. at
20-21.
In Peru, following a military coup in 1968, General Juan Velasco adopted several
"drastic policy measures," including the expropriation, without compensation, of the
International Petroleum Company's holdings and the nationalization of numerous mining
companies, the fishmeal industry, foreign-owned banks, and Peru's huge agro-industrial
sugar complexes. See M6rner, supra note 143, at 225; Julio Coder, The New Mode of
Political Domination in Peru, in The Peruvian Experiment 44, 54 (Abraham F. Lowenthal
ed., 1975); Thorp & Bertram, supra note 143, at 205, 301. "The nationalist stance of the
Junta" dealt "a severe blow" to both the domestic elite and foreign capital. See M6rner,
supra note 143, at 225.
147. General Pinochet, who took over the Chilean government in 1973, championed
the liberalization and "opening of the economy to foreign competition and foreign
investment"; "[p]rivatization was seen as an integral part of this policy package," Pifiera &
Glade, supra note 5, at 21, although he continued the public ownership and management
of the copper sector nationalized under Allende, see id. at 31. In Peru, President
Fernando Belafinde, upon his return to power in 1980, reversed Velasco's policy, calling
for extensive privatization and "outward oriented economic expansion, led by free
enterprise in alliance with foreign interests." M6mer, supra note 143, at 229.
148. Pifiera & Glade, supra note 5, at 21. Although General Pinochet returned over
50 failing entities to government control, Chilean policy remained overwhelmingly pro-
privatization throughout the Pinochet era. See id. at 22.
More recently, however, "[right-wing and pro-privatization candidates Arturo
Alessandri andJos6 Pinera were soundly defeated by ruling party candidate Eduardo Frei,
whom they had painted as a defender of big government and state monopolies." Gustavo
Gonzilez, Latin America: Privatization Fever Cools in 1993, Inter Press Serv., Dec. 22,




Brazil followed roughly the same pattern. During the First Republic
(1889-1930), Brazil's economy became increasingly dominated by
Europeans (chiefly the British) and by domestic coffee growers "who
were intimately linked to the world markets" and who "slavishly copied
European styles, words, customs, and tastes." 150 This period of "subservi-
ence" to foreign culture and capital' 5 1 gave way to the military coup of
1930 and the ascendance of Getfilio Vargas. 152
Declaring his government "profoundly nationalistic," Vargas oversaw
the enactment of a constitutional amendment requiring "the progressive
nationalization of mines, mineral deposits, and waterfalls or other
sources of energy" and of industries "essential to the economic and mili-
tary defense of the country."' 53 With the imposition of the Estado Novo
(New State) in 1937, the Vargas government began consolidating state
control of the shipping, airline, banking, and steel industries. 54
The military overthrew Vargas in 1945, and throughout the next five
years, the "liberal internationalist" government of General Eurico Dutra
"chose to ignore nationalism" and sought to promote development
through private, particularly foreign, enterprise. 155 Vargas's re-election
149. See Alex Emery, Hard Times Persist for Peruvian Mines, Miners, LA. Times
(Orange County ed.), Jan. 19, 1994, at D8; Jane Holligan, Peruvian Telephone Sell-off
Reflects Latin American Trend, UPI, Feb. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI
File; The Peru Business Report, supra note 142, at A15; Peru Privatizations to be
Completed in '95,J. Com., Mar. 25, 1994, at 5A; Peru to Privatize Oil Company, Wall St.J.,
Mar. 30, 1994, at A12.
150. E. Bradford Burns, Nationalism in Brazil 38, 73 (1968).
151. See id. at 62. Beginning in the 1850s, "the state found itself compelled to
counter the reluctance of international capital to invest" in Brazil by granting to foreigners
extremely favorable concessions and rate of return guarantees. Peter Evans, Dependent
Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil 84 (1979).
In addition, Brazil's coffee economy "placed it in the curious position of being an
agricultural country that had to import food. While two-thirds of its total agricultural
output was exported, it had to import," mostly from Great Britain, "large amounts of
beans, rice, and all of the wheat it consumed." Id. at 59.
152. See Evans, supra note 151, at 85. Vargas governed Brazil for close to a
generation, "first as chief of the provisional government (1930-1934), next as
constitutional president elected by Congress (1934-1937), then as dictator (1937-1945),
and finally as constitutional president elected by the people (1951-1954)." E. Bradford
Burns, A History of Brazil 346-47 (3d ed. 1993). A brilliant politician, Vargas was known
as "father of the poor" but managed also to keep the support of the ruling oligarchy, as
well as "large[ ] numbers of the military, industrialists, politicians, and the middle class."
Id. at 356, 370.
153. Burns, supra note 150, at 74, 82 (citations omitted).
154. See Evans, supra note 151, at 87. In 1941 the state steel company Companhia
Siderfirgica Nacional ("CSN") was officially founded. The creation of CSN was primarily a
response to European and North American domination of the steel industry. Thus,
although "CSN was clearly a state enterprise, private Brazilian capital was never excluded."
Id. at 87, 89.
155. Burns, supra note 152, at 388; Evans, supra note 151, at 91. One of Dutra's first
steps "was to open bids to private Brazilian companies for the construction of refineries."
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in 1950, however, represented the triumphal return of nationalist and
statist policies. Under the slogan, "0 petrdleo j nosso!,"156 Vargas created
the state oil monopoly, Petrobr-ds, and a number of other government
enterprises during his second administration. 157 In the early sixties, the
electricity industry was nationalized. 158
Another military coup in 1964 ushered in a brief phase of privatiza-
tion. 159 However, by 1967 economic liberalism had again been discred-
ited,160 and during the next decade "the number of state enterprises in-
creased more rapidly than in any previous era."' 61 The tide turned again
in 1979, and privatization became an explicit policy objective. 162 After
the end of military rule in 1985, PresidentJos6 Sarney called for "signifi-
cant enhancement of the privatization policy in Brazil," because" 'private
initiative is the engine of economic development... [and] every time the
state's penetration in the economy increases, our liberty decreases.' "163
Argentina too has oscillated between privatizing and nationalizing
governments. Through the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries,
"unprecedented wealth" and political power became concentrated in the
hands of a few landowning families and large foreign corporations. 164
Anti-American sentiment grew, with the "privileged and frequently
monopolistic positions of the Swift, Armour, Wilson, Goodyear, and
International Telephone and Telegraph companies" perceived by many
Argentinians as a form of "yanqui aggression." 165 By 1935, "nearly half of
Evans, supra note 151, at 90. The bids, however, were disappointingly low, because local
companies had "difficulty getting foreign firms to sign long-term contracts assuring them
of supplies of crude oil." Id. Thus, "the debate between those who wanted to let foreign
firms in and those who wanted the state to take over began in earnest." Id. at 91.
156. "The oil is oursl"
157. See Burns, supra note 152, at 373; Burns, supra note 150, at 83, 88; Evans, supra
note 151, at 91-92.
158. The American and Foreign Power Company was nationalized, and the state
agency Electrobr-as created, during the administration of Joao Goulart. See Burns, supra
note 150, at 99; Evans, supra note 151, at 93.
159. Humberto Castello Branco, the first post-1964 military president, privatized the
F~brica Nacional de Motores (which was sold to Alfa Romeo) and the steel company
owned by the state of Guanabara. See Evans, supra note 151, at 217.
160. Between 1964 and 1967, the economic performance of the Brazilian economy
was "disastrous." See id.
161. Id. at 218. Foreign investment continued to increase during this period of "state
entrepreneurship" under military rule. Many at the time accused the state of "serving as
the 'handmaiden' of multinational expansion." Id. at 220 (citation omitted). Peter Evans
argues thatjoint ventures combining state and foreign capital were "a new way of drawing
the multinationals into a 'nationalist' schema of accumulation." Id. at 227.
162. See Rog~rio L.F. Werneck, The Uneasy Steps Toward Privatization in Brazil, in
Privatization of Public Enterprises in Latin America, supra note 5, at 59, 63.
163. Id. at 63, 69; see Munck, supra note 28, at 137 (citation omitted). Recently,
Brazil has been "forced to table ... privatization plans due to political turmoil," including
the "scandal that ousted President Fernando Collor" in 1993. Gonzf.lez, supra note 148.
164. James R. Scobie, Argentina: A City and a Nation 143, 196 (1971); see Gary W.
Wynia, Argentina in the Postwar Era 22-23 (1978).
165. Scobie, supra note 164, at 188.
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the country's industrial capital came or was controlled from abroad." 16 6
These conditions were followed by a powerful nationalist reaction 167
that culminated in the first major Argentinian nationalization program
under Juan Per6n (1946-1955, 1973-1974). Inciting hatred against for-
eign capitalists and the estancieros-the landed agricultural elite16 8 -and
stressing the state's responsibility to "the common good," Per6n national-
ized Argentina's foreign-owned railroads, gasworks, public services, and
utilities.' 6
9
Following Per6n's overthrow in 1955, Argentina entered an ex-
tended period of economic and political turbulence (including a brief
return to power by 'Per6n himself in 1973). The country vacillated be-
tween regimes advocating deregulation, openness to foreign capital, and
vigorous free enterprise, and regimes calling for greater state regulation,
the expurgation of foreign capital, and an expanded state economic sec-
tor.170 The present privatization efforts, begun in principle by Rafil
Alfonsin (1983-1989)1 71 and pursued more aggressively by the current
president, Carlos Safil Menem, include the return to private ownership of
the national airline, railways, numerous utilities, and most banks.172 Not
all the transactions have gone smoothly. The privatization of Aerolineas
Argentinas, for example, involved "a botched leveraged buyout" that
166. Id.
167. See Wynia, supra note 164, at 37.
168. See Tomis R. Fillol, Social Factors in Economic Development: The Argentine
Case 31, 78, 83 (1961); David Rock, Argentina 1516-1982, at 258, 286, 312 (1985); Scobie,
supra note 164, at 222-23; Eldon Kenworthy, The Function of the Little-Known Case in
Theory Formation or What Peronism Wasn't, Comp. Pol., Oct. 1973, at 17, 40, 42.
169. See Rock, supra note 168, at 258, 262-63, 283, 285; Scobie, supra note 164, at
235.
170. Per6n's government had announced plans to privatize as early as 1953. See
Glade, supra note 144, at 430. Under the presidency of Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962)
foreign private capital, "in response to lavish inducements," poured into Argentina's oil,
steel, chemical, automotive, and other major industries. Rock, supra note 168, at 328, 340;
see Wynia, supra note 164, at 91. Indeed, Frondizi reversed his own "well-established
nationalistic stance on the petroleum issue" when he "authorized the state petroleum
company to contract foreign firms to extract Argentine oil." Id.
This period of openness to private capital, both domestic and foreign, was followed by
a brief return under Arturo Illia (1962-1966) to statism and "a commitment to expunging
foreign influence" from oil, Rock, supra note 168, at 345; a swing back to "efficiency" and
the "'denationalization' of Argentine industry and finance" under General Juan Carlos
Ongonia (1966-1970), id. at 350; see Wynia, supra note 164, at 180; another phase of
antiforeign sentiment (1970-1976), culminating again in Juan Per6n's plans "to trim the
influence of foreign corporations and to extend nationalization," Rock, supra note 168, at
361; and, with the coming to power of the junta of 1976, a return to free market policies,
pyivatizad6n, and "aggressive pursuit of foreign investment," id. at 368.
171. According to one commentator, little actual privatization occurred during
Alfonsin's presidency in part because of "the private sector's ambivalence toward the
entire privatization process." Javier A. Gonzilez Fraga, Argentine Privatization in
Retrospect, in Privatization of Public Enterprises in Latin America, supra note 5, at 87.
172. See id. at 93-97; see also Marcos Pipan, Argentina: North Meets South, 195
Railway Age, Feb. 1994, at 41 (discussing freight railroad privatization).
[Vol. 95:223
PPJVATIZATION-NATIONALIZATION CYCLE
landed the airline in more than one billion dollars of debt and led even-
tually to its partial renationalization. 173
In Uruguay, economic liberalism in the nineteenth century led to a
"booming export economy based on beef and wool" controlled by a small
class of "nouveaux riches." 174 This period of laissez-faire capitalism and
growing foreign dependence ended in 1903 with the election of DonJos6
Batle y Ord6fiez, who "used his two presidencies.., to transform the
country's political economy."175 Baffle stressed "national reconciliation"
and called for restraints on private (particularly foreign) economic
power.x76 He and his Colorado party enacted sweeping social reforms
and nationalized a number of railways, the electricity and insurance in-
dustries, and large portions of the financial sector.177
After the March 1933 military coup, Batllismo and nationalization
gave way to a decade of free-market orientation and policies favoring the
economic elite. 178 Thus, "state corporations were attacked in the Baltar
Law of 1936," which stripped them of the right to establish monopolies
and permitted international oil companies once again to supply the do-
mestic market.179 By 1942, however, Batllismo had been restored, and
over the next twenty years, numerous, principally British-dominated, en-
terprises in the transportation and utility sectors were nationalized. 180
The economic stagnation evident after the mid-fifties "dealt a blow
to Batlista Uruguay which eventually was to prove fatal."' 8 ' Commencing
in 1958, with the electoral triumph of the Blanco party and "the arrival of
a team of [International Monetary Fund] officials," Uruguay moved into
a new phase of economic liberalism.' 8 2 Free enterprise in Uruguay con-
tinues precariously today.183
173. See Thomas Kamm, Bungled Buyout: Argentine Airline Sale Shows Privatization
is Hardly a Cure-All, Wall St. J., May 20, 1993, at Al.
174. Charles G. Gillespie, Uruguay's Transition from Collegial Military-Technocratic
Rule, in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, supra note 123, at 173, 173.
175. Id.
176. While Batlle's "hostility towards foreign capital was not disguised," his "relations
with domestic capital were very different." M.HJ. Finch, A Political Economy of Uruguay
Since 1870, at 207-08 (1981). The expansion of the state sector "occurred generally in
response either to the failure of existing private capital in an industry, or to the
development of a new industry.... Radical initiatives to displace existing private interests
were rare." Id. at 210.
177. See id. at 210-11.
178. See id. at 17.
179. Id. at 217.
180. See id. at 212, 218, 221.
181. Id. at 235.
182. See id. at 237, 245, 252-53; see also Munck, supra note 28, at 31 (period after
1955 marked by increase in foreign investment and smaller role for the state as defender of
national industry).
183. In the 1980s, lack of regulation of private capital and the courting of foreign
investment led to "a speculative financial whirlwind" and heightened economic instability.
Munck, supra note 28, at 72; see also Gillespie, supra note 174, at 173, 179. In November




By contrast to Latin America, most of Southeast Asia remained under
colonial control until the 1950s. Even so, virtually every nation in the
region has already been through at least two alternations-and in many
cases more-between privatization and nationalization.
Malaysia's recent history is in many respects typical of the region,
and its current privatization program is one of the most ambitious.185
Accordingly, postcolonial Malaysia will be considered first in some detail,
followed by a much briefer treatment of other Southeast Asian nations.
1. Malaysia.
(a) Laissez Faire Under the Alliance Government. - Following British
colonial rule,' 8 6 Malaysia became an independent state on August 31,
1957.187 The so-called "Bargain of 1957," a careful compromise between
indigenous Malay (or Bumiputra) interest groups and Chinese and In-
dian interest groups, shaped the political economy of Malaysia until
1970.188 Essentially, this compromise-crafted by the Alliance coali-
tion189 and embodied in the Constitution-ensured Malays political con-
trol of the country, 90 while allowing the other ethnic groups to pursue
percent of Uruguay's voters rejected in a referendum the privatization of the state-run
telecommunications company." Only Vasp Seeks to Buy Into Uruguay Airline, Agence
France Presse, Sept. 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File; see also
Holligan, supra note 149 (reporting that 1992 proposed privatization law in Uruguay was
rejected by referendum).
184. In this Article, Southeast Asia refers broadly to the nations of southern and
southeastern Asia.
185. See Adam et al., supra note 6, at 48; Privatisation, The Economist, Aug. 21, 1993,
at 19.
186. Although British presence in Malaysia dates back to the late eighteenth century,
the 1874 Pangkor Treaty established a system of British "residents" in Malaysia and marked
the beginning of Great Britain's formal colonial rule. See Barbara W. Andaya & Leonard
Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia 107, 157 (1982).
187. Technically it was Malaya (composed of the states of the Malay peninsula) that
achieved independence in 1957. See id. at 262. On September 16, 1963, the former
British colonies of Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawekjoined Malaya to form the Federation of
Malaysia. See id. at 274. Singapore left the federation in 1965 to become an independent
nation. See id. at 275. In this Article, "Malaysia" is used to refer both to Malaya and to the
present day Federation of Malaysia, depending on the context.
188. See Adam et al., supra note 6, at 214.
189. The Alliance, a coalition between the major ethnic parties in Malaysia, was
composed of (in order of dominance) the United Malays National Organization
("UMNO"), the Malayan Chinese Association ("MCA"), and the Malayan Indian Congress
("MIC"). See id. at 266-68; Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict 401, 417
(1985).
190. To satisfy the Bumiputra, the constitution establishes Malay as the national
language of Malaysia, and Islam as the state religion, and provides for the Yang di-Pertuan
Agong ("Supreme Head of the Federation") to be elected from among the nine Malay
heads of states comprising the Federation. See Frank H. Golay et al., Underdevelopment
and Economic Nationalism in Southeast Asia 360 & n.21 (1969) (citing Federation of
Malaya Agreement of 1948). Furthermore, while "'the legitimate interests of other
communities'" is recognized, see id. at 360, the constitution specifically safeguards the
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their commercial interests under a laissez-faire economic system.19 1
Accordingly, up to 1970, government intervention in commerce and
industry was insubstantial, and the small public sector comprised only a
handful of state-owned enterprises in the transport, energy, communica-
tions, and utilities sectors. 192 Foreign domination of the corporate sec-
tor, left over from pre-independence Malaysia, lasted through the sixties,
with more than fifty percent of the country's capital stock owned or con-
trolled by foreigners, so that roughly seventy percent of all corporate
profits accrued to foreign companies.'
9 3
Despite impressive economic growth in Malaysia between 1957 and
1970,194 the Alliance government's laissez-faire economic policies served
to reinforce certain structural inequalities inherited from Malaysia's colo-
nial past. Thus, between 1957 and 1970, the Chinese, regarded as
"cleverer" and "more industrious" by the British,'9 5 and historically re-
cruited for tin mining and other commercial activities, strengthened
their domination of the lucrative tin industry as well as their power in the
manufacturing, trade, transportation, and communications sectors of
Malaysia's economy.196 The Indian population, traditionally assigned to
work on the rubber estates, came to dominate Malaysia's plantation agri-
culture. 197 Meanwhile, the Malays, whom the British considered "lazy"
but "good imitative leamer[s],"198 generally continued to occupy the low-
est rung of society:' 9 9 "the modified subsistence economy of rice and fish
and squatter mixed farms, . . . an economy of poverty and chronic
"'special position of the Malays,' "see id. (citing Malay. Const. art. 153), by favoring Malays
for positions in the public service, for scholarships and other educational privileges, and
for business permits and licenses.
191. See Adam et al., supra note 6, at 214.
192. See id. at 216; Zainal A. Yusof, Distributional Policies and Programmes: The
Malaysian Experience, in The Malaysian Economy Beyond 1990, at 343, 343 (Lee IL Hock
& Shyamala Nagara eds., 1991). During the sixties, the Malaysian government was actively
interventionist only in the agricultural sector. See id.
193. See Fong C. Onn, The Malaysian Economic Challenge in the 1990s:
Transformation for Growth 109 (1989). Foreign dominance was particularly evident in the
mining sector (excluding tin), where foreigners owned 84.5% of all assets. See id.
194. See Andaya & Andaya, supra note 186, at 282-83; Onn, supra note 193, at
131-35.
195. Horowitz, supra note 189, at 162; see Andaya & Andaya, supra note 186, at 136,
176.
196. See Horowitz, supra note 189, at 350-52.
197. See id. at 348.
198. Andaya & Andaya, supra note 186, at 176 (quoting Frank Swettenham, Malay
Sketches 2-3 (1913)).
199. Malays also occupied high rungs of society. For example, there was (and still is)
a Malay aristocracy and, by constitutional prescription, Malays continue to dominate the
elite Malayan Civil Service by a ratio of four to one. See Horowitz, supra note 189, at 587,
654; Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation 26 (1991). Conversely,
not all Malaysian Chinese and Indians have been uniformly advantaged: To this day, for
example, many Chinese in Malaysia remain poor vegetable farmers or soup hawkers. See




The fragile coalition of ethnic interests under the Alliance govern-
ment had virtually disintegrated by 1969. The non-Malay groups were
fearful of total political and cultural "submersion by the Malays." 20
More importantly, there was growing resentment among the Malays-at
least among the elites-of Chinese and Indian domination of the econ-
omy.20 2 In 1970 roughly half of all households in Malaysia received in-
comes below the poverty line; of these households, about seventy-five per-
cent were Malay.203 Further, between 1957 and 1973, the mean income
of the Chinese, more than twice that of the Malays to begin with, in-
creased more rapidly than the income of all other ethnic groups in the
country.20 4
Following the Kuala Lumpur race riots in 1969, "it became widely
accepted (amongst the ruling Bumiputra) that economic discrimination
was endemic and, if rapid economic advancement amongst the
Bumiputra was to be achieved, broader state intervention would be re-
quired."20 5 The predominantly Malay government quickly moved to es-
tablish a program of economic affirmative action toward the Bumiputra.
This program was known as the New Economic Policy ("NEP"). For
nearly two decades (1971-1990), one of its main objectives was "'national
unity.., expressed as the improvement of economic balances between
the races.'" 206
(b) Growth of the Public Sector (1970-1980). - In accordance with the
NEP, the Malaysian government between 1970 and 1981 took dramatic
measures to alter the distribution of corporate ownership.20 7 In 1970,
sixty-two percent of all corporate assets were owned by foreigners, thirty-
four percent by Chinese and Indian Malaysians, and a mere four percent
by the Bumiputra. The goal of the NEP was for Malays to own thirty
percent of the corporate sector by 1990, with non-Bumiputra Malaysians
200. T.H. Silcock, The Economy of Malaya 1 (1957).
201. Andaya & Andaya, supra note 186, at 279; see Means, supra note 199, at 3-4
(discussing campaign by non-Malays for uniform rights and pluralist cultural policies).
202. For a subtle treatment of the critical events, political interpretations, and policies
that shaped this transitional period, see Donald L. Horowitz, Cause and Consequence in
Public Policy Theory: Ethnic Policy and System Transformation in Malaysia, 22 Pol'y Sci.
249, 255-57 (1989).
203. See Andaya & Andaya, supra note 186, at 284 (statistic refers solely to Peninsular
Malaysia).
204. See On, supra note 193, at 105-06.
205. Adam et al., supra note 6, at 216.
206. Id. at 214 (quoting the NEP); see also Means, supra note 199, at 23-25 (stating
that NEP was promoted to non-Malays as means to calm ethnic hostilities through creation
of just society). The other two goals were creation of employment opportunities and
promotion of overall economic growth. See Adam et al., supra note 6, at 214.
207. Although the NEP embodied a broad range of socio-economic objectives
affecting areas such as employment, housing, education, and the civil service, "the litmus-
test was, and remains, the distribution of corporate asset ownership as the indicator of
wealth distribution." Adam et al., supra note 6, at 214.
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owning forty percent, and foreigners thirty percent.20 8
In pursuit of this goal, the government created a number of large
public enterprises20 9 to "channel federal and state funds to Bumiputra
entrepreneurs"210 and to "engage[ ] in business ventures with the inten-
tion of eventually relinquishing control to Malay private groups." 21' In
addition, government agencies initiated direct share transfers to Bumipu-
tra individuals and companies212 through the acquisition of corporate
shares on behalf of the Malay and indigenous peoples. 213 To prevent the
resale of equity to non-Bumiputra, the government, relying on the con-
cept of "ownership-in-trust," established a number of special investment
trusts reserved exclusively for the Bumiputra. 2 1 4
At the same time, many wholly Malaysian Chinese (or other wholly
non-Malay) companies were subjected to what was effectively compulsory
corporate restructuring. Commencing in about 1977, any company that
sought expansion, new licenses to operate or to import goods, or devel-
opment of new product lines was required to sell thirty percent of its
existing shares to Bumiputra entities or to issue enough new Bumiputra
shares so that the Bumiputra portion of total shares would be thirty per-
cent. Companies subjected, to restructuring generally did not have a
choice about the Malay recipients of such shares. By 1980 the distribu-
tion of equity ownership in Malaysia had improved significantly but was
still a long way off the original NEP target, being foreign ownership forty-
three percent; other Malaysian forty-five percent; and Bumiputra twelve
percent (of which seven percent was institutional).215
The redistributional aspects of the NEP aside, "its predominant ef-
fect [was] to assign an extremely broad role for government intervention
in the [Malaysian] economy."216 The 1970s, then, saw an unprecedented
increase in government participation, primarily in the commercial, indus-
trial, and service sectors, but also in the emerging oil and gas industries
and in nontraditional areas such as manufacturing, construction, and ag-
208. See id. at 214 (citing statistics provided by the Malaysian Permodalan Nasional
Berhad ("PNB")).
209. For example, the Majlis Amanah Rakyat, or Council of Trust for Indigenous
Peoples ("MARA"), encourages Bumiputra involvement in business management and
transport, and PERNAS, the National Trade Corporation, provides import and export
assistance to Bumiputra businessmen. See Onn, supra note 193, at 75-77.
210. Stephen B. Wickman, The Economy, in Malaysia: A Country Study 129, 145
(Frederica M. Bunge ed., 4th ed. 1984).
211. Andaya & Andaya, supra note 186, at 285.
212. See Adam et al., supra note 6, at 224.
213. See Andaya & Andaya, supra note 186, at 285; Means, supra note 199, at 27.
214. See Adam et al., supra note 6, at 224-25. Thus, the main task of the PNB, see
supra note 208, was "to acquire a portfolio of shares in profitable companies (including
those held by public sector agencies) to be held in trust for subsequent sale through the
Amanah Sahaam Nasional (ASN), the national unit trust scheme open to all Bumiputeras
[sic]." Onn, supra note 193, at 79.
215. See Horowitz, supra note 202, at 266-68; Adam et al., supra note 6, at 214.
216. Adam et al., supra note 6, at 215.
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riculture. 21 7 Indeed, by the mid-1970s, Malaysia's public sector grew at a
rate of over 100 enterprises per year and, by 1990, was one of the largest
in the world, with more than 1,100 state-owned enterprises accounting
for approximately twenty-five percent of the gross domestic product in
Malaysia.218
Although Malaysia's gross domestic product grew at an impressive
real rate throughout the seventies and eighties, 219 "the overall perform-
ance of the economy [was] only modest by regional standards."220 When
the NEP was introduced in 1971, Malaysia ranked second only to Japan
among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in terms of gross do-
mestic product per capita. 221 By 1990, however, Malaysia had dropped
below South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, and it was only
marginally above Thailand.222
According to many, Malaysia's growth was hampered by the NEP. 223
The overexpansion of the public sector not only crowded out private in-
vestment but also created "a huge class of [state-owned] companies whose
managements were defacto acting independently of any effective share-
holder control."224 Further, the explosion of the public sector increased
significantly the federal government's budget deficit, which was then
financed by foreign loans. 225 Most importantly, while the standard of
living in Malaysia generally rose during the first decade of the NEP, distri-
bution of income actually deteriorated: between 1973 and 1979, the posi-
tion of the poorest forty percent of the households in the country, princi-
pally Malays, improved more slowly than the rest of the population. 226
By the early eighties there was general agreement that government
intervention in the public sector had, with few exceptions, "failed to
maintain the value of assets appropriated for the Bumiputra"227 and that
only if the value of those assets were maintained could the NEP's goals of
wealth redistribution be realized. Restoring the value of Bumiputra assets
became a priority with the election of Dr. Mahathir bin Mohammed in
1980, and the creation of new state-owned enterprises came to an abrupt
217. See id. at 215, 216-19.
218. See id. at 215-16, 219 (citing World Bank, Malaysia Matching Risks and Rewards
in a Mixed Economy Program: A World Bank Country Study (1989)). "[A]long with the
proliferation of state organizations, went a four-fold increase in the size of the public
bureaucracy, from 1970 to 1983." Horowitz, supra note 202, at 265.
219. See Andaya & Andaya, supra note 186, at 289. This growth stemmed in part
from the discovery of oil and natural gas in the mid-1970s. See id.
220. Adam et al., supra note 6, at 215.
221. See id. at 215.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. Id. at 216; see also Yusof, supra note 192, at 368 ("With rare exceptions, the
record of public enterprises has been quite dismal.").
225. By the mid-eighties, Malaysia had a current account deficit of $1,722 million due
largely to the servicing of foreign debt. See Onn, supra note 193, at 80.
226. See Means, supra note 199, at 46; Wickman, supra note 210, at 136-37, 143.




(c) The Current PFrivatization Programs (1980 to the present). - In 1983
Prime Minister Mahathir urged the nation to build a "Malaysia Incorpo-
rated" and embarked on a highly ambitious privatization program that
continues to this day. Unlike most other developing nations, however,
Malaysia's privatization program aims not only to encourage "private en-
trepreneurship and investment" in the development of the economy, but
also to "contribute towards meeting the [equality] objectives of the
[NEP]." 2 29 Although the privatization program is open to foreign and
non-Bumiputra participation, ownership of privatized entities generally
must be at least seventy percent Malaysian (as opposed to foreign), of
which at least thirty percent must be owned by Bumiputra. 23 0 Thus, the
privatization of various state-owned airline and shipping companies "con-
sisted, to a large degree, of distribution of equity to the Bumiputra or
their institutional representatives."2 31 Moreover, a significant tranche of
every public offering was reserved for Bumiputra individuals or public
institutions acting on their behalf.232
Malaysia's privatization program has been heavily criticized. Evi-
dence of the first seven years of privatization suggests that efficiency
objectives were traded off against the affirmative action goals of the
NEP.2 33 Consequently, as of 1992, it was "difficult to conclude that the
privatization process . . . [had] elicited any fundamental efficiency
changes."2 34
In 1988 the government responded to criticism that privatizations
were being conducted on an ad hoc basis by developing a "privatization
master plan," which assessed the desirability and feasibility of privatizing
434 state-owned enterprises.2 35 In December 1992 it designated an addi-
tional fifty-seven government operations to be privatized over a three-year
period.2 36 As a result, the national telephone company has passed into
private hands, and numerous state-owned entities in the transportation,
utility, and financial sectors (including Bank Bumiputra Malaysia, the
country's second-largest financial institution) are expected to be priva-
tized in the near future.23 7
228. See id. at 216, 226.
229. James Craig, Privatisation in Malaysia: Present Trends and Future Prospects, in
Privatisation in Less Developed Countries, supra note 27, at 248, 248 (quoting Economic
Planning Unit, Government of Malaysia, Guidelines in Privatisation (1985)).
230. See Adam et al., supra note 6, at 228. These rules have been relaxed in some
sectors in order to attract more foreign investment. See, e.g., infra note 239.




235. See Mohd. Sheriff b. Mohd. Kassim, Privatization: Performance, Problems and
Prospects, in The Malaysian Economy Beyond 1990, supra note 192, at 183, 191.
236. See Malaysia Targets More Selloffs, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1992, at A15.
237. See Stephen Duthie, Bank Bumiputra Posts Profit Increase, Asian Wall St. J.,
Sept. 5, 1994, at A22; Malaysian Firm Agrees to Buy Airline StakeJ. Com.,June 14, 1994, at
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This shift to privatization in Malaysia has been accompanied by a
significant increase in foreign participation. Since mid-1987, direct for-
eign investment, particularly from Singapore, Japan, and the United
Kingdom, has surged.23 8 In addition, many of the major privatizations
pending are expected to be open to foreign as well as local bidders.2 39
2. Other Southeast Asian Countries. - In Pakistan, as in Malaysia, in-
dependence was followed by an extended period of free enterprise
(1947-1971), in which the government gave broad incentives to private
capital to foster industrialization.2 40 During these years, the economy
came to be dominated by a small number of Muslim capitalists, largely
migrants from India, known as Muhajirs. 241 Many of the Muhajir busi-
nessmen belonged to minority Islamic sects; Memons, Chiniotis, Bohras,
and Khoja Ismailis were and are among the more prominent.242 By the
late sixties, "it was commonly held that [twenty-two] families"-princi-
pally Muhajirs-"controlled perhaps 80 percent of private industrial as-
sets"; the Memons, Bohras, and Khoja Ismailis alone, although compris-
ing "less than 1 percent of the population, held more than 40 percent of
privately owned firms."24 3
This period of free enterprise was followed by a "complete reversal"
of policy under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-1977), who
brought about the "wholesale nationalisation" of the industrial and other
sectors of the economy.2 44 This nationalization-directed in large part at
the Muhajir industrialist families whose wealth was widely resented 245 -
was part of Bhutto's attempt to unify the demoralized West Pakistanis
2B; Pacific Watch: Malaysia: State to Sell Off 14 Entities, L.A. Times, Aug. 22, 1994, at D5;
William Tuohy, Wiring the World: Britain's Private Line of Communication, L.A. Times,
July 26, 1994, at H16.
238. See Kamal Salih, The Malaysian Economy in the 1990s: Alternative Scenarios, in
The Malaysian Economy Beyond 1990, supra note 192, at 41, 50.
239. See Adam et al., supra note 6, at 259-60; Malaysia's Ailing Gas Plant to be
Privatized, Reuters, May 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuter File. Following
regulatory changes in 1987, 100% foreign control is now permitted for any Malaysian
company that "exports more than 80% of its products." Adam et al., supra note 6, at 260.
240. Between 1948 and 1958, several large government enterprises were created to
promote economic development. However, the public industrial sector built up during
this period operated "in close relationship with private industry," and the government
remained committed to the principle of free enterprise. Riyaz Bokhari, Privatisation in
Pakistan, in Privatisation in Developing Countries 145, 145 (V.V. Ramanadham ed., 1989).
241. See Hafeez Malik, Nationalism and the Quest for Ideology in Pakistan, in
Pakistan: The Long View 271, 292-93 (Lawrence Ziring et al. eds., 1977).
242. See id. at 293 & n.34; P.A. Kluck, The Society and Its Environment, in Pakistan:
A Country Study 65, 104 (Richard F. Nyrop ed., 5th ed. 1984).
243. Kluck, supra note 242, at 103-04; see Malik, supra note 241, at 293.
244. Bokhari, supra note 240, at 145; see Introduction, in Pakistan: A Country Study,
supra note 242, at xix, xxii [hereinafter Introduction].
245. See William J. Barnds, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Shifting Opportunities and
Constraints, in Pakistan: The Long View, supra note 241, at 369, 375.
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following the secession of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). 24 6 Bhutto's
nationalizations, however, "substantially slowed economic growth."247
Pakistan's current phase of "denationalization" began in 1977, imme-
diately after General Mohammad Zia ul Haq, himself a Muhajir,248 took
power. Since 1983, when the government formally adopted privatization
as a goal, numerous losing public enterprises have been either liquidated
or returned to the private sector; these privatizations have occurred prin-
cipally in the cement, marble mining, cigarette, hotel, textile, and finan-
cial industries.2 4 9 Benazir Bhutto, who became Prime Minister for the
second time in late 1993, "has continued the country's privatization
program."2 50
Thailand25 ' followed a similar pattern. From the mid-nineteenth
century to roughly 1932, the economy was shaped by policies favoring
private enterprise and large-scale foreign commerce.2 52 Over the same
period, the economy became dominated by a small, nepotistic group of
military and bureaucratic elite on the one hand, and by increasing num-
bers of Chinese immigrants, on the other.2 53
Beginning in 1938, when Luang Phibunsongkhram (called Phibun)
became prime minister, the government began nationalizing several im-
portant economic sectors. 254 This nationalization was directed princi-
pally at the country's economically powerful Chinese minority and was
part of a series of anti-Chinese enactments.2 55 Thus,
246. See Surjit Mansingh, Historical Setting, in Pakistan: A Country Study, supra note
242, at 1, 57-59.
247. Introduction, supra note 242, at xxii.
248. See Darrel R. Eglin, The Economy, in Pakistan: A Country Study, supra note
242, at 131.
249. See generally id. at 139-42 (exploring general economic development of
Pakistan and interplay between industrialization and Islamization); Iqbal Haidari,
Privatisation: An Assessment: Pakistan, 24 Econ. Rev. 9 (1993).
250. John W. Anderson, Pakistan's Bhutto, Despite Progress, Haunted by Past, Wash.
Post, Sept. 18, 1994, at A29, A31.
251. Thailand is unique among Southeast Asian nations in that it successfully evaded
the direct colonial control of the Western powers. See, e.g., David K. Wyatt, Thailand: A
Short History 181-90 (1984) (emphasizing the role caution played in foreign diplomacy
with British authorities). See generally Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia 72-73 (1985)
(noting that outstanding Thai rulers were largely responsible for Thailand's avoidance of
colonial control); D.R. SarDesal, Southeast Asia: Past and Present 126 (2d ed. 1989)
(observing that Thailand was able to survive colonial imperialism because of geography,
diplomacy, and modernization). Nevertheless, Thailand's economic history has much in
common with that of its neighbors. See generally Golay et al., supra note 190, at 267-340
(discussing economic nationalism in Thailand).
252. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 270; Wyatt, supra note 251, at 183-85; Ng
Chee Yuen & Norbert Wagner, Privatization and Deregulation in ASEAN: An Overview,
ASEAN Econ. Bull., Mar. 1989, at 209, 212.
253. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 271; SarDesa, supra note 251, at 226.
254. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 300-01; Wyatt, supra note 251, at 252-55.
255. See Wyatt, supra note 251, at 254.
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The government formed a state corporation to compete with
Chinese in the rice trade and virtually took over the salt, to-
bacco, petroleum, and pork business.... A new revenue code
sharply increased taxes on the commercial (i.e., Chinese) class,
and all noncitizens were required to pay an alien registration
fee.... [U]se of the Chinese language [in Chinese schools was
limited] to two hours a week, and all the Chinese newspapers
save one were closed down.... [S]ome of its acts of economic
nationalization affected Western multinational corporations as
much as they affected Chinese enterprise (for example, tobacco
and petroleum). But no one was fooled. These were anti-
Chinese measures, which, from Phibun's point of view and that
of many other Thai, were necessary in order to give the Thai
control over their own economy and society.256
Following the Second World War, the emphasis on "Thaification"
through government enterprise shifted from nationalization of existing
enterprises to the direct creation of public establishments. 25 7 Again,
however, the establishment of state-owned enterprises was part of a larger
campaign to create a "Thailand for the Thai."258 The Government Orga-
nizations Incorporation Act (1953), which called for an active role for
public enterprises, openly sought to transfer control of Thailand's com-
merce from Chinese to Thai hands.259 Over the next quarter century,
government enterprises proliferated; by 1986, the government controlled
the nation's public utilities and transportation sectors as well as roughly
sixty manufacturing establishments in the tobacco, liquor, timber, sugar,
mineral, cement, pharmaceutical, textile, and other industries. 260
In 1986, the Thai government launched its current privatization ef-
forts "because of the increasing inability of state-owned enterprises to fi-
nance their own investments and their increasing reliance upon external
debt-financing." 261 Although a number of entities in the paper, sugar,
and airline industries have been transferred from state to private owner-
ship, on the whole Thailand's privatization movement has not progressed
smoothly.262 However, relations between Thais and Chinese in Thailand
have improved markedly in recent years. 263
A number of countries in Southeast Asia embarked on nationaliza-
tion programs immediately after achieving independence. Because the
colonial economies in these states had been characterized mainly by free-
trade and laissez-faire policies, the postindependence nationalization pro-
256. Id.
257. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 304.
258. Wyatt, supra note 251, at 254; see Yuen & Wagner, supra note 252, at 212.
259. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 305; Wyatt, supra note 251, at 267.
260. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 305; Yuen & Wagner, supra note 252, at 214.
261. Yuen & Wagner, supra note 252, at 216-17.
262. See id.
263. See Donald L. Horowitz, Democracy in Divided Societies, 4J. Democracy 18, 19
(1993). Rates of intermarriage between Thais and Chinese are notably higher today than
they were several decades ago. See id.
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grams constituted an extreme shift away from a previously privatized
economy, and may themselves be viewed as the first oscillation of a priva-
tization-nationalization cycle. In all of these countries, the period of na-
tionalization lasted roughly from independence until the mid-1970s,
when the current phase of privatization began.
Burma (now Myanmar) exemplifies this pattern. During its colonial
rule, Britain encouraged competition, private enterprise, and free
trade,26 a policy that favored not only British enterprise but also that of
certain "nonindigenous" groups, particularly Burmese of Indian extrac-
tion.2 65 During the 1930s and 1940s, the antagonism between the indige-
nous peoples and those who had profited from British colonial rule be-
came extremely bitter.266
Promptly after independence, Prime Minister U Nu vowed to put an
end to the country's "unfair, orie-sided economic system," which favored
British, Indian, and Chinese capitalists over Burmans.2 67 To carry out his
policy of "Burmanism," U Nu nationalized many major foreign-owned
teak, cement, and sugar companies as well as the country's transporta-
don, communications, and utilities sectors.2 68 After a military coup d'6tat
in 1962, both xenophobia and state intervention became much more ex-
treme. The new government under Ne Win immediately banned all for-
eign journalists and missionaries, expelled the Ford, Fulbright, and Asia
Foundations, and expropriated all large-scale industrial enterprises, in-
cluding the British-owned Imperial Chemical Industries.2 69 Following
"the 1964 nationalisation of virtually all foreign (largely Indian and Chi-
nese) and domestically-owned companies," there was "a mass exodus
from the country" of the foreign capital that remained.2 70 Approximately
15,000 enterprises passed into government hands between 1963 and
1972.271
The current phase of privatization in Burma can be dated to 1973
when, in a major shift of policy, the government announced that private
investment would once again be allowed in more than 200 industries. 272
264. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 204.
265. See Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity 43-46
(1991).
266. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 204; Smith, supra note 265, at 43-46. "When
Indians were attacked in Burma in the severe riots of 1938, the main victims were Indian
Muslims, despite the fact that the landlord class in Lower Burma was heavily composed of
Indian Hindus who had profited inordinately from the depression." Horowitz, supra note
189, at 121 (footnote omitted).
267. Golay et al., supra note 190, at 211 (quoting U Nu, Towards Peace and
Democracy 3 (1949)).
268. See id. at 229-31.
269. See Donald M. Seekins, Historical Settings, in Burma: A Country Study 62
(Frederica M. Bunge ed., 1983); Smith supra note 265, at 201.
270. Smith, supra note 265, at 201.
271. See Seekins, supra note 269, at 61-63.
272. See id. at 143.
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In 1975, large portions of the transportation industry were privatized.273
In 1977, the Right of Private Enterprise Law was enacted to promote pri-
vate investment by protecting various important sectors of the economy
from nationalization. 27 4 In recent years, however, only limited privatiza-
tion has been undertaken, primarily in the agricultural sector and in the
mining and petroleum industries.275
Allowing for local differences, the same sequence-from a colonial,
free-trade economy to postindependence nationalization, and subse-
quently to the current round of privatization-can generally be seen in
India,2 76 Indonesia,277 and Sri Lanka.278
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See Burma: Economy Improves Considerably After Years of Decline, Bus. Am.,
Nov. 15, 1993, at 20, 21.
276. British free-enterprise and free-trade policies (which chiefly preserved India as a
market for British manufacturing) gave way with independence in 1947 to the socialist
government of Nehru (1947-1964). Over the next quarter century, Indira Gandhi
nationalized numerous sectors of the economy, including the financial, insurance,
shipping, coal, steel, and textile industries.
"In a major reversal of its earlier policy, the Indian Government" has in the last decade
generally pursued a policy of economic liberalization. Indian Banks Crippled as 600,000
Strike Over Privatisation, Extel Examiner, Feb. 17, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Extex File. India has recently called for privatization of its insurance, mining, petroleum,
steel, and financial sectors and liberalization of its foreign investment legislation. See
India May Open Up Its Insurance Market to Private, Foreign Firms, Official Says, BNA Int'l
Trade Daily, Mar. 9, 1994, at 385, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Intrad File; India to Sell
More State-Owned Firms, Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 1, 1994, at 8.
277. Colonial laissez faire in Indonesia, which tended to favor the Chinese over the
indigenous population, gave way with independence in 1949 to a period of "professed
socialist ideals." Golay et al., supra note 190, at 118-19, 125-26. Although President
Sukarno called immediately for nationalization and "indigenization" of industry, and
although a few utilities were expropriated in 1953, it was not until 1957-1958, and again in
1964-1965, that large-scale nationalization of land (principally owned by the British and
resident Chinese) and private enterprise (principally owned by the Dutch and, to a lesser
extent, Chinese) took place. See id. at 125-26, 148, 158.
In 1965 Indonesia's new president, Suharto, "executed a drastic right turn in
economic policy"; numerous entities seized by Sukarno were privatized and measures were
enacted once again to encourage foreign capital. See id. at 199. Between 1965 and 1975,
most of Indonesia's economic development stemmed from foreign enterprise, "and there
was little growth in indigenous industries." M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modem Indonesia
Since c. 1300, at 284 (2d ed. 1993). More recently, the progress of privatization in
Indonesia has been limited, reflecting a familiar ethnic dilemma: most of the businessmen
in Indonesia with the resources and entrepreneurial skills to take over public enterprises
belong to the country's resented Chinese minority, and "[e]ven foreign ownership would
be more acceptable than privatization that primarily favours this ethnic group." Yuen &
Wagner, supra note 252, at 220.
278. In Sri Lanka, under British laissez-faire policies, commercial plantation
agriculture replaced subsistence farming as the mainstay of the economy. See Chandra R.
de Silva, Sri Lanka: A History 158, 166-67 (1987). The expansion of the plantation sector
led in turn to 'increasing control of the economy by the colonial rulers" and by an
emergent group of domestic elite, many of whom "belonged to the Christian or Tamil
minority groups." Id. at 167, 187.
[Vol. 95:223
PRIVATIZATION-NATIONALUZATION CYCLE
The Commonwealth of the Philippines was established in 1935,279
and over the next two decades, it "experimented persistently with bureau-
cratic entrepreneurship and the public corporation."280 Its goals were
not only to industrialize, but also to "indigenize" the country by transfer-
ring control of the economy from Westerners and the economically pow-
erful Chinese minority281 to Filipinos.282 Before and after the Second
World War, the Philippine government brought under state control so-
cial services and utilities; by the early fifties it was operating the country's
"railroads, hotels, electric power, gas and water works."283 In addition, as
"more direct manifestations of indigenism," it sought to participate di-
rectly in the cement, marble, pulp and paper, sugar, textile, footwear,
yam, and other manufacturing industries-many of which had been con-
trolled disproportionately by the Chinese.284
This early period of nationalization gave way to "a radical change"
in economic policy with the election in 1953 of Ramon Magsaysay
(1953-1957), who in his presidential campaign had railed against the
inefficiency and corruption of state-owned enterprises.2 85 By the mid-
1960s, Magsaysay had privatized or liquidated virtually all government-
owned manufacturing enterprises.2 86 The return of the Philippines to
free enterprise ceased abruptly in 1972, when President Ferdinand
Marcos (1965-1986) imposed martial law. Between 1972 and 1977, pub-
lic enterprises once again increased dramatically in size and number.287
However, most of the nationalizations that occurred during this period
Sri Lanka achieved independence in 1947. Commencing in 1956, the government
under S.W.1RD. Bandaranaike (1956-1959), and then under his widow, Sirima
Bandaranaike (1960-1965, 1970-1977), nationalized enterprises in the plantation,
transport, petroleum, and financial sectors. See id. at 251,254-55, 269-70. This period of
nationalization coincided with the government's championing of Sinhalese nationalism "at
the expense of Tamils, Christians of all ethnic groups, and other minorities." Horowitz,
supra note 189, at 383-84. In 1977, the new government ofJ.RIJayawardene returned the
country to policies encouraging free enterprise and foreign investment. See de Silva,
supra, at 263, 270-71. In 1987 the government explicitly committed itself to privatization.
See Adam et al., supra note 6, at 306.
279. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 22. Spain's colonial rule of the Philippines
ended in 1898 as a result of the Spanish-American War. The so-called American period
that followed lasted until 1935. See id. For an appraisal of the history of the American
period, see, e.g., williamJ. Pomeroy, An American-Made Tragedy. Neo-Colonialism and
Dictatorship in the Philippines (1974).
280. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 32.
281. Resentment against the Chinese dates back to Spanish colonial rule. In 1722,
the Spanish king was informed that" 'The Sangleys (Chinese) have gained control of all
the commerce in provisions and other supplies and of the mechanical trades.'" Id. at 21
n.1 (citation omitted).
282. See id. at 32.
283. Id. at 56.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 57.
286. See id. at 57-58.
287. The number of corporations owned or controlled by the state rose from just 35
in 1970 to 290 by 1985. See Yuen & Wagner, supra note 252, at 213.
1995]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
were simply forms of political patronage, undertaken "'to bail out
[Marcos's] cronies.'"288
This phase of "nationalization" under Marcos gave way to the present
privatization efforts, initiated by Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) and con-
tinued by the current President, Fidel Ramos. Most recently, the govern-
ment has accelerated privatization in the telephone, steel, electricity, pa-
per, and oil industries.289 In general, however, privatization in the
Philippines has proceeded slowly, in part because of significant national-
ist resistance to foreign participation.290
II. CAUSES OF G-CLICALITY
For over a century, then, thenations of Latin America and Southeast
Asia have oscillated from privatization to nationalization and back again.
What might cause such cyclicality? In this Part, I examine several alterna-
tive explanations and conclude that these explanations, while useful, are
incomplete. Building on them, I then propose a more comprehensive
model that takes into account the crucial role that nationalism has played
in the developing world. The model encompasses nationalism directed
not only at external (Western or other "imperialist") foreigners but also
at certain, often ethnically identifiable, groups within a nation, whom I
call "foreigners within."
A. Partial Explanations
1. The Exogenous Events Model. - One view of the swings from priva-
tized to nationalized economies in the two regions would trace their ori-
gin to certain massive events with worldwide consequences such as the
Great Depression or the collapse of the Soviet Union. Under this view,
there would be no true privatization-nationalization cycle in the sense of
a self-generating alternation between two (temporary) equilibrium states.
Instead, what might look like an endogenously generated cyclical pattern
within developing countries would be explained as a response to exoge-
nous, typically catastrophic events involving the developed countries, the
"world superpowers," and so on.
It can hardly be doubted that world events have shaped the econo-
mies of developing countries in important respects, or that in some cases
different parts of an entire developing region may respond at more or
less the same time to international economic influences. For example, as
288. Zinnia F. Godinez, Privatization and Deregulation in the Philippines, ASEAN
Econ. Bull., Mar. 1989, at 259, 263 (citation omitted); see Yuen & Wagner, supra note 252,
at 213.
289. See Privatization in Philippines Earns 964 Million Dollars, Agence France Presse,
Mar. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, AFP File; Caspar W. Weinberger, The
Philippines: At Last, Some Reason for Optimism, Forbes, Nov. 22, 1993, at 35.
290. See Godinez, supra note 288, at 280-81; Yuen & Wagner, supra note 252, at 218.
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noted above,29 ' after attaining independence or political consolidation in
the late nineteenth century, virtually every Latin American state adopted
policies of economic liberalism, a phenomenon that may be linked to the
extraordinary success of the United States economy and to the ideology
of liberalism prevalent throughout Europe at that time.2 92 Similarly, the
Depression undoubtedly led to a greater willingness to question free-mar-
ket policies in Latin America in the 1930s.2 93 And, finally, the collapse of
state-run economies in the late 1980s is surely responsible for at least
some of the enthusiasm for privatization seen all over the developing
world today.294
Nevertheless, the usefulness of this exogenous events model exhausts
itself pretty quickly-if not in these three generalizations, then in others
of similar thinness. The historical facts do not support any straightfor-
ward mapping of the privatization-nationalization swings in the develop-
ing world along a world-events chronology.
First, the shifts between nationalization and privatization in Latin
America overlap only marginally with those in Southeast Asia. Moreover,
even within each region, countries display considerable differences in the
time at which either nationalization or privatization policies were
adopted, as well as in the length of each policy phase. The first nationali-
zation programs in Mexico and Uruguay began around 1910,295 whereas
Chile and Peru did not nationalize until the 1930s.296 As for Argentina,
no nationalization was undertaken until the late 1940s297 (when Mexico
was already reprivatizing). Further, these countries did not repudiate
their early nationalization programs at the same time. The first round of
reprivatization began in Mexico in 1940;298 in Peru, in 1948;299 in Chile
and Argentina, in 1958300 (by which time Mexico had already recom-
menced a nationalization program).3 01
Similarly, in Southeast Asia, in the late 1940s, newly independent
Burma and Sri Lanka promptly embarked on nationalization programs
291. See supra text accompanying notes 35-55 (Mexico), 143 (Chile and Peru),
150-151 (Brazil), 164-166 (Argentina), 174 (Uruguay).
292. Cf. Bushnell & Macaulay, supra note 29, at 183, 187 (discussing effects of British
economy and ideology of liberalism in Latin America); Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five
Roads to Modernity (1992) (discussing liberalism in England, France, Russia, Germany,
and United States).
293. See, e.g., Andre G. Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution
384-85 (1969); Munck, supra note 28, at 25-26.
294. See, e.g., Yuen & Wagner, supra note 252, at 209-10.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58, 174-177.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 143-144.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 167-169.
298. See supra text accompanying xiotes 81-83.
299. See supra text accompanying note 145.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 145, 170.
301. Cf. Frank, supra note 293, at 387 (calling for "further study" to understand
differences in scope and timing of various post-Depression nationalist movements in Latin
America).
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that lasted approximately a quarter century. By contrast, Indonesia did
not nationalize until the late 1950s but then returned to private enter-
prise within a decade.30 2 Malaysia, meanwhile, maintained laissez-faire
policies for some fifteen years after attaining independence in 1957; the
expansion of the public sector commenced only in the 1970s.303
Without denying the influence of First World events and trends on
Third World states, the variations in the timing of nationalization and
privatization among developing countries suggest that these movements
cannot be attributed solely to exogenous events. What needs to be ex-
plored are the conditions endogenous to developing countries that, in
case after case, have brought about a recurring oscillation between eco-
nomic extremes.
2. The Idealism-Sefishness Model. - Turning now to a "true" cycle
model, a second theory would emphasize the parallels between privatiza-
tion-nationalization cycles and another pattern of cyclical behavior long
observed and recently studied in detail by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Al-
bert Hirschman, and others.30 4 This cycle involves the regular swings
within a given society from periods in which individuals devote enormous
energies to public issues and political change, to periods of respite, in
which individuals are disillusioned with public ideals305 and more inter-
ested in pursuing their private lives and material gain. 306
A recurrent shift in social mood "between public purpose and pri-
vate interest"30 7 is not sufficient to explain the repeated alternation be-
tween privatization and nationalization in the developing world. First, in
developing countries nationalization and privatization cannot, respec-
tively, be equated with idealism and self-interest. Privatization move-
ments, no less than nationalization movements, are invariably presented
in idealistic, almost fervent, terms.308 Against the background of an en-
trenched corporatist state, a privatization movement can seem as revolu-
tionary as a nationalization movement: it too can be "liberating" and
"heady"; it too can demand sacrifices from the people on behalf of the
public good.30 9
302. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 187-218.
304. See, e.g., Henry Adams, History of the United States of America During the
Administration of ThomasJefferson 123 (The Library of America 1986) (1903); Albert 0.
Hirschman, Shifting Involvements 3, 8 (1982); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Paths to the Present
93 (1949); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History 25-48 (1986).
305. "People tire quickly of ideals," said Franklin D. Roosevelt. See Schlesinger, Jr.,
supra note 304, at 31 (footnote omitted).
306. Frantz Fanon's diagnosis of postrevolutionary conditions in formerly colonized
countries suggests a similar conclusion. See Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth 47,
77, 121, 135 (Constance Farrington trans., 1963).
307. Schlesinger, Jr., supra note 304, at 27.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 2-15.
309. Cf. Hirschman, supra note 304, at 129 (observing that, particularly during
periods of rapid economic growth, "total immersion in the private life" can also be
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More fundamentally, if a mere mood-swing between private interest
and public spiritedness accounted for the privatization-nationalization
cycle, then every country where such sharp vacillations have been ob-
served should also have undergone corresponding periods of privatiza-
tion and nationalization. But this is not the case: America is the obvious
counterexample.3 10
3. The Narrow Economic Model. - Most of the literature on privatiza-
tion today adopts an exclusively economic perspective. According to this
view, nationalization invariably brings a host of familiar economic evils,
including capital flight; inefficient production, employment, and pricing
decisions; excessive bureaucratization; and corruption.311 Often, nation-
alizing governments are ultimately forced to borrow from abroad to re-
duce their enormous public deficits.312 Eventually, rationality and eco-
nomic necessity prevail, returning the country to the free-market policies
from which it should never have departed.313
The importance of economic failure in bringing about the return to
private-ownership policies cannot be seriously doubted. The problem is
that an exclusively economic perspective cannot account for the privatiza-
"liberating" and generate excitement "as heady as the one experienced during a protest
demonstration").
310. The United States has undoubtedly alternated between periods of greater
emphasis on free-market policies and periods of greater emphasis on governmental
regulation. There have even been occasional acts of nationalization here, such as that
involving the Tennessee Valley Authority. See generally C. Herman Pritchett, The
Tennessee Valley Authority: A Study in Public Administration 317-24 (1943). But despite
the well-observed swings between "private and public involvements" in America, see
Hirschman, supra note 304, at 3, 8, 128-30; Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The
Promise of Disharmony 85-87 (1981); Schlesinger, Jr., supra note 304, at 23, there has
been no corresponding privatization-nationalization cycle here of anything resembling the
scope or dimension of those observed in developing countries.
311. See, e.g., Glade, supra note 7, at 4, 15; William Glade, Toward Effective
Privatization Strategies, in Privatization of Public Enterprises in Latin America, supra note
5, at 117, 121-22; Yuen & Wagner, supra note 252, at 213-14.
312. See, e.g., Glade, supra note 5, at 4; Yuen & Wagner, supra note 252, at 213-14.
313. The following is a characteristic account of the move from a nationalized to a
privatized economy:
During the 1960s and 1970s, there was reliance on government and considerable
faith in what government could achieve. . . . The public enterprises . . .
undermined the very objectives they were created to serve. Low fixed prices set to
help lower income people led to enterprise deficits. The deficits in turn led to
government ball-outs, financed either through taxes or inflation. Both taxes and
inflation hit the poorer citizen harder than the rich. "Model" employment
practices led to high wages... for public enterprise employees and entrenched
labor forces who were often not employed productively. . . . Many public
enterprises created secure, well-paying jobs for the few at the expense of the
many.
Developing countries have recognized the flaws in the earlier approach and
are creating a new division of labor between the public and private sector.
Shirley, supra note 8, at S32; see also Adam et al., supra note 6, at 3 (noting that "the




tion-nationalization cycle. It does not explain why so many developing
countries have returned to nationalization time and time again, although
nationalization has repeatedly failed. At best, commentators suggest that
nationalization comes about because of unfortunate "ideological" or
"political" considerations that overwhelm the rational goal of economic
efficiency.3 14 At worst, the implication is that Third World leaders are so
ignorant, self-serving, and incompetent that they keep making the same
mistake.
To be properly grasped, the problems facing today's privatizing
countries in the developing world must be studied within the context of
the historical cycles described in Part I. Given the repeated extreme reac-
tion against privatized regimes in the past, focusing exclusively on effi-
ciency, growth, and other economic issues may prove to be a short-
sighted strategy.
4. The Pessimistic-Marxist-Immiseration Model. - One simple way of
deepening the economic perspective would be to construct a broadly
Marxist narrative that interprets the reaction against free-market regimes
in developing countries as a revolt of exploited labor against an exploita-
tive capitalist class.3 15 On this view, during periods of free enterprise, a
few prosper while most of the populace is condemned to increasing
immiseration.31 6 The masses become increasingly unhappy with their
plight and with outrages such as Porfirio Diaz's exclusion of the poor
from Mexico City during the centennial celebration of Mexican indepen-
dence.317 There eventually comes a breaking point, when the proletariat
(assisted by some elements of the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals)
revolts. Nationalization follows, because the "struggle of the working
class against the capitalist class.., can only end in... the transfer of all
the land, instruments, factories, machines[,] and mines to the whole of
314. See, e.g., Savas, supra note 23, at 285-86; George Soros, Underwriting
Democracy 36-39, 44, 54 (1991); Martinez, supra note 3, at 478; Eric S. Maskin, Auctions
and Privatization, in Privatization: Symposium in Honor of Herbert Giersch 115, 117-18
(Horst Siebert ed., 1992) [hereinafter Privatization]; Moises Naim, Latin America: Post-
Adjustment Blues, Foreign Pol'y, Fall 1993, at 133, 133.
315. Such a perspective underlies the writings of various authors associated with the
Latin American dependencia movement that was prominent in the 1960s and 1970s. See
generally Robert A. Packenham, The Dependency Movement: Scholarship and Politics in
Development Studies 3 (1992). Most of the dependency writers, while critical of "certain
features of Marxist thought," accepted "the basic concepts, methods, theories, and
assumptions of Marxism," id. at 19, and called for the "fundamental transformation" of
Latin American society, as exemplified by Cuba. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 293, at 273.
For a review of the dependencia literature, see, e.g., Cardoso & Faletto, supra note 35, at
102; Richard R. Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba 19 (1969);
Richard i Fagen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Market: Thoughts on
Extending Dependency Ideas, 32 Int'l Org. 287 (1978); Gabriel Palma, Dependency: A
Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or a Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete
Situations of Underdevelopment?, 6 World Dev. 881 (1978).
316. See, e.g., Jean Waelbroeck, Comment on Douglass C. North, "Privatization,
Incentives, and Economic Performance," in Privatization, supra note 314, at 21, 24-25.
317. See supra text accompanying note 55.
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society for the organisation of socialist production."318
Here, however, the pessimistic Marxist account would depart from
orthodox Marxism and instead join the conventional narrative according
to which nationalization fails for familiar economic reasons. The proleta-
rian revolution fails to produce utopian results; instead, nationalization
brings with it capital flight and a period of economic decline that lasts
until the need for progress and development once again triumphs in the
form of privatization.
There is undeniably some truth to this account. Nationalizing lead-
ers have repeatedly invoked the themes of impoverishment and exploita-
tion to justify their programs.3 1 9 On the other hand, it is not at all clear
that the general population gets poorer, at least as an absolute matter,
during free-enterprise periods. Indeed, most of the evidence suggests the
contrary,3 20 although the same evidence indicates that income disparities
often increase (that is, the poor grow poorer as a relative matter)321
Even if it could be shown, however, that free-market policies in the
developing world have made the poor poorer, the Marxist model would
still be inadequate. The Marxist account suffers from a more fundamen-
tal weakness. It attempts in a sense to force the Third World into a First
World ideological mold that does not in reality fit.322 In particular, it
overemphasizes the extent to which nationalization programs in develop-
ing countries have been based on socialist or communist ideals.
To be sure, in developing countries Marxist rhetoric has often ac-
companied nationalization, and occasionally there has been a full-fledged
effort to eliminate private ownership of resources altogether.3 2 3 In gen-
318. V.I. Lenin, On Workers' Control and the Nationalisation of Industry 9-10
(Progress Publishers, Moscow 1974).
319. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 64; infra text accompanying notes
373-374.
320. See, e.g., Packenham, supra note 5, at 8. The economic consequences of
privatization (as well as of nationalization) have been studied extensively elsewhere. See,
e.g., Adam et al., supra note 6; The Promise of Privatization (Raymond Vernon ed., 1988);
Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 Marq. L. Rev. 449 (1988);
Clayton P. Gillette, Who Puts the Public in the Public Good?: A Comment on Cass, 71
Marq. L. Rev. 534 (1988).
321. See, e.g., M6rner, supra note 143, at 189 (Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia); Scobie, supra
note 164, at 175-76 (Argentina); Stallings, supra note 144, at 216-17 (Chile); Onn, supra
note 193, at 105-06 (Malaysia). But see, e.g., Packenham, supra note 5, at 3.
322. Cf. Golay et al., supra note 190, at 126 (noting nationalization by Indonesian
government in fifties and sixties "reflected the priority goal of indigenism rather than
socialism"); Packenham, supra note 315, at 17 (noting dependenda movement was in part
"an effort to criticize certain features of Marxist thought and practice which dependency
writers regarded as vulgar, outdated, incomplete, or faulty" as applied to Latin America);
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Race and Class in Post-
Colonial Society 23, 30 (1977) [hereinafter UNESCO) (noting cultural and ethnic aspects
of Latin American social system make it "much too complex" to be described as a "situation
of class struggle in the Marxian sense").
323. Cuba, Vietnam, and to a lesser extent, Burma, see supra text accompanying
notes 267-271, are examples.
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eral, however, nationalization programs in developing countries-unlike
those in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, and to some
extent Western Europe-have never sought to eliminate the institution
of private property, nor to eradicate all economic classes.3 24 On the con-
trary, in almost every case such programs have left the market system
more or less intact outside of the nationalized industries.3 25
The proposition to be developed in the remainder of this Part is that
in developing countries nationalization has been an expression far more
of nationalism than of socialism; that nationalization has coincided with
the endeavor, whether immediately after independence or in the wake of
a free-enterprise regime, to abolish foreign control and so achieve na-
tional autonomy. The explosive role that nationalism has played in the
Latin American and Southeast Asian political economies3 26 is central to
explaining the recurrence of the privatization-nationalization cycle in the
developing world.
B. Toward a Comprehensive Model: The Role of Nationalism
The following is an attempt to construct a model of the privatization-
nationalization cycle that starts from the premise that nationalism has
been a driving force in bringing about the economic oscillations de-
scribed in Part I. The point is not to detract from economic considera-
tions but rather to integrate them with the cultural and political condi-
tions that have led developing countries to adopt and then reject free-
market regimes over and over again.
One preliminary note: according to some scholars, nationalism is
best understood as an instrument used by elites to organize popular
324. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 293, at 270, 273 (criticizing land reforms by C~rdenas
and other Latin American leaders for leaving in place "the existing social order").
325. See Jan Winiecki, The Political Economy of Privatization, in Privatization, supra
note 314, at 71, 71; see also John Womack, Jr., The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1920, in
Mexico Since Independence, supra note 36, at 128-29 (noting that in Mexico, as in Peru,
Chile, and Argentina, the economic and social reforms of the 1920s "did not go nearly
deep enough to break capitalist domination of production"). Thus, the land reform
programs that were an important component of many Latin American and Southeast Asian
nationalization movements did not abolish private property in land, but rather created a
class of small landholding interests "with a vested interest in maintaining their new
advantages." Frank, supra note 293, at 293; see also Cardoso & Faletto, supra note 35, at
128.
326. With respect to Latin America, see, for example, Douglas C. Bennett & Kenneth
E. Sharpe, Transnational Corporations Versus the State: The Political Economy of the
Mexican Auto Industry 20-21 (1985); Bums, supra note 150, at 3, 8-12, 72-89; Keith
Coleman, Nationalisation: Beyond the Slogans 8 (1991); Finch, supra note 176; Katz,
supra note 36, at 108, 121; and Theodore H. Moran, Multinational Corporations and the
Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile 3-15 (1974).
In the Southeast Asian context, see, for example, Golay et al., supra note 190; Joseph
M. Grieco, Between Dependency and Autonomy: India's Experience with the
International Computer Industry 139 (1984); Horowitz, supra note 189; William R. Roff,
The Origins of Malay Nationalism 248 (1967).
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movements.8 27 In this view, "national identity is an artifact-the deliber-
ate creation of political activists bent on mobilizing popular support."
3 28
While this account may well fit some of the developing world's nationalist
movements, there have also been cases where nationalist leaders appear
to have been following as much as inciting a people's nationalist fer-
vor.3 29 The model developed in this Article is intended to embrace vari-
ous forms of developing-world nationalism, whether artifactual, spontane-
ous, or something in between.
There are two principal aspects to nationalism in developing coun-
tries: that directed at exogenous (Western or other "imperialist") for-
eigners and that directed at what I will call the "foreigner within."
1. Nationalism Directed Against the External Foreigner. - Professor
Albert Hirschman, among others, has observed the repeated "alterna-
tion" in the developing world between "contact and insulation," in which
a period of "openness to trade and capital of the developed countries" is
"followed by a period of nationalism and withdrawnness."330 Apart from
stating that "[i] n the period of openness, crucial learning processes take
place,"3 3 ' Hirschman offers no explanation for why such alternations re-
peatedly occur. It is not difficult, however, to fill in the details.
Courted by leaders seeking badly needed investment funds,3 32 the
foreigner enters the scene of a developing country's economy with his
capital and expertise. Depending on the country and circumstances, the
foreigner might do several things, ranging from building railroads or
327. See, e.g., Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin
and Spread of Nationalism 103 (rev. ed. 1991);John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State 29
(1982) ("[A] non-Western intelligensia can construct a new political identity from
nationalist ideology" and use it for its own ends.); Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change
169 (1964); E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, at 11 (1990); Guyora
Binder, The Kaplan Lecture on Human Rights: The Case for Self-Determination, 29 Stan.
J. Int'l L. 223, 242 (1993).
328. Binder, supra note 327, at 242.
329. See, e.g., Gonz5Iez Navarro, supra note 61, at 1, 2 (noting the "century-long
tradition" of Indian peasant revolts leading up to the Mexican Revolution). But cf.
Cardoso & Faletto, supra note 35, at 107 (stating that in Mexican Revolution "new
bourgeois groups" enlisted "the peasants as allies in order to use them as an 'army' against
the [Porfiriato] oligarchy").
330. Albert 0. Hirschman, Introduction: Political Economics and Possibilism
(November 1970), in A Bias for Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America
(Westview 1985) (1971); see also Richard M. Buxbaum, The Role of Public International
Law in International Business Transactions, in Public International Law and the Future
World Order 16-1, 16-6 (JosephJ. Norton ed., 1987) (noting that "new investment, not to
mention new trade, has followed" nationalization in various host countries, "in a few cases
even for a third time after a second wave of reactions"); Leon Trotsky, Nationalized
Industry and Workers' Management, in Writings of Leon Trotsky [1938-39], at 326
(Naomi Allen & George Breitman eds., 1974) (noting that in industrially underdeveloped
countries the government "veers between foreign and domestic capital").
331. Hirschman, supra note 330, at 25.




steel factories, to drilling oil or inundating the local population with
Coca-Cola and fried chicken.333 But one thing is clear: the foreigner is
making a profit; otherwise, he would leave.
In these circumstances, foreigners will have considerable incentive
for using their economic power to influence the local political actors who
make the relevant decisions about their continuing presence in the coun-
try. 3s 4 This may be an especially effective strategy given the lack of a tra-
dition of democratic processes in Third World countries335 and their con-
comitant tendency to develop a "predatory state"-a state "seeking to
maximize its own utility (including income, perquisites, and power) and
not necessarily the welfare of its citizens."336
The histories of developing countries are full of examples of foreign
economic power dominating local governmental policies. For example,
during the Porfiriato (1876-1880, 1884-1911), United States investors ex-
tracted from the government "special concessions with lower tax rates,...
legislative modifications," and "ridiculously low or fictitious prices."33 7
Similarly, in the Philippines, even after independence, United States cor-
porations and individuals received special privileges in insurance, bank-
ing, construction, plantation import and export, and the exploitation of
natural resources.338 The same was true throughout the developing
world: foreign capital was accompanied by foreign infiltration of local
politics, whether through overt measures such as legislative enactments,
or through bribery and patronage.339
This state of affairs has never lasted. At some point, the corruption
of the political actors and institutions by foreign influence becomes lo-
cally insupportable. The presence of the "ostentatiously opulent" for-
333. For reasons familiar to developmental economists, foreign investment does not
always promote the interests of the local population. Among other adverse effects, foreign
investment may reinforce dualistic economic structures and exacerbate income
inequalities; introduce inappropriate technologies of production; divert resources away
from basic foodstuffs or utilities to the manufacture of more lucrative products; suppress
domestic entrepreneurship; exploit local labor and resources; pursue short-term profit at
the expense of longer-term objectives; undermine local cultures; and produce a net
outflow of capital and profits. See, e.g., Michael P. Todaro, Economic Development in the
Third World 438-39 (3d ed. 1985).
334. See id. at 439; Detlev F. Vagts, Transnational Business Problems 120-21 (1986).
335. See, e.g., Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies 1-4,
28-32 (1968).
336. Deepak Lal, The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization, 1 World Bank
Econ. Rev. 273, 277 (1987).
337. Ulloa, supra note 42, at 40-41. In Mexico today, foreign investors'"clout is
growing" although often "behind the scenes, because it's politically risky for finance
ministers to be seen heeding the suggestions of foreigners." Craig Torres & Thomas T.
Vogel, Jr., Some Mutual Funds Wield Growing Clout in Developing Nations, Wall St. J.,
June 14, 1994, at Al.
338. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 45-46; DavidJ. Steinberg, The Philippines: A
Singular and a Plural Place 110-11 (3d ed. 1994).
339. See Adam et al., supra note 6, at 21.
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eigner,3 40 who seems not only to be extracting the nation's riches for
himself, but also to have the nation's leaders in his pocket, provokes an
extreme reaction. What happens next depends on each particular coun-
try: the old government may undergo a sudden and convenient conver-
sion, a new government "for change" may be elected, or there may even
be an armed revolution. In any event, the host government attempts to
reclaim political control by nationalizing.
Intense antiforeigner sentiments have in fact been voiced by nation-
alizing leaders throughout Latin America and Southeast Asia. After
Porfirio Diaz's "capitalist brand of modernity,"341 President Cirdenas
captured the sentiment of the disillusioned populace when he asked:
In how many of the villages bordering on the [foreign-owned]
oil fields is there a hospital, or school or social center, or a sani-
tary water supply, or an athletic field, or even an electric plant
fed by the millions of cubic meters of natural gas allowed to go
to waste?
What center of oil production, on the other hand, does not
have its company police force for the protection of private, self-
ish, and often illegal interests?...
Who is not aware of the irritating discrimination...? Com-
fort for the foreign personnel; misery, drabness, and insalubrity
for the Mexicans. Refrigeration and protection against tropical
insects for the former; indifference and neglect, medical service
and supplies always grudgingly provided, for the latter; lower
wages and harder, more exhausting labor for our people.3 42
Similar antiforeigner rhetoric accompanied the nationalization programs
of Per6n in Argentina,3 43 Batlle y Ord6fiez in Uruguay,344 Allende in
Chile,3 45 Sukarno in Indonesia,3 46 and U Nu in Burma.3 47
340. Fanon, supra note 306, at 96.
341. Gonzfilez Navarro, supra note 61, at 72; see also Michiko Tanaka, The Peasants
and the Nation-State in Japan, Mexico, and Russia (1860-1940), in Legorreta, supra note
33, at 78, 108 (describing Diaz's system as one of "absolute private ownership and positivist
liberal policies").
342. Miller, supra note 32, at 320-21 (citing Mexico's Oil: A Compilation of Official
Documents 878-79 (1940)).
343. See Rock, supra note 168, at 262-63 (noting that Per6n returned the railroads,
power plants, and telephones to wholly Argentine ownership, promising a New Argentina
founded on "'social justice, political sovereignty, and economic independence' ").
344. See Finch, supra note 176, at 207 (stating that in nationalizing foreign railroads
Batlle expressed widespread national "hostility towards foreign capital" and "British
imperialism").
345. See Moran, supra note 326, at 147, 153 (noting that, upon the nationalization of
the Anaconda, Kennecott, and Cerro copper companies, Allende stated, "The recovery of
Basic Resources is a sovereign decision reflecting the feelings of all Chilean people . ").
346. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 188 (noting that in nationalizing Dutch
business concerns Sukarno appealed to a "deep reservoir of anti-Dutch sentiment").




The difficulty, of course, is that nationalization eliminates not only
the foreigner, but also the foreigner's capital. After an initial period of
antiforeigner euphoria, the nation's economic problems grow increas-
ingly severe. The consequence: the nationalized, economically "in-
dependent" country moves into an economic crisis that can only be ad-
dressed by resorting once again to foreign capital and expertise. Lessons
of foreign domination from previous generations are subordinated to the
demand for development and modernization, which are suddenly discov-
ered to be bound up with notions of freedom and justice.3 48 "In our
country, the problem shared by the industrial and the agricultural sectors
is insufficiency of capital," wrote Argentina's President, Arturo Frondizi, a
generation ago.349 "The foreign investor is critical to our plans," de-
clared Philippine President Corazon Aquino in 1987, "we need foreign
investment and we have set the climate for it."350
The dangers of foreign domination posed by privatization in the de-
veloping world have not been ignored entirely by those involved in to-
day's privatization programs.351 Taking such dangers into account will
not, however, completely account for either nationalism in the develop-
ing world or its role in driving the privatization-nationalization cycle.
After all, not every country that has experienced severe dependence
on foreign capital has been locked into a privatization-nationalization
cycle.3 52
A more complete model would recognize the way in which certain
internal conditions prevalent throughout the developing world (but not,
interestingly enough, in Singapore)353 make nationalism a particularly
problematic political ideology; moreover, such a model would recognize
that nationalization programs in the developing world are never directed
exclusively at external foreigners, but also, and sometimes primarily, at
"the foreigner within."
2. Internally Directed Nationalism. - For the postcolonial countries
of the developing world, nationalism is a profoundly problematic propo-
sition. All countries, to a greater or lesser extent, bear the burden of
holding together a diverse population within an overarching political or-
ganization. But if every nation is to some extent an "imagined political
community,"35 4 or if nationhood always requires individuals to have "for-
348. See supra notes 9-11.
349. Arturo Frondizi, El Programa Agrario del MID, in Frondizi, supra note 14, at 33,
41. President Frondizi cited as additional problems Argentina's lack of heavy industry and
a weak infrastructure. See id.
350. Godinez, supra note 288, at 267.
351. See, e.g., Adam et al., supra note 6, at 49-50, 77, 91; Frydman & Rapaczynski,
supra note 23, at 198-200; Winiecki, supra note 325, at 71, 75.
352. Singapore, postwar Japan, and Germany are counterexamples that come
immediately to mind.
353. See infra note 383.
354. Anderson, supra note 327, at 15-16; see also Hobsbawm, supra note 327, at 10
(stating that "nationalism comes before nations"). Nationalism, it has been said, presents
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gotten many things,"355 still in the postcolonial nation, the imagination
must work harder, and the amnesiac quality of nationhood is far more
pronounced. "[T] he first thing colonial rule denies a people is their his-
tory."356 Consider, for example, the emergence of the modem state of
Burma (now Myanmar):
[T]he new Republic of the Union of Burma which came into
being on 4January 1948 bore little resemblance to any nation or
state from the historic past. The power and authority of the
Burman kings and the central courts at Ava and Mandalay had
been destroyed. The economic hub and the political centre had
moved to Rangoon.... And the institutions of political power
bequeathed to the new nation were an ill-fitting suit of clothes
modelled on the loose pattern of British parliamentary
democracy.357
Even more significantly, the new Burma included "thousands of square
miles of rugged hill tracts and loosely independent mini-states, covering
over 40 per cent of the total land area. These [mini-states] were also
home to diverse ethnic minority peoples .... "3 5 8 Thus, once the struggle
itself as "the awakening of nations to self-consciousness," but in reality always "invents
nations where they do not exist." Gellner, supra note 327, at 168.
355. Anderson, supra note 327, at 16, 158 (quoting Ernest Renan, Qu'est-ce qu'une
nation?, in 1 Euvres Completes 892 (1947-61) ("'Or l'essence d'une nation est que tous
les individus aient beaucoup de choses en commun, et aussi que tous aient oubli6 bien des
choses.' ")).
356. Smith, supra note 265, at 27.
357. Id.
358. Id. Similar political histories surround the post-colonial, national liberation
movements of the entire Third World. See Anderson, supra note 327, at 157; Bushnell &
Macaulay, supra note 29, at 22 (noting that the transformation of former colonial empires
into new sovereign nations in Latin America was quite superficial and that often there were
"much greater cultural and socioeconomic contrasts" within a single nation than across
nations); see also Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Illustrated Introductory History 213
(3d ed. 1985) (noting that Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, and Singapore "are quite clearly
modem creations").
If Anderson is correct, Indonesia provides an extreme illustration of an "invented"
nation:
Some of the peoples on the eastern coast of Sumatra are not only physically close
•.. to the populations of the western littoral of the Malay Peninsula, but they are
ethnically related, understand each other's speech, have a common religion, and
so forth. These same Sumatrans share neither mother-tongue, ethnicity, nor
religion with the Ambonese .... Yet during this century they have come to
understand the Ambonese as fellow-Indonesians, the Malays as foreigners.
Anderson, supra note 327, at 120-21. Moreover, Bahasa Indonesia, the "national
language" adopted in the 1920s, although commonly ascribed to "a putative ancestor in
the Riau Islands," in fact evolved from dienstmaleisch ("administrative-Malay"), which in
turn "belonged typologically with 'Ottoman' and that 'fiscal German' which emerged from
the polyglot barracks of the Hapsburg empire." Id. at 132-33.
Not all imperialists were Western. It was China that originally conquered,
geographically defined, and named Viet Nam. "That today's Vietnamese proudly defend a
Viet Nam scornfully invented by a nineteenth-century Manchu dynasty reminds us of...
the imaginative power of nationalism." Id. at 158.
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for independence has been won, the postcolonial nation has few cultural,
political, or historical resources by which to hold its stratified populace
together.359
Under these conditions, nationalism is necessarily problematic, and
a nationalist nationalization movement doubly so. Nationalization, pro-
claiming itself in the name of the interests and destiny of the nation as a
whole, is obliged to suppress the profound cleavages dividing the popu-
lace. At the same time, however, nationalization intensifies these divi-
sions because it invariably takes from one group of nationals for the sake
of another. The economic and political contest to which expropriation
gives rise fractures the nation along all the fault lines that lie below the
thin nationalist veneer.
The terrain on which this contradiction plays itself out most dramati-
cally is that of race or ethnicity. I will discuss Southeast Asia and Latin
America in turn.
(a) Southeast Asia. - Throughout Southeast Asia (as well as in Africa
and the Caribbean), developing countries are marked by "the number
and seriousness of cleavages along linguistic, religious, and racial-tribal
lines."360 The "permeative character" of these cleavages is reflected "in
the segmented organizational structure of ethnically divided societies."3 61
Thus, capital, labor, and political parties "are often organized on ethnic
lines," 362 and ethnic minorities tend to live and marry among themselves,
much as Jews did in Eastern Europe, Russia, and elsewhere.3 63
More crucially, during periods of laissez faire or free enterprise, it is
invariably the case that one ethnic minority (sometimes more) performs,
or is perceived as performing, disproportionately well in these coun-
tries. 364 As a result, nationalization and other policies of economic na-
359. See Hirschman, supra note 330, at 14; Yuen & Wagner, supra note 252, at 220.
360. Hirschman, supra note 330, at 14; see Horowitz, supra note 189, at 6 (discussing
the "long reach of ethnic affiliations").
361. Horowitz, supra note 189, at 7-8.
362. Id. at 8-9. This Article follows Horowitz in adopting "an inclusive conception of
ethnicity that embraces differences identified by color, language, religion, or some other
attribute of common origin." Id. at 41. Horowitz and others have argued that ethnicity is
best understood "as a form of greatly extended kinship":
The whole matter has been put nicely byJoshua A. Fishman. Kinship, he says, "is
the basis of one's felt bond to one's own kind .... It is the basis of one's
dependency, sociability and intimacy with them as a matter of course." And,
concludes Fishman, "ethnicity may be the maximal case of societally organized
intimacy and kinship experience." The ethnic tie is simultaneously suffused with
overtones of familial duty and laden with depths of familial emotion.
Id. at 57, 59-60 (footnote omitted).
363. See, e.g., Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust 36 (1989); cf. Lynn
Pan, Sons of the Yellow Emperor 129, 132-37 (1990) (discussing the "Jews of the East").
364. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 189, at 147-49, 166-71. Over the years,
numerous theories have been offered to explain this phenomenon. Many have
emphasized that colonizing powers followed the strategy of "divide and rule," thus
ensuring that successful indigenous entrepreneurs "were relative rarities" and that
economic control, to the extent it was not monopolized by the colonizer, lay "with a
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tionalism have gone hand in hand with racial or ethnic hatreds-hatreds
often overshadowing even the national resentment against "Western
imperialists."
In Malaysia, for years after independence the ruling Bumiputra con-
doned Britain's continued presence in mining and finance, rather than
permitting citizens of Chinese and Indian descent to increase their stakes
in the economy.3 65 Moreover, the dramatic expansion of the Malaysian
state sector in the seventies was directed expressly at improving the lot of
the "indigenous" nationals relative to the "nonindigenous" Chinese and
Indians.3 66
In Indonesia, despite centuries of colonization by the Dutch, the
emergence of Indonesian nationalism at the turn of the century resulted
directly "from the suddenly increased impingement of aggressively com-
petitive Chinese entrepreneurs upon the interests of the vestigial Java-
nese merchant class."3 67 Not surprisingly, Sukarno's sweeping national-
izations in the late fifties and sixties aimed not just at eradicating the
Dutch presence but also at narrowing the economic gap between "true"
Indonesians and the country's hated Chinese minority.3 68 Indeed,
through nationalization and other measures of economic nationalism,
Sukarno "indigenized" much of the Chinese-dominated financial sec-
tor;3 69 sixty percent of Indonesia's foreign trade; mining and most of the
modem industrial sector; and the greater part of Indonesia's importing
trade, including the lucrative, Chinese-controlled batik and rice
sectors.3
7 0
In Sri Lanka, Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike's radical expro-
priations of land and industry between 1970 and 1977 were part and par-
cel of the government's "Sinhala Only" program, which openly placed
politically impotent class of pariah [nonindigenous] businessmen-Lebanese, Indian, and
Arab in colonial Africa, Chinese, Indian and Arab in colonial Asia." Anderson, supra note
327, at 116; see also Gellner, supra note 327, at 103-06.
Others have stressed the importance of social "networking" among certain ethnic
minorities. See, e.g., W.L. Cator, The Economic Position of the Chinese in the
Netherlands Indies 61-62 (1936) (arguing that overseas Chinese "clearly discriminate" in
granting credit); Golay et al., supra note 190, at 181 (noting that Chinese in Indonesia and
elsewhere "organized themselves into an informal monopolistic structure, based on dialect
groupings"); Pan, supra note 363, at 132 (stating that "there was no network like the
network of Chinese connections, which joined market to market through clan or family").
365. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 346.
366. See supra text accompanying notes 201-206 (discussing the NEP).
367. George M. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia 67 (1952).
368. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 158, 181, 191-95; supra note 277.
369. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 137, 193. In addition to owning two of
Indonesia's major commercial banks, the Chinese largely controlled the informal money
market. See id. at 137.
370. See id. at 166, 193. Despite his "indigenization" campaign, Sukarno was
criticized by ethnic Indonesians for his "protective attitude to the Chinese minority,"
perhaps reflecting the gradual rapprochement under Sukarno between Indonesia and the
People's Republic of China. See id. at 197-98.
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the interests of "true" Sri Lankans over those of "Tamils, Christians of all
ethnic groups, and other minorities." 71 Mrs. Bandaranaike's nationaliza-
tions were accompanied by other acts of economic nationalism, such as
college admission quotas discriminating against Tamils and, following the
expropriation of domestic and foreign-owned plantations, the exclusion
of non-Sinhalese from land redistribution policies.3 72
In Burma, fear and hatred of "foreign infiltration"373 have marked
the country since independence. For U Nu, the country's first prime
minister, independence meant putting an end to
this unfair, one-sided economic system. The wealth of Burma
has been enjoyed firstly by the big British capitalists, next the
Indian capitalists, and next the Chinese capitalists. Burmans are
at the bottom, in poverty, and have to be content with the left-
over and the chewed-over bones and scraps from the table of
foreign capitalists.374
Nationalization was an important means of "Burmanizing" the econ-
omy.3 75 In the sixties and seventies, General Ne Win's expropriations of
over 15,000 enterprises reflected a larger anti-"alien" campaign and ex-
pressly targeted not just Westerners but also Indian and (to a lesser ex-
tent) Chinese proprietors, many of whose families had lived in Burma for
generations. 376
In Thailand, the nationalist movement early in this century was di-
rected "neither [at] the United Kingdom, which controlled 90 per cent of
Siam's trade, nor [at] France, which had recently made off with easterly
segments of the old realm," but rather at resident Chinese-referred to
by one Thai king as the "jews of the orient."377 Again, the Thai nationali-
zation program initiated in 1953 was a "countermeasure" against the
growing economic dominance of the local Chinese,378 and coincided
with other acts of economic nationalism, such as the slashing of the
Chinese immigration quota, the imposition of harsh new naturalization
laws, and exorbitant alien registration fees.379
371. Horowitz, supra note 189, at 383, 683; see de Silva, supra note 278, at 241-42; A.
Jeyaratnam Wilson, Politics in Sri Lanka 1947-1979, at 134 (2d ed. 1979).
372. See de Silva, supra note 278, at 241-42.
373. Golay et al., supra note 190, at 215 (quoting Editorial, The Nation,June 7, 1961,
at 4).
374. Id. at 211 (quoting U Nu, Towards Peace and Democracy 3 (1949)).
375. Burmanism was also carried out "by direct competition of the State with alien
enterprises, by giving economic advantages to Burmese nationals vis-a-vis aliens, and by
measures to limit the number of alien residents." Id.
376. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 209; Smith, supra note 265, at 200-01; supra
text accompanying note 271.
377. Anderson, supra note 327, at 94-95; Golay et al., supra note 190, at 268 (noting
the presence in Thailand "of a substantial alien minority displaying superior
entrepreneurial talents").
378. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 299-306; Yuen & Wagner, supra note 252, at
212.
379. SarDesai, supra note 251, at 226.
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In short, ethnicity has been a repeated factor in Southeast Asian na-
tionalization programs. Throughout this region, nationalization has
been directed not only at Western foreigners but also at the foreigner
within, and this double targeting is reflected in the familiar nationalist
slogans-for example, "Malay-Malaysia,"380 "Thailand for the Thai,"38'
and "Filipino First 3 82 -that have invariably accompanied nationalization
movements. 38 3
(b) Latin America. - In Latin America, the "transformation of the
former colonial empires into a host of new sovereign nations" was in
many ways as "artificial" as in Southeast Asia.38 4 On the other hand, at
least three profound differences between Latin American and Southeast
Asian society are significant for a comparative analysis of the impetus to-
ward nationalization. First, in Latin America, intermarriage (as well as
concubinage and polygamy) has been common from the beginning of
the colonial era.385 "No part of the world," as one commentator puts it,
"has ever witnessed such a gigantic mixing of races as the one that has
been taking place in Latin America and the Caribbean since 1492. In
380. See M. Nazrul Islam, Problems of Nation-Building in Developing Countries: The
Case of Malaysia 71 (1988).
381. Wyatt, supra note 251, at 254.
382. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 63.
383. Although not discussed in this Article, Singapore provides an interesting
exception to the general Southeast Asian pattern and merits greater exploration
elsewhere. Singapore was part of British Malaya until its expulsion in 1965 and thus shares
its prenationhood history with Malaysia. See SarDesai, supra note 251, at 257. Upon
gaining independence, the Singapore government, although highly interventionist, never
pursued a program of radical nationalization. Rather, its goal from the outset was to create
a mixed economy in which "the state... initiated many risk-taking ventures in partnership
with the private sector...." Yuen & Wagner, supra note 252, at 212.
The basic structure of Singapore's mixed economy has changed little since
independence. Indeed, Singapore has been lauded both as " 'an example of free market
economic success'" (Margaret Thatcher) and as an example of "positive, productive state
interventionism" (John Kenneth Galbraith). SarDesai, supra note 251, at 259. Moreover,
while the current government is planning to privatize some industries, it intends
simultaneously to increase the state's role in other sectors. See Yuen & Wagner, supra note
252, at 216. It is beyond the scope of this Article to explain the absence of extreme swings
between privatization and nationalization in Singapore. Worth noting, however, is that
Singapore differs from other Southeast Asian countries in this striking respect: the country
has always been dominated both politically and economically by a single ethnic majority,
the Chinese, who comprise roughly 70% of the population. See SarDesai, supra note 251,
at 13.
384. Bushnell & Macaulay, supra note 29, at 22. Indeed, the authors write, "If one
had asked an Indian of southern Mexico... what 'nation' he lived in, the answer.., would
no doubt have been Zapoteca, Guahibo, or another Indian ethnic division, not some such
abstract entity as Mexico or Colombia." Id. Further, the same holds true for all of Spain's
American colonies: The spatial fortuity of Madrid's military conquests determined the
original shaping of the various administrative units, each of which, "under the influence of
geographic, political and economic factors," took on over time "a self-contained
character." Anderson, supra note 327, at 54.




fact, it is impossible to determine the racial status of most Latin Ameri-
cans without a genetic and anthropometric investigation." 8 6 In part be-
cause ethnic and racial lines in this region are not starkly drawn, Latin
America has been able to avoid the extreme ethnic animus and violence
seen in Southeast Asia.
Second, throughout Southeast Asia economic and political power
are divorced, with a politically powerful majority characteristically contend-
ing against an economically dominant minority.3 8 7 By contrast, in Latin
American countries the elite landowning class has historically held both
economic and political power.
Third, as a result of the preceding two factors, Latin American na-
tionalization movements have historically had a powerful anti-elitist or
anti-aristocratic component absent from those of Southeast Asia. Latin
American nationalization has involved the attempt, at least rhetorically
and sometimes actually, to overturn a relatively rigid social hierarchy in
which a small landholding and to some extent hereditary elite dominated
not only the economy but also the politics of the rest of the country.3 88
Thus, by contrast to Southeast Asia, nationalization has often re-
quired significant political upheaval in Latin America. It has typically re-
quired an expropriation of political power as well as material resources
from the class against which nationalization is directed. Hence the im-
portance of populist political movements in Latin American nationaliza-
tion campaigns-Cirdenas's in Mexico, Per6n's in Argentina, Vargas's in
Brazil, and Batile y Ord6fiez's in Uruguay-in which new, popular polit-
ical bases were established to offset the political control formerly exer-
cised by a narrow, aristocratic oligarchy.
Despite such differences, a similar core dynamic operates in both
Southeast Asian and Latin American nationalization programs. That is,
in Latin America too, nationalization has been a means by which certain
groups, in the name of a superordinate national identity, try to reclaim
resources from other groups identified as foreigners. The latter include
not just external, "imperial" foreigners, but also the foreigner within-
the aristocratic elite.
The "foreignness" of the Latin American elite has been a recurrent
theme for Latin American writers, scholars, and politicians since indepen-
386. Id. at 1.
387. Again, Singapore is an exception. See supra note 383.
388. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 32, at 292 (Mexico); UNESCO, supra note 322, at
28-29, 195-97 (Bolivia); Fredrick B. Pike, The Problem of Identity and National Destiny in
Peru and Argentina, in Latin American History: Select Problems 173, 207, 218 (Fredrick
B. Pike ed., 1969) (Argentina); id. at 179 (Peru). To say that Latin American
nationalization movements have been anti-aristocratic is not to say that they have been
Marxist. On the contrary, the anti-aristocratic element of Latin American nationalization
explains why it has never been a rigorously anticapitalist movement, but rather one in
which middle classes, workers, rural poor, and even entrepreneurs could all
enthusiastically join together. See, e.g., M6rner, supra note 143, at 200; infra text
accompanying notes 434-438 (discussing Argentina under Per6n).
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dence-not least because of the propensity of the well-to-do to define
themselves through European (and later American) cultural habits.389
During the Pofiriato in Mexico, for example, "theatres were built where
opera singers brought in directly from France and Italy would warble for
the well-to-do," and "[a]mongst the chic, it was a point of pride to be
Gallic in terms of food, women, dress, and drink."3 90 According to one
estimate from Ecuador, in 1900-1913 the outflow of money that enabled
the rich to travel or live abroad "equaled the service on the foreign
debt."391 Today, too, a mark of distinction throughout the upper eche-
lons of Latin American society continues to be having been educated
abroad, owning foreign cars, having a surname traceable to colonial roots
and, in the main, pursuing "a European life-style." 392
The perceived foreignness of the Latin American elite has not been
solely a cultural matter. Numerous Latin Americanists have called atten-
tion to the ties between the landholding classes and foreign capital.3 93
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto refer to traditional land-
owning elites in Latin America as "the main sustaining force for foreign
interests" 394; Paul Baran condemns them as allies of foreign enterprise
"dedicated to the defense of the existing feudal-mercantile order"395;
Andre Gunder Frank castigates the criollos who, he says, have been noth-
389. Diplomat and novelist Gilberto Amado, in his Hist6ria da Minha Infancia, gives
us the following description of aristocratic life in late nineteeth-century Brazil:
[E]verything was imported.... Men's clothing for a tropical climate was made of
English cloth suitable for life in the unheated homes of an English winter. I
asked myself: how did they stand the heat? The ladies... used slippers of heavy
wool as if they were in Siberia.... When I look at a photograph of Jos6 do
Patrocinio, I note the collar of twill, and I ask myself how he could stand, during
the abolitionist campaign, to give his speeches in the Recreio Dramdtico with that
pressure on his body. Imagining the rivers of sweat pouring down, I sweat with
him.
Burns, supra note 150, at 38 (quoting novelist Gilberto Amado).
390. Luis Gonzalez, supra note 39, at 69-70; see Katz, supra note 36, at 71.
391. M6mer, supra note 143, at 180. The darker side of the elite's adulation of
Europe has been a corresponding determination to destroy primitive" indigenous culture.
See Bums, supra note 152, at 253-54. Illustrative of a strong, nineteenth-century
sentiment among certain members of the Latin American intelligentsia was Argentine
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento's influential book, Civilizaci6n y Barbarie, which depicted
"Argentine cities as a kind of funnel through which European civilization passed on its
mission to tame the interior." Id. at 253.
392. See, e.g., Patricia Muck, The Society and Its Environment, in Bolivia: A Country
Study 49, 69 (Rex A. Hudson & Dennis M. Hanratty eds., 3d ed. 1991).
393. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 36, at 103-05, 113; M6rner, supra note 143, at 159;
Rock, supra note 168, at 312; Scobie, supra note 164, at 246-47. Certainly, the interests of
the domestic elite and foreigners have not always coincided. See Finch, supra note 176, at
193 (noting conflict in turn-of-the-century Uruguay between domestic capital class and
foreign capital); Scobie, supra note 164, at 187-88 (noting resentment by Argentinian elite
against westerners during the depression).
394. Cardoso & Faletto, supra note 35, at 27.
395. Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth 195 (1957).
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ing but "minor partners of North American imperialism" 3 96; and many
others as well have denounced the " 'anti-nation inside the nation.' "97
In these respects, the perceived foreignness of the Latin American
aristocracy differs from that of Southeast Asian ethnic minorities. The
Latin American foreigner within has been identifiable-as a matter of
historical continuity, cultural habits, and economic connections-with
the imperialist, First World foreigner in a way that (for example) the
Chinese in Malaysia have not. Nevertheless, ethnicity has played a more
significant role in defining the Latin American foreigner within than one
might think.
Although the "mestization" of Latin America might suggest a readi-
ness to transcend racial boundaries, its effect has been rather to establish
a more complex structure of color consciousness.3 98 Throughout
Spanish America, the so-called sociedad de castas
was created by transferring to the New World the hierarchic, es-
tate-based corporative society of late medieval Castile and impos-
ing that society upon a multiracial, colonial situation. This colo-
nial reality was characterized, first, by the dichotomy between
conquerors and conquered, masters and servants or slaves, and,
second, by the miscegenation between these opposite groups.
Hence it was inevitable that social stratification and social status
would become closely related to the division into ethnic groups.
The location of the existing ethnic groups within the hierarchic
social structure gave rise to what a Chilean student has inge-
niously called "pigmentocracy." People were classified in accordance
with the color of their skin, with the white masters occupying the highest
stratum.399
The disdain of a "pure"-blooded elite400 for the "colored" masses is a
deeply ingrained feature of the history of every modem Latin American
nation.401 In Mexico, for example, mixed-blooded mestizos were for
years prohibited from owning land or joining the army or clergy.40 2 In
Peru, even intellectuals believed that "the Indian is not now, nor can he
396. Frank, supra note 293, at 240.
397. Packenham, supra note 315, at 9; see, e.g., Palma, supra note 315, at 899-904.
398. See Harris, supra note 40, at 36-40.
399. Race Mixture, supra note 385, at 54 (citing Alejandro Lipschiitz, El
Indoamericanismo y el Problema Racial en las Americas 75 (2d ed. 1944)) (emphasis
added).
400. The notion that Spanish blood is "pure" or "white" is ironic. "[Tlhe Iberian
Peninsula itself was anything but ethnically homogeneous. A long series of peoples had
succeeded each other on Iberian soil, merging genetically as well as culturally: Iberians,
Celts, Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians, Romans, Visigoths, Jews, Arabs, Berbers,
Gypsies, and medieval slaves of different origins." Id. at 13.
401. Latin America was- greatly influenced by "specious racial doctrines imported
from Europe," includingJoseph A. de Gobineau's Essai sur l'Inegalit6 des races humaines,
which attested to "the superiority of the northern European," and Gustave Le Bon's
classification of "all mankind into superior and inferior races." Burns, supra note 152, at
316.
402. See Race Mixture, supra note 385, at 43, 60, 99; UNESCO, supra note 322, at 27.
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ever be, anything but a machine."403 In Chile, the victory in the War of
the Pacific (1879-1883) "was sometimes attributed to the 'whiteness' of
the Chileans, as compared with the 'Indians' of Bolivia and Peru."
40 4
A popular Argentinian author wrote in 1903 that mestizos and mulat-
tos were both "impure, atavistically anti-Christian; they are like the two
heads of a fabulous hydra that surrounds, constricts and strangles with its
giant spiral a beautiful, pale virgin, Spanish America."405 Brazil, mean-
while, has been described "as a hell for Negroes."40 6 And throughout
Latin America, landowners preferred their daughters to marry penniless
peninsulares (arrivals from Spain), rather than wealthy criollos (American-
born Spaniards),
for, if nothing else, the fact of being born in the Old World was
reasonably good proof of being pure white. That could not
quite be taken for granted even among the wealthiest members
of the colonial aristocracy, whose ancestors had been living for
years alongside not just the Indians but also the blacks .... 4o7
Ethnicity remains a pervasive feature of Latin American society.
Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and the countries of Central America are
still characterized by fundamentally pigmentocratic social structures. 408
Even in Brazil, which saw large waves of immigration from Europe early
this century,409 there remains "an ideal racial ranking gradient, in which
whites occupy the favorable extreme," and color continues to be "one of
the criteria of class identity."410 Similarly, in Chile, not just the upper,
but also the middle classes, "[p]riding [themselves] on [their] white-
ness," consist "by and large [of] believe[rs] in the inferiority of Indians
and mixed bloods."41'
The ressentiment engendered by Latin American racism, always inter-
woven with the struggle between rich and poor, has been a powerful en-
gine of revolutionary change throughout the region. In countries with
significant Indian populations, the revolutionary periods were repeatedly
characterized by efforts to champion Indian culture and to make the per-
centage of Indian blood in one's veins a mark of status.412 "The only true
Peru is Indian Peru," said nationalist leader, Luis Valcircel in 1927.413 At
403. Mrmer, supra note 143, at 181 (quoting "a Peruvian intellectual of great
reputation, Alejandro Deustua").
404. Race Mixture, supra note 385, at 141.
405. Id. at 140 (quoting Carlos 0. Bunge, who "had many readers at the time").
406. Id. at 72.
407. Bushnell & Macaulay, supra note 29, at 5.
408. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 40, at 38, 96; Mrner, supra note 143, at 257; Pike,
supra note 59, at 107-08.
409. See Race Mixture, supra note 385, at 133-34; infra note 432.
410. Harris, supra note 40, at 60-61.
411. Fredrick B. Pike, Chile and the United States, 1880-1962, at 36, 289-92, 444-45
(1963).
412. See Race Mixture, supra note 385, at 142-43.
413. Pike, supra note 388, at 182 (footnote omitted).
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the same time, particularly in countries with smaller Indian populations,
the mixed-blooded mestizo was also glorified. The mestizo became "the
treasury of all the previous races, the final race, the cosmic race,"414 "the
symbol of the original affinity among men."415 Meanwhile, in Brazil and
the Caribbean, nationalists embraced "Afro-Latin Americanism." As one
writer declared, "[tihe Negro is the people in Brazil."416
Nationalization movements in Latin America have long been fueled
by such ethnically tinted nationalism-a nationalism framed against the
background of an elite class celebrating its whiteness and allying itself
with foreign (first European and later American) cultures. Throughout
Latin America, nationalizers have mobilized support for their movements
not only with class-based rhetoric, but also with appeals to ethnicity and
national identity, seeking in most cases to preserve the white/non-white
dichotomy but to reverse its polarity. Indigenism 417 "became a main in-
gredient in a new, more authentic brand of nationalism" that sought to
redress "the immense gap between the light-skinned descendants of the
victors and the dark-skinned descendants of the vanquished."418
Thus, in Mexico from 1920 to 1940, nationalizing leaders fomented
the revolutionary spirit by championing Indian causes (most saliently
through land reform) and glorifying Indian culture.419 These leaders
were supported by the "artistic, literary, and scholarly communities," who
awakened "the consciousness of the new social order" with their murals,
novels, poetry, and musical compositions. 420 During Cirdenas's adminis-
tration, "indigenist action became more vigorous."421 The government
established a Department of Indian Affairs in 1936 and the Instituto
Nacional de Antropologia e Historia three years later.422 While exalting
"indigenous communalist values," Cirdenas assailed "the excesses of indi-
vidualistic capitalism" 4 23; his nationalizations targeted not only Ameri-
cans, but also the (almost exclusively white) hacendados with their links to
414. Race Mixture, supra note 385, at 1 (quoting Mexican philosopher Jos6
Vasconcelos, Raza C6smica (1925)); see also Miller, supra note 32, at 312 (in The Cosmic
Race, Vasconcelos "predicted a brilliant destiny for [Mexicans] because of their
multicultural heritage stemming from a blend of blood and traditions").
415. Pike, supra note 388, at 183 (footnote omitted) (quoting Peruvian historian Jos6
Varallanos).
416. Race Mixture, supra note 385, at 147 (quoting Brazilian Guerreiro Ramos).
417. Also known as "indianism," indigenism in the Latin American context refers to
an ideology of promoting (and often glorifying) the interests and culture of American
Indians. See id.
418. M6rner, supra note 143, at 199.
419. See Meyer, supra note 56, at 207-09, 256-57; Miller, supra note 32, at 309.
Crdenas was himself the grandson of a Tarascan Indian and "made much of the Indian
question" in his original campaign for president. Meyer, supra, at 267.
420. Meyer & Sherman, supra note 32, at 614; see id. at 614-22.
421. Race Mixture, supra note 385, at 143; see Meyer, supra note 419, at 267-68.
422. See Meyer & Sherman, supra note 32, at 621; Meyer, supra note 419, at 267-68.
423. Pike, supra note 59, at 272.
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foreign capital and their European cultural pretensions.424
In Peru, "[c] hauvinist nationalism" also served as "an excellent polit-
ical tool" for nationalizing leaders seeking to bridge the country's "wide
ideological and social cleavages." 425 In the 1920s and 1930s, and again in
the 1960s, nationalist leaders joined "[t]he glories of the Inca past...
with the Indian misery of the present" to foment "anti-oligarchy, anti-cler-
ical, pro-Indian and worker revolutionary ideas."426 These movements
were simultaneously Marxist, nationalist, and deeply ethnic in character:
"Our economy, our political organization, our social architecture, our
literature and our art, the forms of our lives must be ours, created by us
and for us . . . we believe in and feel the creative potential of our [Indian]
race."427 Again, Peruvian nationalizations in this century were directed
not just at "imperialists" abroad but also at the Spanish-blooded, "Paris-
obsessed" internal elite. 428
In Bolivia, as early as 1909, indigenistas, such as novelist-historian
Alcides Argfiedas, were "condemn[ing], in stark colors, the exploitation
of the Indians by their various oppressors."429 Some thirty years later, the
revolutionary party, Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario ("MNR"),
mobilized the largely mestizo middle class with slogans like, "The land to
the Indians, the mines to the State."430 After the MNR seized power in a
bloody coup in 1952, the government aimed its drastic-and economi-
cally disastrous-nationalization and land reform programs at the crio-
llo-"illustrious-blooded" hacendados and mine owners-in an attempt to
reverse the ethnically-based "disdain that [had] imbued society" at every
level since the colonial period.431
Not surprisingly, in the nationalization movements of countries such
as Argentina, Uruguay, and parts of Brazil and Chile, in which Indian
populations were largely extinguished and in which the "enormous
waves" of European immigrants came to be a majority early this cen-
tury,432 ethnicity has played a more erratic role. While in every case the
idea of an internal foreigner remained an organizing force, at times na-
424. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 44, at 252; Meyer, supra note 34, at 36-37; Miller,
supra note 32, at 319; Meyer, supra note 419, at 259-62.
425. M~mer, supra note 143, at 200.
426. Id. at 185, 196.
427. Id. at 202 (emphasis added) (quoting intellectual leaderJos6 Carlos Marifitegui).
428. Id. at 187; see id. at 199, 202.
429. Id. at 196-97.
430. Id. at 205.
431. Id. at 69; see Jos6 Havet, The Diffusion of Power: Rural Elites in a Bolivian
Province 30-42 (1985); M~mer, supra note 143, at 221-22; Xavier Alb6, From MNRistas to
Kataristas to Katari, in Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant
World, 18th to 20th Centuries 382 (SteveJ. Stem ed., 1987).
432. Previously mainly mestizo, the temperate zone of southern South America
received most of the twelve million European immigrants... mainly from Italy,
Spain, Portugal, [and Germany] ... who arrived in Latin America between 1850
and 1930.... Since Argentina, Uruguay, and the south of Brazil formerly were
very sparsely populated, the enormous waves of newcomers soon outnumbered
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tionalizing leaders, like Chile's President Allende, have sought to define
this foreigner within using exclusively class-based terms.433 Nevertheless,
in many of these "Europeanized" countries, nationalizing leaders have
sought to harness this ethnic component and the ressentiment it generates
in ingenious ways.
Without doubt, Per6n's appeal to the "shirtless masses" 43 4 was first of
all an economic, even quasi-socialist appeal. 435 But when Per6n called on
these masses, together with the middle-class sons of Italian, German,
Irish, and Portuguese immigrants to join together as the "true
Argentinians," he was appealing to something more. These assorted
groups were "true Argentinians" precisely in opposition to the aristocratic
estancieros, whom Per6n accused of attempting to "sabotage" the na-
tion.4 6 With his extensive nationalization campaign targeting not just
yanquis but aristocratic oligarcas as well, Per6n was able, perversely, to
scapegoat the "old ruling elite" while at the same time "presenting him-
self as the promoter of native values."43 7 In a strange reversal, the "pure"
blood of the elite became an impure blood, explicitly associated with for-
the original population, although they gradually adopted at least part of the
criolIo tradition and also the language of the land.
Race Mixture, supra note 385, at 133-34.
433. Allende's economic minister described the government's program as providing a
role for "the vanguard of the working class to organize an alliance of classes that will
embrace all anticapitalist sectors. Here, too, we are discussing the unification of the people
as a whole, while defining at the same time who are the enemies of the people." Patricia Santa
Lucia, The Industrial Working Class and the Struggle for Power in Chile, in Allende's
Chile 128, 133 (Philip O'Brien ed., 1976) (emphasis added) (quoting 1971 report of
Minister Pedro Vuskovic to the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance of Progress).
Similarly, Allende called for unity against an aristocratic foreigner within: "We seek the
unity of all those sectors which to varying degrees, are exploited by the property-owning
minority who occupy the centers ofpower." Id. at 130 (emphasis added) (quoting a speech given
by President Allende to workers on May 21, 1971). In fact, this "property-owning minority"
was at least in part an ethnic minority: the highly insular elite identifiable by-and
identifying itself through-the "purity" of its bloodline and the longevity of its "old family"
lineage. See Pike, supra note 411, at xxii. It seems, however, that Allende's Popular Unity
party never explicitly exploited this ethnic dimension.
434. Rock, supra note 168, at 263.
435. Unlike Allende, however, Per6n refused to define the enemy in socialist terms.
Per6n declared before the Argentine stock exchange in 1944: "Businessmen (se~lores
capitalistas]: Don't be afraid of my unionism [sindicalismo]. Never has Capitalism been
firmer than now .... What I want to do is to organize workers through the state .... In
this way revolutionary currents endangering capitalist society in the postwar can be
neutralized." Rock, supra note 168, at 257 (footnote omitted).
436. See Fillol, supra note 168, at 83-84; Scobie, supra note 164, at 219; Kenworthy,
supra note 168, at 40. On the polyclass nature of Per6n's support, see id. at 25.
437. Fillol, supra note 168, at 83-84; see id. at 31. According to Kenworthy, Per6n
subjected the agricultural elite "to economic policies that drained their wealth," and,
further, used outright force "to seize several bastions of high society: converting the
newspaper La Prensa into a Peronist organ .... opening resorts to the lower class, and
burning the Jockey Club and the cathedrals." Kenworthy, supra note 168, at 40, 43.
Kenworthy argues that Per6n directed his hostilities not only at the traditional agricultural
elite, but also at the modem industrial elite. See id. at 43.
[Vol. 95:223
PRJVATIZATION-NATIONAL!ZATION CYCLE
eignness, 438 while the genuine blood of true Argentina ran rather in the
veins of the bastard masses and polyglot newcomers.
Another interesting variation is found in Brazil, where slavery was
more extensive than in most of Spanish America.439 Brazilian intellectu-
als of the early twentieth century purported to repudiate racism as "yet
another European effort to subjugate their country by an insidious
mental colonization."440 Calling for the "nationalization of commerce,"
condemning foreign influence, and decrying "the economic and political
monopoly" of the wealthy plantation and ranch owners (fazendeiros),
these new nationalists formulated a counter-conception of the unique
"Brazilian culture and race" in which miscegenation played a crucial and
positive role:
[I]t is easy to discern the immense influence the Negroes had in
the formation of the Brazilian people.... The mixing of the
races modified relations between master and the slave, relaxed
our customs, and produced the mulatto who constitutes the ma-
jority of our population and to a certain degree the most beauti-
ful part of our race.441
Getfilio Vargas, "a master manipulator of the increasingly complex forces
in Brazilian society," was eventually able to harness this rising nationalism
to support his nationalization and industrialization policies.442
To summarize, in Latin America as well as in Southeast Asia, nation-
alization movements have been organized and powerfully motivated by
nationalist ideologies targeting not only external foreigners, but also resi-
dent groups depicted as foreigners within. And although more intermit-
tently and often more obscurely in Latin America than in Southeast Asia,
ethnicity has played a significant role in defining this nationalism, in mo-
bilizing popular support for it, and in turning its divisive energies inward.
3. Cycicality. - I have addressed so far the repeated shifts in devel-
oping countries from privatizing to nationalizing regimes. The foregoing
analysis, however, also sheds light on the shift back from nationalization
to privatization. As discussed earlier, the economic failures of nationali-
zation in developing countries have surely played a dominant role in
bringing about a return to free-market policies.443 But nationalization
has also unravelled ideologically and politically throughout the develop-
ing world.
438. See id. at 83-84.
439. See Race Mixture, supra note 385, at 72.
440. Burns, supra note 152, at 319-20.
441. Id. at 319; see also id. at 327, 341-42 (describing attempts by Brazilian
intellectuals to rid themselves of European influence).
442. Id. at 356. Although "[h]is government acquired a decidedly populist cast,"
Vargas "tried not to antagonize the rural oligarchy. Land reform, for example, was neither
an interest nor a goal of his government. He managed to offer something to both the elite
and the masses." Id. at 367-68.
443. See supra text accompanying notes 311-314.
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If nationalization were directed solely at external foreigners, the na-
tionalist ideology underlying it might exert a unifying force throughout
an entire society. But to the extent that nationalization turns inward,
overtly or covertly targeting internal minorities, it fractures the nation in
the same gesture that is meant to unify it. This phenomenon has un-
folded differently in the Southeast Asian and Latin American contexts,
but the same self-consuming process is observable in both regions.
As we have seen, in the countries of Southeast Asia, nationalization
has typically occurred under the aegis of leaders attempting to define the
nation in terms of a single, "true" ethnicity. In these countries, however,
there simply is no "true" national ethnicity. For example, in Malaysia the
Malays actually comprise only about fifty percent of the nation's total
population.444 In Sri Lanka, the hated "intruder" Tamils (Ceylon and
Indian) comprise roughly twenty percent of the population; moreover,
"[t] he Ceylon Tamils, who arrived, on average, perhaps a thousand years
ago, can hardly be regarded as immigrants, even though the Sinhalese
arrived, on average, earlier."445 In Burma, which comprises over 100 eth-
nic subgroups, each speaking a different language, the census itself is so
contested that no certain data exist.446 Even according to government
figures, "native Burmans" make up less than two-thirds of the population,
and among these "Burmans," there are numerous "distinctive dialects
and local sub-groups" to which "loyalties still run very deep."447
Under these conditions, an ethnic group seeking to capture the na-
tion's resources and identity for itself has a number of paths it might
pursue. For example, it could try to secede, rejecting the existing na-
tional boundaries and claiming a certain territory as its own; it could try
to expel the other ethnic groups; or it could try to exterminate those
groups. These violent strategies, however vicious, involve no internal con-
tradictions. But a nationalism that simultaneously seeks to forge the na-
tion's identity in terms of a single ethnicity and yet to retain the bounda-
ries and populace bequeathed to the nation by its colonial past is almost
incoherent.
For a startling illustration of this incoherence, consider the remarks
of Burma's President Ne Win, who nationalized virtually every industry in
an attempt to "Burmanize" the economy:
444. Even the widely accepted notion that Malays are "the original" Malaysians is
misleading. Although the largest, Malays are only one of several indigenous peoples, most
of whom do not share a common language, religion, or culture. Nor are the Malays the
people with the longest history in Malaysia; on the contrary, the true aborigines, such as
the semi-nomadic "negritos" and the "proto-malays," were themselves displaced and
marginalized by the politically dominant Malays. See Andaya & Andaya, supra note 186, at
2-4; SarDesai, supra note 251, at 9-10. In addition, "a good many Chinese can trace their
roots in Malaysia much further back than the roots of fairly recent Indonesian immigrants
who are assimilated to the Malay identity." Horowitz, supra note 189, at 203.
445. Horowitz, supra note 189, at 203.
446. See Smith, supra note 265, at 30.
447. See id. at 30-31.
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Today you can see that even people of pure blood are being
disloyal to the race and country .... If people of pure blood act
this way, we must carefully watch people of mixed blood. Some
people are of pure blood, pure Burmese heritage .... Karen,
Kachin and so forth, are of genuine pure blood. But we must
consider whether these people are completely for our race, our
Burmese people: and our country, our Burma.448
By exalting people "of genuine pure blood," of "pure Burmese heritage,"
Ne Win was manifesting a sad but familiar pathology: he himself was of
mixed Burman-Chinese ancestry.449 But Ne Win's vision of "our race,"
"our country, our Burma" was a doomed fantasy in a political as well as
personal sense: there was no "Burma," and there has never been a "Bur-
mese people," that did not include multiple, contending ethnicities. And
not only multiple ethnicities: the "Burmese people" invoked by Ne Win
were similarly riven by religious, political, and economic rivalries. It is no
surprise, then, that Ne Win's nationalization program, which expressly
targeted Indian and Chinese proprietors and which encouraged the
"Burmese people" to identify nationhood with bloodline, precipitated the
country into a long period of interethnic warfare.450 The ethnically
driven nationalization movements in Indonesia451 and Sri Lanka 452 met
similar fates.
By contrast, Latin American nationalizers have not sought to define
the nation as belonging to or consisting of a single "pure" ethnicity. In-
stead, they have attempted to mobilize an interclass and interethnic na-
tionalism defined in opposition to the aristocractic elite. Consequently,
as observed above, Latin American nationalizers and nationalists have
been able to celebrate the virtues of the mixed-blooded mestizo (or of
bearing some portion of Indian blood in one's veins) in a fashion that
could not contrast more sharply with Ne Win's suspicion of Burmese with
"mixed blood."
On the other hand, the embarrassment of Ne Win's own mixed-
bloodedness has its counterpart in the conspicuous fact that the leaders
of Latin America's nationalization regimes have themselves almost invari-
ably been much more closely affiliated with the elite than with the Indian
or mestizo peasants in whose name they often acted. In fact, despite im-
portant differences, Latin American nationalization has been afflicted
with the same disintegrative inner logic that has undermined the nation-
alization movements of Southeast Asia.
If Latin American nationalizers had dismantled the class and ethnic
divisions of their societies-through whatever radical measures-their
448. Id. at 37 (footnote omitted) (quoting speech of Ne Win (Dec. 11, 1979)).
449. See id.
450. See, e.g., Golay et al., supra note 190, at 212-13, 262-64; Smith, supra note 265,
at 202-06, 219-23.
451. See Osborne, supra note 358, at 194-95; C.L.M. Penders, The Life and Times of
Sukarno 180-83 (1974).
452. See de Silva, supra note 278, 254-268.
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programs would have been coherent. But this has never been the case.
On the contrary, nationalizing Latin American regimes have, in almost
every case, left intact the largely pigmentocratic class structures that
marked this region long before independence. In these conditions, the
"nation" in whose name nationalization occurred has been a fiction that
cannot long be sustained.
This has been the fate of nationalization programs throughout Latin
America. In Mexico, for example, political disintegration followed on the
heels of the initial success of Cirdenas's nationalization programs. The
entrepreneurial segments of the economy, still in place despite the na-
tionalization of key industries,453 grew increasingly hostile to Cfirdenas's
anticapitalist and pro-Indian rhetoric. 45 4 At the same time, antigovern-
ment dissent and internal conflict broke out among the trade unions, 455
as the "classless society" promised by Cardenismo failed to materialize. 456
Finally, by 1940, the largely Indian rural poor, despite (or perhaps be-
cause of) Cdrdenas's land reform programs, no longer represented a bloc
supportive of the once-revolutionary government. 457 On the contrary,
confronted by the same basic social hierarchy that existed before, this
group became just one class among several demanding satisfaction of
their interests, which they had been taught to view as the interests of the
"nation."458 In short, "[t]he relative national unity created by the revolu-
tionary process" had broken down.4 59
Similarly, in Chile, Allende's nationalization movement, although
much more self-consciously Marxist, during its short life remained an
abortive effort to forge a coalition among workers, small agrarian inter-
ests, and what was called the petty bourgeoisie. Similar "multi-class alli-
ances," forged in opposition to a largely hereditary elite, were attempted
by almost all of Latin America's nationalizing regimes. As Barbara
Stallings puts it,
Such an alliance may be possible in a society with abundant
and increasing resources, and where class conflict is muted, but
these conditions did not prevail in Chile-nor do they in most
other Third World countries. [These] regimes succeeded in im-
plementing their models for a short period of time, but then the
internal contradictions of the alliances reached such a stage that
"caretaker" governments were all that were possible.460
Per6n's Argentina is yet another vivid example of this process. The
echelons of society that Per6n united against the estancieros by no means
453. See supra text accompanying notes 324-325.
454. See Miller, supra note 32, at 320.
455. See id.; Knight, supra note 65, at 291.
456. See Knight, supra note 65, at 318.
457. See Cardoso & Faletto, supra note 35, at 144.
458. See Knight, supra note 65, at 290-93.
459. Cardoso & Faletto, supra note 35, at 144.
460. Stallings, supra note 144, at 231.
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constituted a "monolithic class." 4 6 1 In these circumstances, Per6n's na-
tionalism-a nationalism that began by identifying those Argentinians
who had prospered under the previous regime as "antinational 4 62 -as
foreigners within-was far too thin to keep the rival parties from turning
against each other. Thus Per6n's nationalization regime eventually dis-
integrated into a contest among the rival blocs-labor, military, rural,
and a burgeoning state bureaucracy-whose conflicts grew increasingly
intense, who each understood that the "nation" properly belonged to
them, and whom Per6n could not possibly satisfy all at once.4 63
In both Southeast Asia and Latin America, the nationalism that
makes nationalization possible proves insufficient to sustain the national-
ized regime. Nationalization begins as an attempt to rid the postcolonial
nation of foreign elements, and to reclaim for the nation economic and
political power. But the "nation" on whose behalf nationalization makes
its claims is deeply problematic, and nationalization itself heightens the
divisions that make it so. In Southeast Asia, the rhetoric of unity is a thin
veneer over bitter religious, ethnic, political, and economic rivalries. In
Latin America, the nationalized sector, founded on a unity of all against a
supposedly pure-blooded elite, co-exists in uneasy tension with the free-
market sector of contending economic interests and a society in which
whiteness of skin continues to play a marked role in the apportionment
of political, economic, and social status.
As the economic results of nationalization worsen and the intrana-
tional divisions-racial, economic, political, and cultural-grow increas-
ingly intense, there ceases to be a "nation" that can be recognized as the
owner of the nationalized resources. Instead, the latter appear as exactly
what they (often) are: an enormous cache of wealth presided over by
incompetent or corrupt politicians, ultimately up for grabs, and sought by
every organized interest group-including the state itself-in what is
called the "nation."46 Once this stage has been reached, a nationalist
nationalization movement is no longer tenable, and privatization be-
comes the obvious attractive alternative.
The new privatizers promise to eliminate the inefficiencies and cor-
ruption of state ownership and to bring renewed prosperity.4 65 Addition-
ally, they promise a new, genuine national unity in contrast to the false
national unity proclaimed by the nationalizers. Thus, the Camacho re-
gime in Mexico, which immediately succeeded Cirdenas's administra-
461. Kenworthy, supra note 168, at 25.
462. Id. at 40.
463. See, e.g., Rock, supra note 168, at 305; Scobie, supra note 164, at 223.
464. See, e.g., Adam et al., supra note 6, at 216, 226; Penders, supra note 451, at 181;
Francisco E. Thoumi, Privatization in the Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago,
in Privatization of Public Enterprises in Latin America, supra note 5, at 99, 104-05.
465. See, e.g., John Barham, Argentina Scours the World for Investors, Fin. Times,
Aug. 22, 1991, at 23; Andrew Hurst, Deregulation in Latin America May Cut Corruption,
Reuters, Mar. 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, Alhvld File.
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tion, rested its privatizing policies expressly on a platform of "national
unity" and the need to prevent further national disintegration. 466 By sta-
bilizing the contest among the various social groups, and by calling for
the participation of each in a nationwide process of wealth creation,
privatization is to bring about true national harmony as it brings about
prosperity.467
As we know, however, privatization-despite its frequent economic
successes-reintroduces into the developing country a dependence on
foreign capital and expertise that gradually proves difficult to bear. At
the same time, the ethnic and economic rivalries to which nationalization
was in part a response are not in reality smoothed over in a new national
project of cooperative joint enterprise. Instead, the old divisions reap-
pear and worsen. The same ethnic minorities that previously prospered
under a free-market regime tend to do so again, and economic disparities
invariably increase.468 In privatized Southeast Asia, race riots against the
Chinese were common; in privatized Latin America, there are renewed
populist revolts against a wealthy, foreign-linked elite.469 Thus the priva-
tized regime leads back to the same nationalist urges-both against the
enemy without and the enemy within-that underlay the nationalization
programs to begin with.
IlL PossmiLE RESPONSES TO THE PRIVATIZATION-NATIONALIZATION CYCLE
In this Article, I have argued that many of the states of Latin America
and Southeast Asia today returning their economies to private hands
have, since independence, oscillated between free enterprise and nation-
alization, an oscillation fueled by nationalistic and ethnic forces as well as
economics. How might today's privatizers-in particular, American law-
yers and legal academics designing and implementing privatization pro-
466. See Miller, supra note 32, at 320-21. Similarly, Pinochet and Suharto insisted
that their respective coups against the nationalization regimes in Chile and Indonesia
aimed not only to rescue the economy, but also to restore unity to a country being torn
apart by factional violence (a goal apparently to be achieved by mass killing where
necessary). See, e.g., Brian Loveman, Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism 310-11,
350-52 (2d ed. 1988); Golay et al., supra note 190, at 199-200; Osborne, supra note 358, at
195-96; SarDesai, supra note 251, at 239.
467. Privatizers throughout the developing world today justify their policies by
reference to the social fragmentation accompanying the preceding nationalization
regimes. See, e.g., Adam et al., supra note 6, at 226-27; Pifiera & Glade, supra note 5, at
17, 26; cf. Robert S. Leiken, Routes of Region's Modernization Transcend Mexico's Woes,
Wall St. J.,Jan. 6, 1995, at A13 (asserting that with privatization and other market reforms
"a different sort of nationalism has emerged" in Latin America, "one which stresses
national opportunity rather than historical dependency and welcomes relations with the
U.S.").
468. See Yuen & Wagner, supra note 252, at 220.
469. See, e.g., PatrickJ. McDonnell, The Roots of Rebellion, L.A. Times, Mar. 6, 1994,
Magazine, at 30; Opening Shots: Revolt in Mexico, The Nation, Jan. 31, 1994, at 111;




grams-respond to this cycle? Obviously, there is no special formula for
ending the privatization-nationalization cycle. The forces driving the cy-
cle may be too strong or too delicate to be controlled by any measures
realistically available. At best, actual "solutions," to the extent any exist,
would have to vary across regions, countries, and industries and would
require carefully tailored research and innovations going far beyond the
narrow economic focus of today's privatization programs. The following
discussion includes a sketch of possible concrete measures that might be
undertaken, but the efficacy of such measures (either singly or in combi-
nation) remains in considerable doubt.
Generally speaking, three basic responses are possible: (1) doing
nothing; (2) designing regulations compatible with today's privatization
programs aimed at anticipating a nationalistic backlash; and (3) under-
taking structural political and legal reform. I will consider each approach
in turn.
A. The Invisible Hand
Several reasons might be offered for doing nothing in response to
the privatization-nationalization cycle. For example, Professor
Hirschman has suggested that "[i]n order to maximize growth the devel-
oping countries could need an appropriate alternation of contact and
insulation, of openness to the trade and capital of the developed coun-
tries, to be followed by a period of nationalism and withdrawnness." 4 70
Periods of openness to foreigners allow "crucial learning processes [to]
take place... [that] come to fruition only [when] contact is interrupted
or severely restricted .... Thus both contact and insulation have essential roles
to play, one after the other."47 '
Hirschman was referring in these passages specifically to foreign in-
vestment, but the broader cycle identified here (of which the vacillation
in favor of and against foreign capital is a part)472 might be considered in
a similar light. Thus the historical oscillation between privatization and
nationalization in developing countries could be understood as being
part of a difficult, halting, but nonetheless "essential" learning process. If
this were so, the appropriate response might be to allow the cycle to run
its course.
Even an advocate of this position would have to agree that the re-
peated oscillation between privatization and nationalization involves cer-
tain unrecoupable losses. Each swing entails the considerable transaction
costs of negotiation, economic and legal restructuring, and bureaucratic
reorganization. 473 To these costs must be added the unquantifiable but
470. Hirschman, supra note 330, at 25.
471. Id. at 25-26 (emphasis added).
472. See supra Part II.B.1.
473. Cf. Glade, supra note 7, at 1, 5 (noting "the process of privatization is not without
cost" and advocating "institutional mechanisms that reduce transaction costs"). Today, the
fees paid by governments of developing countries to foreign (usually American)
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potentially enormous costs associated with the destruction and violence
that in many cases accompany such swings.474 Further, each episode of
nationalization makes future privatization more expensive, 475 each epi-
sode of privatization makes future nationalization more expensive, 476 and
alternating between the two jeopardizes the already precarious legitimacy
of the governing institutions.477
More fundamentally, history indicates an astonishing lack of any dia-
lectical progress in the repeated vacillations from privatizing to national-
izing regimes and back again. Indeed, throughout Latin America and
Southeast Asia, the cycle has reflected not advance, but stagnation; not
education, but the replay of ignorant enmities and massacres; not more
justice, but the juggling of rhetoric while the rule of privilege for a few
and destitution for the rest remains constant. In sum, rather than follow-
ing an upward spiral, as Hirschman might have hoped, the privatization-
nationalization cycle has been pendular and unrelentingly unprogressive.
Another, related means ofjustifying a do-nothing approach is to in-
voke the invisible hand of the market. Most American lawyers and schol-
ars currently implementing and writing about privatization in the devel-
oping world take this approach. Under this view, the task facing today's
privatizers is to institute an efficient marketplace, stripping away as much
governmental intervention as possible, and letting the market thereafter
accountants, investment advisors, and lawyers in connection with a single privatization can
be in the millions of dollars. See Wendy Cooper & Harvey D. Shapiro, The Privatization of
Privatization, Institutional Investor (Int'l Ed.), Oct. 1991, at 87, 89; see also Saul Hansell,
Latin Finance Comes in from the Cold, Institutional Investor, Aug. 1991, at 79, 80
(describing "[g]old rush atmosphere" in Latin America and "gangs" of American
investment bankers "hustl[ingl for financings, privatizations and merger deals").
474. Thus, in Burma General Ne Win's nationalization program was accompanied by
the extirpation, and in some cases extermination, of the' Indian, Chinese, and other
"entrepreneurial" minorities. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 250-65; Smith, supra
note 265, at 219-23. In Mexico, Cf.rdenas's nationalizations represented the culmination
of a revolution that had wreaked havoc and bloodshed for over a decade. See supra text
accompanying notes 56-80. In Chile, General Pinochet's free-market vision went along
with notorious brutality, beginning with the assassination of Salvador Allende. See Robert
Corrigan, Chile: From Pariah to Economic Powerhouse, Investors Daily, Aug. 28, 1991,
available in LEXIS, News Library, US File.
475. See Adam et al., supra note 6, at 11. "Open-door" governments trying to attract
wary domestic and foreign investors often end up underpricing entities, providing "deal
sweeteners" or selling off "crown jewels"-at the expense of "the underlying fiscal,
efficiency, private sector and capital market objectives." Id. at 55, 57.
476. Privatizing governments hoping to attract foreign and domestic investment
typically enact or amend foreign investment laws to protect investors against expropriation.
See, e.g., Golay et al., supra note 190, at 236-37. In ensuing periods of nationalization,
such laws often become the basis of extremely costly litigation and settlement procedures.
See, e.g., Wright, supra note 63, at 71-73.
477. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 335, at 1-4, 28-32. Professor Horowitz has
noted in a related context: "To have failed once makes things more difficult the next time.
To have failed twice makes the next time problematic altogether." Donald L. Horowitz,




take care of itself.478
The difficulty here is that in the developing world, there may be
more than one invisible hand at work. Rational economic self-interest is
not the only, and perhaps not the strongest, fundamental motive operat-
ing within developing societies. As I have stressed throughout, ethnic
and national self-interest (or "group-interest") has been equally potent.
Alongside the universalistic rationality supposed by the market, there is
also the irrationality imposed by ethnic hatreds and desperate national-
isms that in some cases have existed for hundreds of years. This is the
invisible hand that steers societies not toward cooperation and prosperity,
but toward bloodshed and ruin.
A third argument in favor of ignoring the cycle is that this time
things are different. The collapse of the Soviet Union (one might argue)
has finally and thoroughly discredited nationalization; in addition,
changes in the local economies of developing countries, such as a larger
and better-educated middle class, will make these countries more recep-
tive to privatization. After all, if eighty-three countries are privatizing,479
something must be different.
That "everyone is privatizing"480 is hardly a guarantee of privatiza-
tion's success. In the 1930s, nationalization and other quasi-socialist poli-
cies swept various parts of the world, only to give way to swings to the
opposite economic extreme. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union,
if it has discredited anything, has discredited socialism; but as I have ar-
gued throughout, nationalism, not socialism, has been the primary force
driving developing countries to nationalize. 481 Further, I have precisely
tried to show that while there have obviously been social and economic
changes in the developing world since the last round of privatizations-
history never repeats itself exactly-things today ate not that different.
Ethnic hatred and nationalism still flourish, and today's privatization pro-
grams display an all-too-familiar blindness to these phenomena. ,
A final reason for doing nothing about the cycle might be that there
is nothing to be done-at least by lawyers. After all, I observed earlier
that the forces driving the cycle may overwhelm any practical efforts to
arrest them. In any event, it might be said, it is not the place of lawyers
implementing a privatization program to try to arrest the cycle. Whether
representing a private party or a government, the lawyer's job is to facili-
tate the transaction, not to introduce obstacles that might encumber the
privatization process.
Obviously, no legal reform is going to bring nationalism, ethnic ha-
tred, and class conflict to an end. Nevertheless, it remains the case that
478. See supra text accompanying notes 311-313.
479. See supra text accompanying note 2.
480. "'Everybody has come to the conclusion that privatization is the thing to do.'"
Cooper & Shapiro, supra note 473, at 87 (quoting Eamonn Butler, director of London's
Adam Smith Institute).
481. See supra text accompanying notes 326-329.
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American lawyers-both practitioners and academics-are today being
paid to design the fundamental legal and economic institutions of the
developing world to an extent unprecedented since decolonization. 482
This task creates not only an enormous opportunity483 but also a certain
responsibility. To the extent that privatizing lawyers focus exclusively on
short-term efficiency solutions, they will fail to serve their clients' best
interests. Today's privatizers, for the sake of the long-term stability of
their own programs, ought at least to try to adopt measures designed to
anticipate the forces that have led so often to the overthrow of free-mar-
ket policies. To such measures I now turn.
B. Re-regulation
A more thoughtful response to the privatization-nationalization cycle
would involve regulatory measures aimed at anticipating nationalistic
backlash. "[A]lthough privatization is normally associated with deregula-
tion,"484 there is no reason in principle why strong privatization programs
could not be accompanied by regulatory measures addressing the cycle in
various ways. "Re-regulation," as a few commentators have recognized,
may be an essential element of successful privatization plans in the devel-
oping world.4 5
Even for these commentators, "re-regulation" of developing-world
privatization principally means enacting laws "to strengthen the opera-
tion of the capital market,"486 to curb monopolistic behavior, 487 and
"[t]o ensure that newly privatized companies meet acceptable levels of
operational efficiency."488 Such proposals miss the larger point. Accord-
ing to my model, to have any chance of long-term success, privatizers
482. See David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short Happy Life of the Law and
Society Movement, 18 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 4, 21-23 (1990); Virginia Citrano, Shrinking
Governments Fatten City Firms, Crain's N.Y. Bus.,Jan. 11, 1993, at 11; Cooper & Shapiro,
supra note 473, at 87.
483. Professor Horowitz, writing about the connection between ethnic conflict and
democracy, has observed:
[M]ore than a few provision merchants from the United States have sold ready-
made constitutional clauses to Africans, Asians, and East Europeans eager for
their talismanic value, even though they had been fashioned for the conditions of
American democracy rather than their own. As the recent wave of
democratizations now runs its course, it is not too soon to say that a major
opportunity for constitutional planning for interethnic accommodation has
largely been lost.... This is a serious foreign policy failure for the United States
and for the Western world more generally.
Horowitz, Democracy in Divided Societies, supra note 477, at 18, 35.
484. Glade, supra note 7, at 1, 5.
485. See, e.g., Glade, supra note 7, at 5; Martinez, supra note 3, at 489, 505; Naim,
supra note 314, at 133; cf. Frydman & Rapaczynski, supra note 23, at 46-64 (discussing
possibility of re-regulation in Eastern Europe).
486. Glade, supra note 7, at 5.
487. See id.
488. Martinez, supra note 3, at 505.
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must also confront the core, often explosive, role nationalism has played
in driving developing countries back to nationalization.
Various kinds of regulations compatible with today's privatization
programs are possible. I will consider four main areas of regulation
below.
1. Ownership Restrictions. - One important regulatory strategy lies
in restricting the ownership of privatized entities. Where nationalism has
been directed principally against external foreigners, this strategy would
include restrictions on foreign investment. Where nationalism has been
directed at internal foreigners as well, this strategy might also include
minimum ownership requirements (set-asides) for certain groups within
the country.
Foreign investment regulation, although currently in place in many
developing countries, 489 runs counter to the thrust of today's commen-
tary as well as to the instincts of today's privatizers. Indeed, existing for-
eign ownership restrictions are invariably regarded as obstacles to success-
ful privatization. As commentators have noted, "The prospect of too little
rather than too large capital inflows is the worrisome prospect,"490 and
one should "do everything possible to get foreigners involved, that is for-
eign banks, foreign managers and foreign owners."491
There is no point debating whether private capital should play a sig-
nificant role in the developing world: it clearly will. Nor is there any
point debating whether foreign capital is helpful or harmful: it is clearly
both.492 The challenge is to structure the influx of private capital in gen-
eral, and foreign capital in particular, in such a way as to avoid an even-
tual nationalist reaction against it.
Privatizing lawyers ought to take a more measured view of ownership
restrictions. Prevalent though they are, the foreign ownership restric-
tions in developing countries were virtually without exception enacted by
previous nationalizing regimes.493 As a result, ownership restrictions
489. In many Latin American and Southeast Asian countries, foreign investment laws
prohibit foreigners from owning over 49% of enterprises in certain industries. See, e.g.,
Golay et al., supra note 190, at 190, 195-96 (discussing Indonesian Foreign Investment
Law of 1958); Wright, supra note 63, at 95-150 (discussing Mexican laws restricting foreign
investment).
490. Ulrich Hiemenz, Comment on Andris Inotai, "Experience with Privatization in
East Central Europe," in Privatization, supra note 314, at 183, 184; see also Martinez, supra
note 3, at 489 ("Some of the required measures include the elimination of restrictions on
trade, foreign exchange and foreign investment.").
491. Holger Schmieding, Alternative Approaches to Privatization: Some Notes on the
Debate, in Privatization, supra note 314, at 107; see also Adam et al., supra note 6, at 50;
David B. Hodgins, Mexico's 1989 Foreign Investment Regulations: A Significant Step
Forward, But Is It Enough?, 12 Hous. J. Int'l L. 361, 375 (1990).
492. It is by now standard for introductory economic development or international
law textbooks to include a chapter on the "pros and cons" of foreign capital in developing
countries. See, e.g., Todaro, supra note 333, at 400-07; Vagts, supra note 334, at 114-23.
493. See, e.g., Bums, supra note 150, at 81-82; Golay et al., supra note 190, at 190,
215; Wright, supra note 63, at 95-150.
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have almost never been thoughtfully integrated into a privatization pro-
gram. On the contrary, viewing such restrictions as misguided holdovers
from a defunct economic philosophy, privatizers have generally sought to
undermine them. The incentive for doing so is obvious. Dazzled by the
prospect of massive capital influx, privatizers have time and again under-
taken to abolish or to relax such restrictions, or, alternatively, to grant
"special dispensations" that eventually rendered them nugatory.
Indeed, this is precisely what many developing governments-ad-
vised by foreign investment bankers and lawyers-are seeking to do to-
day. In Mexico, for example, a recently enacted foreign investment regu-
lation 494 creates a general presumption that 100% foreign ownership of
privatized entities is permissible in the absence of special limitations. 495
And even where Mexican law provides such special limitations, the gov-
ernment has found ways around them. For example, while the Mexican
Constitution "reserves the public service of electricity production to the
state," President Salinas procured legislation in December 1992 declaring
many forms of electricity production to be "private service." 496 Foreign
investors are reportedly "jumping" at this invitation, and if current plans
are realized, within twelve years almost half of Mexico's electricity may be
supplied by private American firms.4 97
At the same time, the Mexican government has entered into highly
complex financing transactions to bypass constitutional restrictions
on foreign ownership in the oil industry. Although the Mexican
Constitution prohibits private investment, Mexican or foreign, in the oil
refining sector,498 foreign lenders "will hold title to a refinery soon to be
built in Salina Cruz... until the $1.4 billion construction loan is repaid,"
at which time ownership will revert to Pemex. 499 According to Pemex's
chief financial officer, "'This will be the first refinery within Mexico not
owned by Pemex.' -500 Further, "foreigners will lend $300 million to
Pemex under a new procedure, supervised by Citibank, that comes closer
than in the past to pledging Mexican oil as collateral"-"a practice out-
494. See Ignacio G6mez-Palacio, The New Regulation on Foreign Investment in
Mexico: A Difficult Task, 12 Hous. J. Int'l L. 253, 259 n.30, 260 n.32 (1990) (citing and
quoting Reglamento de la Ley para Promover la Inversi6n Mexicana y Regular la Inversi6n
Extranjera, D.O. (May 16, 1989)).
495. The new regulation, personally issued by President Salinas, see id. at 255, was
intended to "coincide with the requirements of NAFTA" and is part of "the recent trend
making foreign direct investment a more vital part of the Mexican economy." Stephen
Zamora, The Americanization of Mexican Law. Non-Trade Issues in the North American
Free Trade Agreement, 24 L. & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 391, 413 n.75, 414 (1993).
496. Dianna Solis, Foreign Investors Jumping at Mexico's Invitation to Help Boost
Power Capacity, Wall St.J., May 17, 1993, at A13.
497. See Martin Langfield, Mexico Relaxes Rules on Electricity Investment, J. Com.,
June 18, 1993, at 10B; Solis, supra note 496.
498. See Constituci6n politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos art. 27.
499. Louis Uchitelle, Pemex: Mexico's Hesitant Oil Giant, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1993,
at D1, D6.
500. Id. (quoting Ernesto Marcos, chief financial officer).
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lawed after Mexico nationalized the industry in 1938."501
Similarly, Brazil's privatizing government enacted new legislation
that, while nominally preserving foreign ownership restrictions during
the privatization process, permitted subsequent transfers of control to
foreigners after the privatization transaction had been completed.5 0 2
The Peruvian government recently enacted "wide-open free market rules
and a straightforward mining code" that, by one account, has "spurr[ed]
an international gold rush by prospectors into Peru."5 03 In Uruguay, the
government tried to do much the same thing in 1993, but failed, running
up against intense popular opposition.50 4 And in Argentina, the 1989
Public Sector Reform Law5 05 temporarily "declare[d] a state of emer-
gency for all public entities.., and suspend[ed] legal action against the
state for two years."50 6 This law, viewed as "a legal masterpiece," author-
ized the president to modify the legal status of state entities and to en-
force "equal treatment for domestic and foreign investors . . .without
further approval from the Congress."50 7
The same phenomenon can be seen in Southeast Asia. In Burma,
privatizers "desperate for foreign cash"508 enacted new legislation elimi-
nating foreign ownership restrictions in many sectors and easing them in
others.5 09 Philippine President Corazon Aquino, while acknowledging
the foreign ownership restrictions in the Philippine Constitution, none-
theless set an important tone when she declared in 1987, "Our policy, let
me repeat, is . . .one of equality towards Filipinos and foreigners who
wish to invest in the future of this country."51 0
Subverting or abolishing foreign ownership restrictions, although
potentially lucrative in the near term, is a shortsighted strategy. These
laws were enacted for a reason and should not be done away with casu-
ally. A case in point is Argentina's recent privatization of its national air-
line, Aerolineas Argentinas. The new "emergency" laws511 enabled the
Argentinian government to sell Aerolineas Argentinas to a consortium
501. Id.
502. See Werneck, supra note 162, at 68.
503. The Peru Business Report, supra note 142.
504. See Douglas Feiden, Overseas Operators: Telephone Privatization Plans Could
Boost Service, Costs, Crain's N.Y. Bus., July 19, 1993, at 14; Only Vasp Seeks to Buy Into
Uruguay Airline, supra note 183.
505. Ley 23.696 Reforma del Estado-Emergencia administrativa-Privatizaciones y
participaci6n del capital Privado, Anales de Legislaci6n Argentina (1989).
506. See Fraga, supra note 171, at 94.
507. Id.
508. Ben Barber, Burmese Junta Reforms Economy, But Not Rights, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Dec. 2, 1993, at 7.
509. See Burma: Economy Improves Considerably After Years of Decline, There Is
Some Hope for Better Bilateral Relations, Bus. Am., Nov. 15, 1993, at 20, 21-22.
510. Godinez, supra note 288, at 267.
511. President Menem has issued "more than 240 emergency decrees, 10 times as
many as all of his predecessors under the 1853 constitution." Jack Epstein, Brazil's
Economy Lagging Behind, S.F. Chron., Feb. 28, 1994, at AS.
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dominated by Spain's national airline, Iberia, sparking a "nationalistic
backlash to 'a new Spanish colonization' and ideological hostility to priva-
tization."5 12 This "botched" privatization, in which fifty-one percent of
the shares allegedly came under Spanish control, was followed in short
order by "the partial re-nationalization" of the airline.5 13
A related problem concerns the privatization of sectors that are par-
ticularly sensitive for historical reasons: for example, the teak industry in
Burma, the oil industry in much of Latin America, and the mining of
precious metals throughout the developing world.51 4 Attempting to
privatize these sectors indiscriminately, particularly without restrictions
on foreign ownership, would be foolhardy. For example, as noted above,
the Mexican government is again seeking ways to accomplish the "un-
thinkable": privatizing the oil sector.515 Indeed, the government has al-
ready offered its secondary petrochemical plants for sale to foreigners,
and it is now considering privatization of its oil pipelines.516 Likewise,
Peru is urging foreign investors to "dig in on [the] new Andes gold-rush";
according to a recent full-page advertisement, United States-based
Newmont Mining, "the first foreign investment start-up in Peruvian min-
ing for 20 years,. . . is racking up a million dollars a week in profits" at
the Yanacocha gold mine.517 In Burma, too, the long-xenophobic gov-
ernment has announced its "goal to attract foreign investment" to ex-
plore "Burma's treasure chest of mineral wealth" as well as its natural gas
and oil reserves. 518 While such familiar attempts to court foreign capital
at almost any price might well promote short-run growth in the mining
and oil industries, they are certain sooner or later to spur the same sort of
nationalist reaction observed in the past.
Ownership restrictions may be relevant in addressing inwardly di-
rected nationalism as well. In Latin America, where backlash against "in-
ternal foreigners" has assumed an anti-aristocratic form,519 the aim of
such restrictions would be to prevent reconcentration of ownership in the
hands of "a small ... European and mixed blood" elite.520 There are
512. Kamm, supra note 173, at Al; see Gelpern & Harrison, supra note 2, at 251-52.
Iberia also acquired significant stakes in both the Venezuelan and Chilean national
airlines. See Kamm, supra note 173, at Al.
513. Kamm, supra note 173, at Al, All. In 1992 the Argentine government increased
its share ownership in Aerolineas Argentinas from 5% to 43%. See id. at All.
514. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 158-60, 229; Miller, supra note 32, at 320-21.
515. Uchitelle, supra note 499, at D1; see Debra Beachy, Mexico Said to Be
Considering Privatization of Oil Pipelines, J. Com., Aug. 24, 1993, at 6B.
516. See B eachy, supra note 515, at 6B; Pemex Poised to Privatize Its Petrochemical
Plants, supra note 134, at 9A; Uchitelle, supra note 499, at Dl.
517. The Peru Business Report, supra note 142, at A15. Newmont Mining's chief
executive officer is quoted as saying, "Never before have we got this kind of enthusiasm
and support from a government." Id.
518. Burma, supra note 509, at 21.
519. See supra text accompanying notes 388-397.
520. Tim Golden, Rebels Determined 'to Build Socialism' in Mexico, N.Y. Times, Jan.
4, 1994, at A3.
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various ways to accomplish this. One straightforward step would be to
limit the number of shares purchasable by any single person or family. In
Jamaica, to address "the intense opposition" of the People's Nationalist
Party to the privatization of the National Commercial Bank ("NCB"), the
government imposed "a 7.5% limit on the total shareholding to be ac-
quired by any individual" and priced the public issue "conservatively."
5 2
'
" [T] his strategy was successful in attracting a large number of new players
into the equity market ... "52
A more ambitious strategy would involve so-called capitalismo popular
("popular capitalism") sales, in which small local investors are en-
couraged to participate in the privatization process through government
subsidies.523 In Chile's partial privatization of Empresa Nacional de
Electricidad ("Endesa"), the country's largest utility company, small inves-
tors were offered "fifteen years of interest-free loans on 95 percent of the
investment (with a 30 percent discount if payments were made on time)
and tax breaks."5 24 Thus far, no countries in Latin America other than
Chile have considered seriously the possibility of privatizing through
capitalismo popular.
525
Also instructive here are the "mass privatization" programs currently
being undertaken in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Gen-
erally speaking, these programs contemplate a distribution, through
vouchers, of shares in the privatizing company to the local population.
52 6
Although the use of vouchers may not be appropriate or necessary in
Latin America, where an existing capital market is already in place,
the underlying notion of "popularizing privatization" may be equally
important.
Once again, regulations such as these would run counter to the pure
free-market philosophy currently in fashion. Measures to disperse share
ownership invariably reduce the proceeds received by the privatizing gov-
ernment.5 27 In Jamaica's case, "the promotion of wider share ownership
... reduced NCB's potential efficiency by locking in a sub-optimal level of
management monitoring (resulting from the free-rider problem in infor-
mation collection implicit in a widespread shareholding)."528 Moreover,
"mass privatization" programs of the sort now being attempted in Eastern
Europe are difficult to implement; they have, for example, significantly
delayed the privatization process in countries like Poland and the former
Czechoslovakia. 52 9
521. Adam et al., supra note 6, at 54.
522. Id.
523. See, e.g., Pifiera & Glade, supra note 5, at 22, 31-32.
524. Id. at 22.
525. See id.
526. See generally Roman Frydman et al., The Privatization Process in Central Europe
(1993).
527. See Adam et al., supra note 6, at 54-55.
528. Id. at 54.
529. See Schmieding, supra note 491, at 97, 106.
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Nevertheless, privatizers who ignore the issue of ownership distribu-
tion do so at their peril. Ominously familiar is the recent charge by a
Mexican columnist that "[t]he booty of privatization has made multimil-
lionaires of 13 families, while the rest of the population-some 80 mil-
lion Mexicans-has been subjected to the same gradual impoverishment
as though they had suffered through a war."530 Nor is it coincidental that
the leaders of the fierce resistance that took place at Chiapas early in
1994 framed their struggle as "the timeless one of poor Indians against
'the rich,'" and declared repeatedly that "[t]he people must rule
Mexico."531
In Southeast Asia, where nationalism has been directed against dis-
tinct ethnic minorities, the situation is more complicated and perhaps
more intractable. One intriguing approach here would be to tie priva-
tization to measures distributing ownership to indigenous groups that his-
torically have been disadvantaged during free-market periods. Such
measures would include share set-asides for the relevant ethnic or racial
groups. As described earlier, a program of this sort is currently in place
in Malaysia. Consistent with affirmative action policies adopted during
the previous nationalizing government, ownership of privatized entities
must be at least seventy percent Malaysian (as opposed to foreign), of
which at least thirty percent must be owned by Bumiputra.5 32
Such set-asides are not only costily in terms of short-term efficiency,
as commentators like to point out,5 33 but morally controversial as well.
There is a genuine danger that they will serve only to legitimize and en-
courage bigotry. In America, a quota limiting corporate ownership by
successful minorities-say, Jews or Asians-would surely prompt horri-
530. Anthony DePalma, Mexico Sells Off State Companies, Reaping Trouble as Well
as Profit, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1993, atAl, A8 (quoting from Alvaro Cepada Neri's column
in LaJornada). In the same vein, even as privatization in Mexico was resulting in hundreds
of thousands of layoffs, Fortune magazine ranked one of the new Mexican owners of
Telmex the sixty-eighth wealthiest person in the world. See id.
In Chile and Argentina too, the popular consensus is that "the benefits of record
growth rates and lucrative privatization deals have not trickled down very far." Epstein,
supra note 511, at AS. By at least one account, in Argentina "unemployment is at a historic
high, the gap between rich and poor is growing, and growth is restricted to Buenos Aires
and three other industrial cities." Id.; see Paula Green, Argentina Squeezes Its Middle
Class, Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 29, 1993, at 2.
531. Golden, supra note 520, at A3.
532. See Adam et al., supra note 520, at 228.
533. -"The linking of privatization and the New Economic Policy will... make the
progress of the privatization programme even more difficult, as it reduces the chances of
finding entrepreneurs with the capital as well as the managerial and technical skills to run
the privatized companies." Yuen & Wagner, supra note 252, at 220. As a result of the NEP
affirmative action policies, "asset ownership is broad, [but] assets are systematically
underpriced and risks massively underwritten by public sector institutions, thereby
compromising the underlying fiscal, efficiency, private sector and capital market objectives
of... [Malaysia's privatization] programme." Adam et al., supra note 6, at 57.
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fled protest.53 4 But our instinctive aversion to policies that discriminate
on the basis of ethnicity may not graft cleanly onto Third World societies.
Whatever one thinks of set-asides in advanced countries, in the socially-
riven nations of Southeast Asia, where extermination has at times been
commonplace, 53 5 such second-best solutions may be the best options
available. The Chinese in Malaysia, for example, might well prefer to
be limited to seventy percent ownership of privatized enterprises than
to have their assets appropriated in a subsequent round of
nationalization. 536
More important, indigenous ownership requirements may be a
means of forcing representatives of deeply antagonistic groups into posi-
tions of economic alliance and interdependence. In Indonesia, for ex-
ample, little seems to have changed since the extermination of one-half
million Chinese two decades ago5 37 : it is still the view on the streets that
"[e]ven foreign ownership would be more acceptable than privatization
that primarily favours [the country's minority Chinese] ethnic group."538
Although state-dictated joint ventures are hardly exemplars of racial
harmony, they may be one way to initiate a process of interracial
accommodation.
Whether directed at the external or internal aspect of nationalism,
ownership restrictions are prey to circumvention problems. A strong reg-
ulatory framework would have to be in place to police secret transfers, or
front-man schemes such as the "Ali-Baba" arrangements in Malaysia (less
prevalent today), in which Chinese businessmen collude with Bumiputra
front men who "have no role in the enterprise beyond collecting a fee for
534. It should be observed, however, that the Malaysian program still allows Chinese
and Indian ethnic minorities to be-majority owners and arguably is more analogous to an
affirmative action program for disadvantaged ethnic groups.
535. See, e.g., Golay et al., supra note 190, at 199-200 (noting that furious anti-
Chinese drive during Suharto's regime was punctuated by frequent and violent rioting);
Osborne, supra note 358, at 195-96 (noting that at least 250,000 Chinese were killed
during Indonesian upheaval of 1965-1966).
536. One might view indigenous ownership requirements as a form of security for the
targeted minority. For example, in Malaysia, the Bumiputra minority owners of privatized
entities are "hostages" of the Chinese majority owners: because they are "of value" to the
Bumiputra government and community, they are a way of securing the government's
"promise" to perform its part of the privatization "contract"-by not turning around and
renationalizing. See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L.
Econ. & Org. 5, 12-15 (1985); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using
Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 519 (1983).
537. See Golay et al., supra note 190, at 200; SarDesai, supra note 251, at 244.
538. Yuen & Wagner, supra note 252, at 220 (citing Indonesia Business Digest
(1987)). Indonesia's current Research and Technology Minister, B.J. Habibie, who many
think will eventually succeed Suharto as president, "'appeals to indigenous Indonesian
professionals, who would like to take control of the industrial and technological side of the
economy they feel is too dominated by the Chinese.'" Raphael Pura, Technology Guru
Stands Out in Indonesia, Wall St. J., .Nov. 21, 1994, at B6D (quoting Islamic leader
Abdurrahman Wahid). The ethnic Chinese in Indonesia fear that Habibie would
encourage a return to more extreme economic nationalism. See id.
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the use of their name."539 As discussed below, 540 the kind of accountable
administrative structure necessary to this task might not be feasible in
developing countries without thoroughgoing institutional reform. Never-
theless, today's privatizers should regard ownership restrictions not as an-
tithetical to the goals of privatization but as integral to an enduring priva-
tization program.
2. Rate, Service, and Product Regulation. - In addition to regulating
ownership, developing states should consider requiring private and, in
particular, foreign investors to bring tangible and prompt benefits to the
local population. To be effective, these requirements would have to be
enumerated in detail, perhaps as part of the terms of sales agreements or
operating licenses. Moreover, such requirements should be easily en-
forceable, either by penalty or, in egregious circumstances, by revocation.
The regulations governing the new owners of Tel6fonos de M6xico
("Telmex") are useful here. Under both the relevant telecommunication
laws and the purchase agreement, the new owners of Telmex-subsidiar-
ies of Southwestern Bell and France Cables & Wire arid a Mexican invest-
ment bank-must comply with the terms of a detailed operating conces-,
sion. The concession in turn requires Telmex "to expand, improve and
modernize its telephone network" in ways specifically intended to benefit
Mexican consumers.541 In particular, Telmex must increase the number
of lines in service by a specified annual percentage, expand telephone
service to sparsely populated (and hence unprofitable) rural areas, in-
crease the density of public telephone booths, and "reduce the maximum
waiting time for installation of telephone service ... to six months by
1995 and to one month by the year 2000."542 Telmex is also required to
comply with a rate cap, which beginning in 1997 "will be adjusted down-
ward periodically to pass on the benefits of increased productivity to the
Company's customers."545
While a few commentators have pressed for performance standards
in the context of developing country privatizations, once again the sug-
gested measures have been directed at ensuring "operational effi-
ciency."544 By contrast, some or all of the regulations I am proposing will
likely be less than optimally efficient from the short-run perspective.
Their costs, moreover, may be passed along to Mexican telephone users
or, ultimately, to Mexican taxpayers. The point, nevertheless, is to avoid
the spectacle of a privatized company-particularly a public utility or
539. Horowitz, supra note 189, at 666.
540. See infra Part III.C.
541. Final Prospectus of Tel6fonos de M6xico, S.A. de C.V., supra note 137, at 38.
542. Id.
543. Id. at 37. To be sure, such requirements are not always met. See Gregory Katz,
Promise of Mexico's Phone System Remains Unfulfilled, J. Com., Mar. 23, 1993, at 12A.
Still, the penalties prescribed for noncompliance exert significant financial pressure on
newly privatized companies to do so. See, e.g., Final Prospectus of Telffonos de M6xico,
S.A. de C.V., supra note 137, at 38-39.
544. Martinez, supra note 3, at 505.
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public carrier-now in the hands of foreigners and a few wealthy domes-
tic elite, reaping enormous profits without conferring corresponding
benefits on the general populace. Waiting for the trickle down is not
sound strategy in the developing world. The benefits of privatization
must be spread as widely as possible, as quickly as possible, and as visibly
as possible.
3. Environmental Regulations. - For similar reasons, privatizing gov-
ernments would be well advised, at least in certain industries, to build
environmental regulations into their programs. Charges of "ecological
colonialism" have become increasingly prevalent in recent years.5 45 Ex-
amples are plentiful of local backlash against developed nations "export-
ing pollution" to the developing world.5 46 If today's privatizers wishto
guarantee a (externally directed) nationalist reaction, they would do well
to oversee the construction of a foreign-owned petrochemical plant send-
ing a steady stream of income north and pollutants south.
4. Regulations Protecting Labor. - It is well known that privatization
programs, in trying to redress the inefficiencies and excesses of state-own-
ership, often result in significant layoffs, as well as in reductions in pen-
sions and other benefits.5 47 Moreover, low-wage labor is one of the most
attractive features for foreign capital in the developing world. These cir-
cumstances make the handling of labor a delicate and volatile aspect of
privatization programs.
One-sided solutions in favor of labor-for example, flatly prohibit-
ing worker dismissals or requiring high severance payments-are prob-
lematic. Not only do they undercut potential efficiency gains, but they
also run the risk of stymieing privatization efforts altogether. The costs of
appeasing labor "could reduce the firm's potential profit levels to the
point at which ownership is not worthwhile" to any prospective buyers at
all.548
At the same time, labor cannot be viewed as an irritating obstacle to
privatization to be dismissed as quickly and costlessly as possible. For ex-
545. Soviet Ties Venture to Pollution Control, Chi. Trib.,July 10, 1989, at 2C (quoting
Valentin Katasonov, Soviet economist).
546. The 1984 Bhopal gas leak that killed nearly 3,000 Indian citizens provides
perhaps the most dramatic example of such local reaction. In 1987, the government of
India filed criminal charges (including homicide) against Union Carbide and certain
employees in response to public outrage at an anticipated civil settlement. See, e.g., Paul
Richter, India Accuses Carbide of Homicide in Bhopal Deaths, L. Times, Dec. 2, 1987, at
14. In Latin America, local resentment and retaliation against the foreign businesses that
have ravaged the Amazon rain forests are also well documented. See, e.g., Roger D. Stone,
The Nature of Development 75-77 (1992) (describing deforestation of Amazon rain
forest). For other examples, see Merrill Goozner, Court Hands Japan Environmental
Setback, Chi. Trib., July 14, 1992, at 4 (Japanese mining venture shut down by Malaysian
court because company's radioactive waste poisoned local villagers); Marlise Simons,
Concern Rising Over Harm from Pesticides in Third World, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1989, at
C4 (noting recent gains by environmentalists to limit export of pesticides to third world).
547. See, e.g., L. Gray Cowan, Privatization in the Developing World 38-39 (1990).
548. Id. at 41.
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ample, those who argue that worker participation should be rejected "for
good and well-known reasons of efficiency"549 are taking a dangerously
ahistorical view. The squalid conditions of labor surrounding foreign-
owned plants galvanized nationalization movements in the past,5 50 and
signs of similar resentment are already present today. In the last few
years, there have been strikes by workers in Uruguay, the Philippines, and
elsewhere protesting privatization.551 Indeed, in Thailand hostile
"[tirade union leaders of Thai state enterprises have even set up a 'watch-
dog' committee in order to monitor any move" toward privatization.552
Under these conditions, it is important for today's privatizers to avoid the
appearance and reality of foreign investors (whether external or internal)
exploiting the local laboring populace.
Among the measures to be considered here are minimum wage,
maximum hour, and worker safety regulations-of the sort that investors
routinely accept in the developed world but are eager to dispense with in
developing nations. Another possibility is including labor in the privatiza-
tion process. In connection with the Telmex privatization, a percentage
of the company's shares was allocated to a trust for the benefit of Telmex
employees.555 And in the case of a few small companies, full employee
buyouts have been possible; Chile's Empresa Chilena de Computaci6n e
Informdtica, for example, was privatized through a sale to its employ-
ees.554 Meanwhile, many commentators have advocated job retraining
for employees laid off as a result of privatization,55 5 "educational cam-
paigns" to enlighten labor "on the meaning of privatization,"55 6 and un-
employment insurance.55 7
C. Structural Reform
The ultimate goal of the various regulatory measures discussed above
is to disperse the benefits of privatizations to an extent far greater than
has been done in the past. Such measures, however, while perhaps neces-
sary to arrest the cycle, may well be insufficient to do so. The longstand-
ing social divisions, governmental corruption, and lack of political ac-
countability common to developing countries can undermine the best-
laid regulatory schemes. Absent far more systematic institutional reform,
549. Schmieding, supra note 491, at 97.
550. See supra text accompanying note 342.
551. See Craig Dunlap, Uruguay Port Strike Enters Second Week, J. Com., Dec. 13,
1991, at B12; Yuen & Wagner, supra note 252, at 219.
552. Yuen & Wagner, supra note 252, at 219.
553. See Final Prospectus of Telffonos de Mexico, SA de C.V., supra note 137, at
34-35.
554. See Pifiera & Glade, supra note 5, at 29.
555. See Cowan, supra note 547, at 45 (noting that retraining should be carefully
targeted at meeting specific prospective employment needs).
556. Id. at 42.
557. See Maskin, supra note 314, at 118 (advocating unemployment insurance rather
than "the inefficient device of requiring firms to employ a certain number of workers").
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the forces that have driven the privatization-nationalization cycle for a
hundred years will likely persist. Although such -reform extends well be-
yond the scope of this Article, let me briefly outline the principal issues
here.
The critical arena for institutional reform in the developing world is
the state itself. Lawyers and economists working on privatizations in the
formerly socialist countries have uniformly recognized the need for thor-
oughgoing "institutional reform" because of the lack of a market system
and of anything but the most rudimentary framework for holding and
transferring private property.558 By contrast, the relatively well-estab-
lished capital, equity, and commercial markets of the developing world 559
have given rise to an impression among today's privatizers that funda-
mental institutional reform is unnecessary-that privatization is "revolu-
tion" enough.560 In fact, while the developing nations may require less
economic restructuring than the formerly socialist states, they are in need
of at least as much political restructuring.561
While American lawyers and economists working on developing-
world privatization usually presuppose a "'technocratic framework',
which assumes a benevolent and well-informed government, with altruis-
tic policymakers maximizing some social utility function subject to 'nor-
mal' (that is, resource and technological) constraints," 562 some commen-
tators have stressed that these assumptions are particularly misleading in
the developing world. Time and again, the governments of developing
nations have become personal fiefdoms for individual leaders. Even with
respect to the more advanced governments of Latin America, more
thoughtful commentators have recognized that the idea of a "techno-
cratic" state is less apt than that of a "predatory state."565
If privatization is not going to degenerate into privateering in the
developing world, reform of the predatory state will eventually be neces-
sary. Such reform is more than a matter of creating a reliable electoral
process. While many of today's commentators reflexively call for a reduc-
tion of the state apparatus and a minimum of state intervention in the
private sector, this developed world agenda is not wholly suited to devel-
oping nations. These nations require what Professor Theda Skocpol calls
"state-building"56 even as they relinquish state ownership. There will
have to be a functioning and accountable bureaucracy, capable of enforc-
ing the regulatory frameworks essential to the distribution of privatiza-
558. See Frydman & Rapaczynski, supra note 23, at 168-77; Andrds Inotai, Experience
with Privatization in East Central Europe, in Privatization, supra note 314, at 163, 163;
Winiecki, supra note 325, at 71-73.
559. See Winiecki, supra note 325, at 73.
560. See Pifiera & Glade, supra note 5, at 19.
561. See Winiecki supra note 325 at 73-75.
562. Id. at 73; Lal, supra note 336, at 276-77.
563. See Winiecki, supra note 325, at 73.
564. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions 291 (1979).
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tion's benefits. To the extent that such regulations simply become an-
other opportunity for rent-seeking,565 so will privatization itself.
In addition, the introduction of much more sophisticated social se-
curity, tax, and unemployment programs may be another crucial ingredi-
ent of political reform, because of the potential for such programs to ease
the transition to privatization and to redistribute the benefits thereof.
Elaborate social welfare programs would probably be fiascos in the devel-
oping world given the existing administrative conditions. Yet they may be
necessary if privatization is to endure.
In the Southeast Asian context, the problems of structural reform go
beyond state-building. The characteristic Southeast Asian fissure between
political and economic power, with an indigenous majority holding the
former and a resented "entrepreneurial" minority holding the latter, will
create profound strains for any privatization program. I have suggested
above that the prospect for breaking out of the privatization-nationaliza-
tion cycle may well be bleaker in Southeast Asia than in Latin America.566
The more nationalism is bound up with hatred among genuinely distinct
ethnic groups-the more it is rooted in the hysteria of tribalism or ra-
cism-the more intractable it is likely to be.
All the more reason, therefore, why today's privatizers must think
carefully about integrating economic reform with broader social and
political reform. Specialists addressing ethnic conflict have over the years
considered solutions ranging from partition or secession, 567 "on the fre-
quently spurious ground that it will create ethnic homogeneity,"568 to in-
ternational integration, on the ground that it will create greater heteroge-
neity.56 9 Others have argued persuasively that while proposals such as
partition or secession have a dramatic, visionary quality to them, they are
also unrealistic.570 Professor Donald Horowitz proposes "measures to
contain, limit, channel, and manage ethnic conflict, rather than to eradi-
cate it or to aim at either a massive transfer of loyalties or the achieve-
ment of some consensus."571 His proposals include "alter[ing] ethnic
balances and alignments" through federalism and territorial design or
using "electoral innovation . . . as a vehicle for ethnic accommoda-
tion."57 2 Implementing such "structural half-measures" with any hope of
success would require intensive study and innovations going far beyond
the efficiency-oriented focus of today's privatizers.
565. See Winiecki, supra note 325, at 73-74.
566. See supra note 532 and accompanying text.
567. See, e.g., RobertA. Dahl, Polyarchy 121 (1971); Nathaniel H. Leff, Bengal, Biafra
and the Bigness Bias, Foreign Pol'y, Summer 1971, at 129, 135-39.
568. Horowitz, supra note 189, at 592.
569. See id.
570. See, e.g., id. at 599.
571. Id. at 599-600.
572. Id. at 613, 629.
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The analysis of cyclicality set forth in Part II and the possible re-
sponses thereto discussed in this Part may well have applications beyond
the context of Latin America and Southeast Asia. Many of the developing
nations of Africa (for example, Kenya, Nigeria, and Chad) and the
Caribbean (for example, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic) have
committed themselves-in rhetoric if not yet in practice-to privatiza-
tion.573 These nations have much in common with those of Latin
America and Southeast Asia. They are all postcolonial, "underdeveloped"
countries, in many cases with a similar historical background.574 More
significantly, these countries are marked by the same kind of grave "cleav-
ages along linguistic, religious, and racial-tribal lines" that characterize
Latin American and Southeast Asian nations.575 Economically successful
but "politically impotent" Lebanese, Indian, and Arab minorities have
long been targets of resentment throughout Africa and the Caribbean.
576
These regions are almost certainly prey to the same nationalization-priva-
tization cycle described here.
Nor are the lessons of this Article limited to the developing world.
The nationalist model of privatization and nationalization I have ad-
vanced will be relevant wherever the forces of the marketplace favor par-
ticular, ethnically identifiable groups, and wherever an ethnically charged
nationalism can be harnessed by leaders seeking to overturn a free-mar-
ket regime. Although this Article has not addressed Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union,577 many of the countries in these regions-the
former Yugoslavia offers perhaps the saddest example-are as riven by
ethnic hatreds as the nations of Southeast Asia.578 Indeed, throughout
the former communist bloc, many of the targets of ethnic cleansing have
been groups that historically have prospered disproportionately during
periods of free enterprise. 579 Here, too, the privatization-nationalization
cycle observable in developing countries, while perhaps not directly appli-
cable,580 may nonetheless hold important lessons.
581
573. See, e.g., Adam et al., supra note 6, at 102-03, 107-75, 323-51 (Jamaica and
Kenya privatization case studies).
574. For example, many of the nations of the Caribbean, like those of Latin America,
were Spanish colonies that achieved independence in the nineteenth century. See, e.g.,
Anderson, supra note 327, at 48-53; Bushnell & Macaulay, supra note 29, at 3-12.
575. Hirschman, supra note 330, at 14; see Democracy in Divided Societies, supra
note 477, at 18, 21-22.
576. See Anderson, supra note 327, at 116.
577. Many of these countries, struggling with inchoate market systems, lack of
investment capital, food shortages, and so on, might also be labeled "developing"
countries.
578. See, e.g., Democracy in Divided Societies, supra note 477, at 23-25.
579. See, e.g., William Pfaff, Invitation to War, Foreign Aff., Summer 1993, at 97, 103.
580. As noted above, the nationalization programs pursued by the countries of
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union since the Second World War were principally
driven by socialism, serving as a vehicle for a full Marxist overhauling of the economy. See




I have argued in this Article that many of the developing countries of
Latin America and Southeast Asia currently privatizing have, since inde-
pendence, looked to private-enterprise regimes as a cure for their social
and economic problems, only to lurch back to nationalization in a burst
of nationalist, and often ethnically charged, reaction.582 Moreover, Latin
America and Southeast Asia are not the only regions likely to be subject
to the privatization-nationalization cycle. 583
those of Latin America (with the exception of Cuba) and Southeast Asia (with the
exception of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) enough to require a separate analysis.
China, too, while now experimenting with forms of privatization, has a history and
social structure so different from the regions I have discussed as to merit a separate
exploration. I briefly observe here that China differs from the nations of Southeast Asia in
at least three noteworthy respects. First, China is not a postcolonial nation; indeed, it is a
quintessentially imperialist nation. See Anderson, supra note 327, at 158-63. Second, as
in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, nationalization in China was part of a
thoroughgoing rejection of a market system. See, e.g., Jacques Gernet, A History of
Chinese Civilization 663-68 (1982). Finally, with "the vast majority of the population"
(approximately 19 out of 20 people) belonging to the "Han" people, id. at 12, China is not
nearly as ethnically stratified as the Southeast Asian nations, although animosities along
north-south, mainland-overseas, and provincial lines may have interesting implications that
should be explored elsewhere. To the extent that nationalism in China has had an ethnic
component, it has, as in the United States, been targeted at politically and economically
impotent non-Han minorities, such as Tibetans, Uighurs, and Miao. SeeJohn IL Fairbank,
China 23-25 (1992); Gernet, supra, at 13.
581. There may also be countries for which my model has little if any relevance, at
least at the moment. For example, I have not focused on privatizing countries in the
developed world, such as France, Great Britain, or Spain, not because these countries have
clearly avoided cyclicality-they may not have. Cf. Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast,
Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in
Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. Econ. Hist. 803 (1989) (discussing episodes of
nationalization in seventeenth-century England); John M. Veitch, Repudiations and
Confiscations by the Medieval State, 46J. Econ. Hist. 31 (1986) (discussing property rights
of individuals in medieval Europe). Rather, I have not discussed developed Western
countries here because the nationalist model of privatization and nationalization I have
proposed most clearly applies to postcolonial nations deeply divided along ethnic and
economic lines.
582. A few countries in Latin America and Southeast Asia were not discussed in this
Article. Cuba, after following a historical pattern initially similar to other Latin American
nations-a long period of economic liberalism followed by the nationalization of foreign-
dominated industries-under Fidel Castro turned toward Soviet-style communism quite
distinct from the others. See generally Conflict and Change in Cuba (Enrique A. Baloyra
&James A. Morris eds., 1993); Cuba (Leslie Bethell ed., 1993). The same is true of the
Southeast Asian nations, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Although geographically,
historically, and sociologically similar to their neighbors-as elsewhere in Southeast Asia,
the Chinese historically dominated the economies of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and
were much resented by the "indigenous" populations-these countries ultimately followed
a starkly different historical course, for reasons that are beyond the scope of this work.
See, e.g., Osborne, supra note 358, at 158-63, 181-85; SarDesai, supra note 251, at 177-85,
189-92.
583. See supra text accompanying notes 573-581.
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PRIVATIZATION-NATIONALIZATION CYCLE
Two overarching forces seem to drive this phenomenon: markets
and ethnicity. Ultimately, the point of this Article is that these two power-
ful forces may be in deep tension with one another. In fact, contrary to
received wisdom, market solutions in developing countries appear actu-
ally to aggravate ethnic hatreds, which in turn subvert market solutions.
It is by now commonplace to recognize that a free market has both a
utopian and dystopian aspect.5 8 4 Montesquieu wrote, "wherever there is
commerce, manners are gentle."5 85 And Thomas Paine: "The invention
of commerce ... is the greatest approach towards universal civilization
that has yet been made."5 6 Against this eighteenth-century vision, there
has long been a counter-vision vilifying markets as promoting selfishness,
rampant egoism, a culture of instantaneous gratification, and so on.587
What has been overlooked in this debate about the effect of the mar-
ket on individual relations is its effect on the relations among ethnically
differentiated-or differentiable-groups. Here the dichotomy of civility
versus egoism is inapposite. Where a free market produces groups of vic-
tors and losers defined or definable along ethnic lines, private enterprise
may result in a deep exacerbation of volatile social divisions, even if it
enhances cooperative civility within each rival group. In such a society,
the operation of the market cannot be regarded as creating a new sort of
individual, whether civilized or egoistic. It rather entrenches the most
ancient sort of individual-the one who identifies himself with his tribe
or race, perceiving all others as aliens and enemies-and the most an-
cient sort of group relations.
584. See generally Albert 0. Hirschman, Rival Views of Market Society and Other
Recent Essays 105-06 (1986).
585. Charles L. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 338 (Anne M. Cohler et al. trans.
& eds., 1989) (1768).
586. Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man 234-35 (Henry Collins ed., 1969).
587. See, e.g., Samuel T. Coleridge, 6 The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor
Coleridge: Lay Sermons 169-70 (R.J. White ed., 1972); Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to
Growth 117-18, 137-51 (1976); see generally Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, The
Communist Manifesto (Frederick Engels ed., Int'l Publishers 1948) (1848).
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